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Extraordinary Rendition: A Study of the ‘Gaps’ in the International 
Legal Framework  
 
R.M.Grozdanova 
 
Following 9/11, the prevention and pre-emption of acts of terrorism has become a 
priority at domestic and international level. The immediate legislative and political 
responses of countries such as the US and the UK are illustrative of the preference for 
more expansive national security policies over effective protection of individual 
human rights and civil liberties. In this context, national security has become much 
more strongly associated with pre-empting and preventing acts of terrorism. 
Expansive counter-terrorism programmes such as the high value detainee programme 
including extraordinary rendition were developed in order to facilitate this push for 
pre-emption and prevention. 
Extraordinary rendition in its post 9/11 construct has become a euphemism for the 
irregular transfer of individuals across borders for the purposes of their 
incommunicado detention and enhanced interrogation in conditions that constitute 
multiple violations of human rights, including the right to be free from torture. It is, 
thus, a complex phenomenon, comprising of grave and multiple violations of 
international obligations, and severely challenging the perception that international 
human rights law has the capacity to effectively protect individual rights and 
particularly to uphold the absolute, jus cogens character of the prohibition against 
torture.  
However, while certain elements of the international and human rights frameworks 
may have lend themselves to hyper legalistic exploitation for the purposes of the ‘War 
on Terror’, human rights adjudicatory bodies such as the European Court of Human 
Rights and the UN Human Rights Committee have tried to resist the challenge posed 
by expansive counter-terrorism practices and have shown the strength within the 
human rights framework.  
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The Uniqueness of 9/11 – Prevention, Pre-Emption and 
Securitisation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following 9/11, the prevention and pre-emption of acts of terrorism has become a 
priority at domestic and international1  level. Through Resolutions such as 1368,2 
1373,3 16244 and most recently 2249,5 the UN Security Council (UNSC) has urged 
states to take “all necessary” measures to prevent acts of terrorism both individually 
and collectively.6 Some of the measures suggested have included more traditional 
counter-terrorism methods such as bi- and multi-lateral agreements to prevent and 
supress acts of terrorism as well as bi- and multi-lateral sharing of intelligence 
information on movement of individuals within a country and across borders.7 The 
UNSC additionally placed emphasis on more contemporary methods of countering 
terrorism such as the freezing of funds, assets and any other economic resources of 
individuals suspected of or having committed acts of terrorism.8 The Security Council 
Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) was specifically created to improve the ability 
of UN Member States to prevent terrorist acts within and outside their own country as 
                                               
1  Despite the number of signed Conventions prohibiting certain acts of terrorism in discrete 
circumstances there is however no single codified definition of terrorism in international law.  
2 This Resolution was adopted on 12 September 2001 in the immediate aftermath of the events of 
September 11. The Resolution referred to the events of the previous day as an ‘act of international 
terrorism’ and thus a ‘threat to international peace and security’. Full text available at: 
http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
3 Adopted on 28 September 2001, this Resolution expressly reaffirmed Resolutions 1269 (1999) and 
1368 (2001). Full text available at http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
4 Adopted on 14 September 2005 two months after the events on 7 July 2005 in the United Kingdom. 
Full text available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2005.shtml [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
5 Adopted on 20 November 2015 following the attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. Full text 
available at http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/2015.shtml [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
6 There currently are 32 Security Council Resolutions adopted between September 2001 and December 
2015 addressing, condemning or prohibiting acts of terrorism, the full list is available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/resources/res-sc.html [last accessed 30 March 2016].  
7 UN Security Council Resolution 1373. 
8 See further the text of Resolutions such as 1373 and 1624. In addition, in accordance with state 
obligations under Resolution 1373, the global initiative of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate (CETD), launched in 2012, has been aimed at assisting UN Member States to set up 
effective asset freezing mechanisms. Further details of the initiative are available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/news/2012-10-24_amsterdam.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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well as monitor compliance with its founding Resolution – Resolution 1373.9 The 
overall approach of the UNSC post 9/11 based on the language and range of 
recommendations contained within the Resolutions and initiatives such as the CTC 
indicates an eagerness not to just advocate for a broad range of domestic, bi- and 
multi-lateral counter-terrorism measures but also willingness to facilitate a 
transnational environment accommodative of such wide-ranging counter-terrorism 
measures.10 Thus, while terrorism is not a new phenomenon, at international level, the 
threat posed by Al Qaeda and international terrorism in general post 9/11 has been 
approached as a deeply concerning11 challenge requiring collaborative and expansive 
methods of counter-terrorism.   
Domestically, countries such as the United Kingdom (UK)12 and the United States 
(US)13 adopted a wealth of new Acts and/or amendments to existing counter-terrorism 
and security legislation. The swift introduction of comprehensive counter-terrorism 
laws such as the 2001 UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act and the 2001 USA 
Patriot Act or modifications of existing legislation have reshaped14 the relationship 
between the state and an individual terrorist suspect.15  However, these additional 
                                               
9  Please refer to the Counter Terrorism Committee’s outline of their mandate available at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/ctc/ [last accessed 30 March 2016].  
10  For similar arguments as well as academic commentary on the UN Security Council arguably 
engaging in international law making post 9/11 see for example Talmon, S., ‘The Security Council as 
World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 175 and Powell, C. H., ‘The 
Legal Authority of the United Nations Security Council’ in Lazarus, L. and Goold, B.J. (eds.), Security 
and Human Rights (2007, Portland; Hart Publishing). 
11 See further the perambulatory clauses of the UN Security Council Resolution 1373.  
12 After 9/11 and the adoption of the comprehensive Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, the 
UK has been regularly renewing anti-terrorism legislation – either annually or biannually. In 2006 and 
2008, the changes to the existing legislation included minor expansions to the definition of terrorism. 
The list of Acts containing the term ‘terrorism’ in their title and the full texts of the Terrorism Act 2006 
and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 are available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/primary?title=Terrorism [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
13  The USA Patriot Act 2001 amended a number of existing pieces of legislation such as the 
Immigration and Nationality Act 1952. See further Section 412 US Patriot Act full text available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3162enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr3162enr.pdf [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. Other relevant legislation includes the Department of Homeland Security Act 2002, 
Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act 2002, Detainee Treatment Act 2005 and the Military 
Commissions Act 2006. 
14  See for example the use of first Control Orders and subsequently Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures (TPIMs) in the United Kingdom. Control Orders and TPIMs aimed to reduce 
the risk of terrorism by imposing significant constraints on the movements and activities of individuals 
suspected or convicted of terrorist activities. For the operation of these measures please refer to the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 
as well the relevant Annual Reports of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, available at 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/category/reports/tpims-control-orders/ [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
15 On this point see further the following edited collection - Jenkins, D. et al (eds.), The Long Decade: 
How 9/11 Changed the Law (2014, Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
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domestic legislative measures were not deemed sufficient to counter the threat posed 
by terrorism. The considerable legal and political effort devoted by the US in 
particular to construct multi-faceted and multi-front counter-terrorism responses 
based on their assessment of the threat posed by terrorism post 9/11 also resulted in 
the creation of the transnational counter-terrorism campaign otherwise known as the 
‘War on Terror’.16  
As a political paradigm, this ‘war’ was used to justify the military operations in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In his State of the Union address on 21 September 2001, 
George W Bush announced the beginning of the ‘War on Terror’. 17 In the same 
speech, he also noted that the “US would pursue nations that provide aid or safe 
haven to terrorism” thus linking any potential invasions with the ‘War on Terror’. In 
its subsequent National Security Strategies, the US has described states such as Iraq 
and Afghanistan as “rogue states”, which “sponsor terrorism around the globe”.18 As 
a legal paradigm, the ‘War on Terror’ was designed to construct an environment 
within which the applicability of the relevant international norms and standards was 
either severely restricted or was uncertain. The wealth of academic, legal and political 
debate focusing on the post 9/11 state compliance with international legal obligations 
and the impact on individual human rights during the use of expansive counter-
terrorism measures attests to the transformative effect of this paradigm.19  
                                               
16 The term ‘War on Terror’ was initially described by then President George W. Bush in his Address 
to Congress and the American People on 20 September 2001, full text available at 
http://www.history2u.com/bush_war_on_terror.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. The current Obama 
administration refers to it as Overseas Contingency Operations. 
17  Full text available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. Tony Blair made a similar statement on 7 October 2001 at the start of the 
military campaign in Afghanistan, full text available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/07/afghanistan.terrorism11 [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
18 See for example the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, full text 
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
19 For a short selection see Schmitt, M.N., Counter-Terrorism and the Use of Force in International 
Law, (2002) The Marshall Center Papers, No. 5; Bellamy, A. J., Fighting Terror: Ethical Dilemmas 
(2008, New York; Palgrave Macmillan); Poynting, S. and Whyte, D. (eds.), Counter-Terrorism and 
State Political Violence: The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror (2012, London; Routledge); Ni Aolain, F. and 
Gross, O. (eds.), Guantanamo and Beyond (2013, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press);  Davis, F. 
D. and De Londras, F., Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorism Judicial Review (2014, Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press); Dickinson, R. et al (eds.), Examining Critical Perspectives on Human 
Rights (2014, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press); Roach, K. (ed.), Comparative Counter-
Terrorism Law (2015, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press). 
 12
The high value detainee programme (HVDP) was another significant component of 
the transnational counter-terrorism operations after 2001. 20  The programme was 
designed to target individuals who were in the inner circle of Al Qaeda, who occupied 
key positions within that organisation and held information, which could not be 
obtained from any other source.21 “Timely and accurate” intelligence information was 
seen as crucial in successfully leading the ‘War on Terror’.22 The main facet of the 
programme was the incommunicado detention and use of enhanced interrogation for 
the purposes of gathering intelligence. The initially clandestine existence of HVDP 
after 9/11 was perhaps due to its relatively small size in comparison to other strands 
of the ‘War on Terror’ such as Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. 23  The use and operation of extraordinary renditions particularly in the 
period between 2001 and 2006 was arguably another key factor.24  
The term ‘extraordinary rendition’ has been employed as a euphemism for the covert 
irregular transfers25 of individuals across borders for the purposes of their detention 
and interrogation in conditions that constitute multiple violations of human rights, 
including the absolute jus cogens right to be free from torture.26 Private air carriers 
                                               
20 The operation of the programme appears to have been authorised on 17 September 2001. Please refer 
to ACLU v. Department of Defense, 04 Civ. 4151, Sixth Declaration of Marilyn A. Dorn Information 
Review Officer (CIA), pp. 34–35 available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/20070110/cia_dorn_declaration_items_1_29_61.p
df [last accessed 30 March 2016]. See further the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee 
Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Programme, available at 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/executive-summary.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016].   
21 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Summary of the High Value Terrorist Detainee 
Program, Washington DC 20511, full text available at 
http://www.defense.gov/pdf/thehighvaluedetaineeprogram2.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
22 Ibid. 
23  Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of 
Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36, p. 10.   
24 In its 2012 report, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence referred to 98 individuals who were 
detained and rendered as part of the HVDP as at 5 May 2006. This report was declassified in 2014. The 
2014 Open Society Report, referred to a total of 136 individuals who were rendered after 9/11. This 
suggests that the height of extraordinary renditions was between 2001 and 2006. The full text of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Detention and Interrogation Program is available at 
http://web.archive.org/web/20150214225954/http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/study2014/sscistudy1.
pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. The full text of the Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing 
Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition is available at 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/globalizing-torture-20120205.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
25 The distinction between regular and irregular transfers will be discussed in more depth in Chapters 2 
and 3 of this thesis. 
26 Please see further on this point Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations 
of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State 
Transport of Prisoners, Opinion no. 363/2005 CDL-AD (2006) 009 and Committee on Legal Affairs 
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and charter companies27 were regularly used in order to further conceal the operation 
and purpose of flights on the ‘rendition circuit’.28 54 states reportedly participated in 
and facilitated extraordinary renditions in various ways such as hosting CIA 
temporary detention facilities and black sites, provided assistance in the capture, 
interrogation and transportation of rendees, allowed use of domestic airspace for 
regular flyovers, refuelling and stopover services at airports and intelligence sharing 
leading to the capture and extraordinary rendition of individuals.29 This thesis will 
argue that extraordinary rendition is thus a complex phenomenon, comprising of 
grave and multiple violations of international obligations, which severely challenges 
the perception that international human rights law has the capacity to effectively 
protect individual rights and to uphold the absolute, jus cogens character of the 
prohibition against torture.  
Before proceeding to outline the severity of the challenge posed by extraordinary 
rendition to the international legal framework in general and individual human rights 
in particular, the arguably exceptional legal and political environment within which 
the rendition circuits operated will be mapped out first. While counter-terrorism laws 
since September 2001 have considerably altered the relationship between the 
individual terror suspect and the state, the tensions between liberty and security, 
between normalcy and emergency30  have nonetheless felt familiar to an extent.31 
                                                                                                                                      
and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of Detainees involving Council of Europe 
Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36. 
27 The focus of Chapter 5 of this thesis is the reliance on such private operators and whether and how 
this has impacted on the effectiveness of the human rights framework. 
28 The phrase ‘rendition circuit’ has been used to describe the full flight circuit of aircrafts engaged in 
extraordinary rendition from the originating state through a transit state (stopover, refuelling or 
additional staging site) and back to where possible the aircraft’s “home base”. Please refer to the report 
by the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-
State Transfers involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2006) 16. 
29  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc), p. 6. 
30  The term ‘emergency’ here and throughout this thesis reflects the texts of Article 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights both of which refer to a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. For an 
academic discussion on what constitutes an emergency, see for example Gross, O. and Ni Aolain, F., 
“Emergency, War and International Law – Another Perspective” (2001) 70 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 29 and Dyzenhaus, D. and Thwaites, R., ‘Legality and Emergency – The Judiciary 
in a Time of Terror’ in Lynch, A. et al (eds.), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror (2007, Sydney; 
The Federation Press). 
31 On this point see Ramraj, V. V., ‘Counter-Terrorism’s Engagement with Transnational Legality’ in 
Jenkins, D., et al (eds.), The Long Decade: How 9/11 Changed the Law (2014, New York; Oxford 
University Press). For further discussions on liberty/security debate and previous state responses to 
terrorism see Dickson, B., The European Convention on Human Rights and the Conflict in Northern 
Ireland (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press) and Taylor Saito, N., From Chinese Exclusion to 
 14
However what has been the distinctive characteristic of the post 9/11 security 
exigency is how, as a response to the threat posed by terrorism, the US has 
extensively relied on a number of transnational organisations as well as state allies 
such as the UK in order to embark on a worldwide multi-front campaign against 
terrorism as will be demonstrated further below.  
By (exploitatively) engaging with a complex web of legal norms and institutions 
beyond the state, the US ‘War on Terror’ legal and political paradigm, while not the 
sole factor, has contributed to the significantly increased focus of international legal 
and institutional structures on national security and transnational security 
cooperation.32 Starting with the immediately following discussion on the post 9/11 
securitisation in Section 2 and the drivers or catalysts behind the upsurge of 
international, regional and domestic cooperation on expansive security and counter-
terrorism measures in Section 3, this chapter will explore how the creation of an 
atmosphere within which the ‘War on Terror’ paradigm was palatable33 for a period 
of time was a necessary prerequisite for the operation of the transnational rendition 
circuits. This and the ensuing chapters will then address the core thesis question of 
how the rendition circuits – multi-actor, transnational and covert irregular transfers 
resulting in severe rights violations including the jus cogens prohibition on torture – 
became operationalised despite the comprehensive international rights protections. 
Concurrently, the thesis will assess whether the extraordinary rendition programme 
poses a unique and corrosive threat to the strength of the international legal 
framework in general and the practical effectiveness of individual human rights in 
particular.         
By focusing on the hyper legalistic approach by the US towards perceived and/or 
fashioned gaps within the framework such as the shifting meaning and scope of the 
concepts of ‘armed conflict’ and ‘jurisdiction’ and the liability limiting use of 
                                                                                                                                      
Guantánamo Bay: Plenary Power and the Prerogative State (2008, Colorado; University Press of 
Colorado). 
32 Ramraj, V. V., ‘Counter-Terrorism’s Engagement with Transnational Legality’ in Jenkins, D., et al 
(eds.), The Long Decade: How 9/11 Changed the Law (2014, New York; Oxford University Press). See 
also Klabbers, J., An Introduction to International Institutional Law, 3rd ed. (2015, Cambridge 
University Press) and Kolb, R., An Introduction to the Law of the United Nations (2010, Portland; Hart 
Publishing). 
33 The majority of academic commentary as well as numerous UN, Council of Europe and NGO reports 
have been heavily and persistently critical of the ‘War on Terror’ and its various strands. However as 
evidenced by the facilitation of various aspects of the rendition circuits and the HVDP by 54 states as 
well as the multi-state involvement and cooperation in operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi 
Freedom, between 2001 and 2007 the US enjoyed wide support by states.    
 15
diplomatic assurances and private operators, this thesis argues that these areas of 
definitional uncertainty together with practical enforcement deficiencies of individual 
rights have been exploited by the US in order to operationalise extraordinary 
renditions. Rather than just outlining the range of rights violations committed as part 
of the rendition circuits however, the thesis also explores the relationship between the 
interpretation catalysts,34 which have influenced the conception and development of 
the extraordinary rendition programme post 9/11 and the subsequent reliance on hyper 
legalism35 to provide a veneer of legality36 to the programme through the creation and 
utilisation of perceived or actual gaps in the international legal framework.  
The thesis thus argues that the operationalisation of extraordinary rendition is as much 
the result of multi-faceted, comprehensive and inter-connected legal and political 
arguments within a highly charged international and domestic environment focused 
on securitisation as is also the product of exploitative or male fides interpretation of 
the existing legal obligations relating to transfers and the potential extraterritorial 
applicability of human rights provisions. By approaching extraordinary renditions in 
this manner, the thesis distinguishes itself from the existing academic commentary 
and investigative work by NGOs and journalists which has focused on confirming the 
operation of the programme,37 identifying the states involved,38 providing an account 
                                               
34  For a detailed examination of the term’ interpretation catalysts’ see Ingber, R., ‘Interpretation 
Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking’, (2013) 38 The Yale Journal of International 
Law 359 and Ingber, R., ‘Human Rights, National Security, and Executive Branch Legal 
Decisionmaking’, (2013) Administrative and Regulatory Law News 19. 
35 For general reading on legality and different approaches to it see further Dysenhaus, D., ‘Humpty 
Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication of National Security’ (2003) 28 
Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1; Waldron, J., ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’ in Kramer, 
M. H. (ed.) The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral Philosophy (2008, Oxford; Oxford 
University Press) and Posner, R., ‘Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes 
and the Constitution’ (1986-87) 37 (2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 179. 
36  The phrase “thin veneer of legality” was used in the MB v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (Re) [2006] EWHC 1000 (Admin) at para. 103 with reference to the arbitrariness of the 
control orders legal regime which replaced the use of indefinite detention of non-British nationals 
considered to pose a threat to national security. See further Dyzenhaus, D., ‘Introduction: Legality in a 
Time of Emergency’ (2008) 24 (1) Windsor Review of Legal & Social Issues 1 and Ewing, K.D., The 
Bonfire of Liberties (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
37 Paglen, T. and Thompson, A.C., Torture Taxi: On the Trail of the CIA’s Rendition Flights (2006, 
New York; Melville House); Grey, S., Ghost Plane: The True Story of the CIA Torture Program (2006, 
New York; St. Martin’s Press) and Mayer, J., ‘Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s 
“Extraordinary Rendition” Program’ The New Yorker 14 February 2005. 
38 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-State 
Transfers involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2006) 16; Human Rights Council, Joint 
Study on Global Practices in relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
while Countering Terrorism, the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, General Assembly UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42. 
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of the rendees transferred39 or outlining in detail the international legal provisions 
violated40 and makes an original contribution to the field. 
 
2. The Uniqueness of 9/11 and subsequent Securitisation 
 
Much of the academic and public discourse since 9/11 has focused on how states have 
sought to safeguard the security of society as a whole by placing restrictions on 
individual liberty – especially on those suspected of terrorist activity.41 Security – 
defined as the ability of a state to protect its citizens from internal and external 
threats42 - appears to have become more intrinsically associated with pre-empting acts 
of terrorism and detaining individual terrorist suspects than with more traditional 
crime prevention. The immediate domestic legislative and political43 responses of 
countries such as the UK and the US are illustrative of this push for pre-emptive and 
more muscular national security policies. The USA Patriot Act 2001 included a wide 
range of measures such as indefinite detention of immigrants and other non-nationals 
(or aliens) and permission to conduct searches in the home or office of an individual 
without their prior knowledge or consent amongst many others.44  In the UK, the 
                                               
39  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
40 See for example Weissbrodt, D. and Bergquist, A., ‘Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights 
Analysis’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 123 and Satterthwaite, M. and Fisher, A., 
‘Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice, Extraordinary Rendition, and Human Rights Law’ (2006) 6 The 
Long Term View 52. 
41 See for example Gearty, C., Can Human Rights Survive? (2006, Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press); Gearty, C., Liberty and Security (2013, Cambridge; Polity Press); Waldron, J., Torture, Terror 
and Tradeoffs: Philosophy of the White House (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press); Levinson, S. 
(ed.), Torture: A Collection (2004, Oxford; Oxford University Press); Bingham, T, The Rule of Law 
(2011, London; Penguin Books); Chaskalson, A., ‘The Widening Gyre: Counter-Terrorism, Human 
Rights and The Rule of Law’ (2008) 67 (1) The Cambridge Law Journal 69; ‘Civil Liberty or National 
Security: How Far is Too Far?’ The Guardian 28 January 2005; David Cameron Speech to the Centre 
for Policy Studies, Balancing Freedom and Security – A Modern British Bill of Rights, full text 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2006/jun/26/conservatives.constitution [last accessed 
30 March 2016]. A and X v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 WLR 87 and many 
others.  
42 Goold, B.J., ‘Privacy, Identity and Security’ in Goold, B.J. and Lazarus, L. (eds.), Security and 
Human Rights (2007, Portland; Hart Publishing), p. 57. 
43  Statement to the Nation by Tony Blair on 11 September 2001, full text available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/page1596 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. Labour Party Conference Speech by Tony Blair on 2 October 2001, full text 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6 [last accessed 
30 March 2016]. Speech on Terrorism by George W Bush on 6 September 2006, full text available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
44 See further Section 412, Title IV - Protecting the Border and Section 213, Title II - Surveillance 
Procedures respectively. Full text of these two provisions and the USA Patriot Act 2001 is available at 
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Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 influenced by the recommendations of 
UN Security Council Resolution 1373 included a number of expansive provisions on 
countering terrorism and improving security such as asset freezing, 45  indefinite 
detention of suspected international terrorists46 and extension of powers to prevent 
and enforce criminal law47 amongst other modifications on existing legislation.48 
Before discussing in more depth the post 9/11 securitisation within the US and UK 
however, the immediate responses by both the UNSC and NATO will be considered 
first. While the determinations made by each of these two bodies illustrate the 
perceived uniqueness of 9/11, what is perhaps of even more significance is the extent 
of the domestic internalisation of the relevant UNSC Resolutions and NATO 
declarations and the resulting impact on national and regional counter-terrorism 
responses. In addition, some of the measures specifically recommended by these two 
bodies have had a substantial role in the construction of the ‘War on Terror’ paradigm 
as well as the operationalisation of extraordinary renditions within it.  
 
2.1. International Securitisation   
 
Two UNSC Resolutions led the international response to the events of 9/11. Both 
Resolutions 136849 and the subsequently quite influential 1373,50 adopted shortly after 
the acts of terrorism on 9/11, have reaffirmed the “inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence” of states. Both have expressed readiness and determination by 
the UNSC to take “all necessary steps” to combat all forms of terrorism. Resolution 
1373 in particular urged states to intensify the exchange of operational information 
and to cooperate to prevent acts of terrorism particularly through bi- and multi-lateral 
arrangements and agreements.51 Further, the Resolution made an express link between 
                                                                                                                                      
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3162enr/pdf/BILLS-107hr3162enr.pdf [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
45 Sections 4–14, Part 2 – Freezing Orders. 
46 Sections 21–28, Part 4 – Immigration and Asylum. Part 4 of the Act has been since repealed and 
replaced by the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 following the case of A and Others v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. In this case, Section 23 of the Act was found to be 
incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. 
47 Sections 17-20, Part 3 – Disclosure of Information. 
48  The original full text of the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001 is available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2001/24/pdfs/ukpga_20010024_en.pdf [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
49 Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001) adopted 12 September 2001. 
50 Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) adopted 28 September 2001. 
51 Ibid. 
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refugee status and terrorism by noting that states should ensure that terrorists do not 
misuse refugee status.52  The Resolution has been described as one of the drivers 
behind the post 9/11 trend to rely on immigration provisions and in particular those 
relating to transfers and detention as well as the more widespread use of 
contemporary methods of counter-terrorism such as asset freezing as part of states’ 
counter-terrorism toolkit.53  
More significantly perhaps Resolution 1373 has been described by the then President 
of the UNSC as the “first step” in the UNSC legislating for the “rest of the United 
Nations’ membership”.54 The reasoning behind this statement lies in the distinction 
between classic individualised Resolutions and new generic Resolutions such as 
1373.55 While classic UNSC resolutions are expressly or implicitly limited in time 
until the specific purpose for which they are adopted – usually to secure performance 
of an obligation or the cessation of an internationally wrongful act by the addressee – 
is accomplished. 56  The same does in principle apply to legislative Resolutions 
however, as the language of UNSC Resolution 224957 suggests there seems at present 
to be no end to the fight against international terrorism.58 With this Resolution, UN 
member states were urged to take all necessary measures to “redouble and coordinate 
their efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts”. Additionally, the hallmark of any 
legislative Resolution is the general and abstract character of the obligations 
                                               
52 UN Security Council Resolution 1624 (UN Doc. S/RES/1624 (2005)) similarly expressly noted that 
the protections of the 1951 Refugee Convention including non-refoulement should not extend to an 
individual who is suspected of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN. 
53  Goldstone, R., “The Tension between Combating Terrorism and Protecting Civil Liberties” in 
Wilson, R. A. (ed.), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (2005, Cambridge; Cambridge University 
Press), p. 165. See also Robinson M., “Connecting Human Rights, Human Development and Human 
Security” in Wilson, R. (ed.), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (2005, Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press), p. 308. Luban, D., “Eight Fallacies about Liberty and Security” in Wilson, R. (ed.), 
Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (2005, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p. 249. 
54  Press Conference by Security Council President, 2 April 2004, full text available at 
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/ 2004/pleugerpc.DOC.htm. See also Talmon, S., ‘The Security 
Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 175, p. 175; Alvarez, 
J. E., The UN’s ‘War’ on Terrorism (2003) 31 International Journal of Legal Info 238, p. 241; Krisch, 
N., ‘The Rise and Fall of Collective Security: Terrorism, US Hegemony, and the Plight of the Security 
Council’ in Walter, C., et al, Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security 
versus Liberty (2003, New York; Springer), p. 883 and Alvarez, J., ‘Hegemonic International Law 
Revisited’ (2003) 97 American Journal of International Law 873, p. 874. . 
55  Talmon, S., ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 175, p. 177. 
56 Ibid, p. 176.  
57 Adopted on 20 November 2015, this Resolution is a response to the events in Paris on 13 November 
2015. Security Council Resolution 2249, UN Doc. S/RES/2249 (2015). 
58  Talmon, S., ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 175, p. 176. 
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imposed.59 As noted by the Columbian delegate to the UNSC specifically in relation 
to Resolution 1373 – it “does not name a single country, society or group of 
people”.60 Thus, the obligations are phrased in neutral language, apply to an indefinite 
number of cases, and are not usually limited in time.61 While these obligations may 
well be triggered by a particular situation, conflict, or event, but they are not restricted 
to it and are hence arguably akin to obligations entered into by states in international 
agreements.62  
Concomitantly to the UNSC affirmation of the individual and collective right to self-
defence by states and its attempts at law making, on 12 September 2001, NATO 
invoked the principle of collective self-defence under Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which states as follows:  
 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all … if such an armed 
attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-
defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of 
armed force … 
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately 
be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the 
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain 
international peace and security.63 
 
This was the first invocation of this Article since the adoption of the North Atlantic 
Treaty.64 A subsequent NATO Press Release declared,  “if it is determined that this 
attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an 
                                               
59 Ibid, p. 176. 
60 Quoted in Farley, M., ‘U.N. Measure Requires Every Nation to Take Steps Against Terrorism’, the 
Los Angelis Times, 28 September 2001. 
61  Talmon, S., ‘The Security Council as World Legislature’ (2005) 99 American Journal of 
International Law 175, p. 176. 
62 Ibid, pp. 176 – 179.  
63 North Atlantic Treaty 1949, full text available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
64  Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of 
Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36, p. 16. 
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action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty”. 65  On the basis of this 
phrasing, the NATO invocation of Article 5 was initially considered to be provisional. 
Following a number of classified briefings by the US however the conditional clause 
was removed. In October 2001, the NATO Allies declared a unanimous assessment 
that the 9/11 attacks had been directed against the US from abroad thus activating 
Article 5 provisions. 66  Eight measures, which were intended to improve the 
combatting of terrorism, were agreed upon and were to be relied on either 
individually or collectively.67 Amongst the adopted measures were: 
 
 Enhancing intelligence cooperation and sharing; 
 Providing blanket overflight clearances for the US for military 
flights related to operations against terrorism; 
 Providing access for the US to ports and airfields on the 
territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism including 
refuelling; 
 Providing, either individually or collectively, assistance to 
NATO Allies which are or may be subject to increased threat of terrorism.  
 
Rather than the extensiveness of these measures itself, what is perhaps of more 
significance is that these were agreed upon at the request of the US.68 According to 
NATO procedures, it is the International Staff that have the responsibility for drafting 
documents and resolutions. 69  The language of these particular measures was 
reportedly drafted, re-drafted and put forward by the US unilaterally.70 Article 5 does 
accommodate the undertaking of individual self-defence measures and NATO did 
                                               
65 Statement by the North Atlantic Council, Press Release (2001) 124 of 12 September 2001, full text 
available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-124e.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016].  
66 Statement by the NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, NATO Press Release of 08 October 
2001, full text available at http://www.nato.int/DOCU/pr/2001/p01-138e.htm [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
67 Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General, Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council 
Decision On Implementation Of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September 
Attacks against the United States, 04 October 2001, full text available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
68 Ibid.  
69 Buckley, E., ‘Invoking Article 5’, NATO Review full text available at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2006/issue2/english/art2.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
70  Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of 
Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36, p. 18. 
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outline that while any collective action would be decided by the North Atlantic 
Council, the US could also carry out independent actions, consistent with its rights 
and obligations under the UN Charter.71 However, the departure from the regular 
NATO procedures and the involvement of the US in the drafting process suggests that 
a) there was an acceptance of the uniqueness of events on 9/11 and b) the adopted 
measures would be of some operational significance. A report by the Council of 
Europe’s Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights72 suggests that there were 
additional components of the NATO measures that have remained classified adding to 
the perceived ‘extraordinariness’ of the post 9/11 security emergency.73  
The invocation of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty and the adoption of UNSC 
Resolutions such as 1368 and 1373 has influenced the adoption and further 
development of expansive international, regional and domestic counter-terrorism 
measures as well as contributed to the post 9/11 securitisation. While the above 
outlined measures could arguably be seen as necessarily broad due to the nature of the 
terrorism threat post 9/11, the development of an international security regime 
through the CTC and UNSC Resolutions such as 1373, 1624 and 2249, 74  the 
engagement in international law making in matters of security75 and the multi-layered 
impact on domestic legislation as will be discussed in the immediately following 
section is an illustration of the perceived uniqueness of the events of 9/11.  
More significantly perhaps, the determinations made by the UNSC and NATO have 
contributed to the creation of a legal and political environment within which an 
expansive transnational counter-terrorism campaign such as the ‘War on Terror’ and 
its components such as HVDP could exist. Both the UNSC and NATO strongly 
                                               
71 ‘NATO and the Scourge of Terrorism: What is Article 5?’ 18 February 2005 full text available at 
http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
72  Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of 
Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36, p. 19. 
73 As noted above, the term ‘emergency’ here and throughout this thesis reflects the texts of Article 4 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Article 15 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. For a judicial discussion what constitutes an emergency, please refer to cases such as 
Lawless v Ireland (No 3) [1961] ECHR 2, Ireland v the United Kingdom [1978] ECHR 1 and more 
recently A. and Others v the United Kingdom, Application no. 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 2009 
as well as Landinelli Silva v Uruguay, Case No. 34/1978, Views adopted on 8 April 1981. In addition, 
refer to UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 29.   
74 See also Ramraj, V. V., ‘Counter-Terrorism’s Engagement with Transnational Legality’ in Jenkins, 
D., et al (eds.), The Long Decade: How 9/11 Changed the Law (2014, New York; Oxford University 
Press). 
75 See further Happold, M. ‘Security Council Resolution 1373 and the Constitution of the United 
Nations’ (2003) 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 593 and Szasz, P., ‘The Security Council starts 
Legislating’ (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 901 as well as Klabbers, J., et al, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (2009, Oxford; Oxford University Press).  
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encouraged states to engage in bi- and multi-lateral arrangements to fight terrorism, 
bi- and multi-lateral intelligence cooperation and exchange of information and 
individual or collective assistance for a state or states facing a severe threat of 
terrorism. As Chapters 1, 4 and 5 will illustrate, the role of transit states – states which 
provided some support to the US such as stopover and refuelling facilities and/or 
blanket overflight clearances – and the post 9/11 expansion of intelligence sharing 
and cooperation were of particular importance to the transnational operation of the 
extraordinary rendition programme. Without this support by 54 other states,76 the US 
arguably would not have been able to operationalise the rendition circuits post 9/11 in 
the same expansive and transnational manner as it did. 
 
2.2. Domestic Securitisation  
 
The US engagement in a transnational ‘War on Terror’ and the operation of HVDP 
and its components has been widely criticised.77 The US approach to the relevance of 
core international human rights and humanitarian law protections and the legal tools 
used to limit or circumvent the general applicability of these legal frameworks will be 
discussed in detail in the following chapters. It is however apt at this point to briefly 
distinguish the legislative response embodied by the USA Patriot Act 2001 and the 
Executive78 response which resulted in the authorisation of profoundly problematic 
counter-terrorism measures such as HVDP as a whole and ‘enhanced interrogations’, 
extraordinary rendition and incommunicado detentions in black sites across the world 
within in HVDP.79  
                                               
76  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
77  See for example International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on 
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (2009, Geneva; ICJ); Report of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protections of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while 
Countering Terrorism, Mission to the United States of America, UN Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3; Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and 
Interrogation Program: Findings and Conclusions; Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of 
Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis 
and Recommendations amongst many others.  
78 The role of the Executive response and executive lawyering will be addressed in more detail as part 
of the discussion on the interpretation catalysts which led to the construction of the ‘War on Terror’ 
and the development of the extraordinary rendition programme in Chapter 1. 
79 See for example the full text of John Yoo’s Memorandum Opinion for the Deputy Counsel to the 
President available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]; 
See further the infamous 2003 Torture Memo by John Yoo and Jay Bybee as discussed in Coman, J.  
‘Interrogation Abuses were Approved at the Highest Levels’ The Sunday Telegraph (London), 13 June 
2004, p. 26; see also Yoo, J., ‘The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original 
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The USA Patriot Act 2001 (Patriot Act), codified into law a mere 45 days after 9/11,80 
aimed to “deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world” 
and “to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools”.81 Surveillance and physical 
powers under existing legislation such as the Foreign Surveillance and Intelligence 
Act of 1978 and the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 were 
expanded.82 Under Section 214 in particular and Title II of the Patriot Act in general, 
government agencies were allowed to gather “foreign intelligence information” from 
both US and non-US citizens. Title IV of the Patriot Act – Border Security – has 
amended the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) to expand the law 
enforcement and investigative powers of the US Attorney General 83  and the 
Immigration and Naturalisation service.84  
Under Section 411 of the Patriot Act, non-US nationals or aliens who endorse or 
espouse terrorist activity or have persuaded others to support such activity are 
prevented from entering the US. The spouse or child of such an alien would similarly 
be restricted from travelling into the US. Thus, by relying on immigration legislation 
as part of counter-terrorism measures, the Patriot Act – similar to UN Security 
Council Resolution 1373 – has made express links between the prevention and pre-
emption of terrorism with immigration status. In addition, despite the existence of 
approximately 150 definitions of terrorism in federal law,85 the definition of ‘terrorist 
activity’ was expanded to include actions involving the use of any dangerous device 
other than explosives and firearms as well as the solicitation of funds for a terrorist 
organisation and of individuals to engage in terrorist activity. 86  Overall, the US 
legislative response to 9/11 has resulted in the expansion of the pre-emptive security 
capabilities of various agencies to the detriment of individual civil liberties and 
protections. As a result, the provisions of the Patriot Act have drawn wide attention 
                                                                                                                                      
Understanding of War Powers’ (1996) 84 California Law Review 167; Goldsmith, J., The Terror 
Presidency: Law and Judgment inside the Bush Administration (2009, New York; W.W. Norton & 
Company) and Goldsmith, J., Power and Constraint (2012, New York; W.W. Norton & Company). 
80 The Act was signed into law by President George W Bush on 26 October 2001 following very brief 
discussions in both Houses of Congress. Please refer to http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/10/images/20011026-5.html  [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
81 Full text of the Act is available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-107hr3162enr/pdf/BILLS-
107hr3162enr.pdf  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
82 See for example Sections 202, 207, 216 and 217 of the USA Patriot Act of 2001. 
83 See for example Subtitle A, Section 401. 
84 See for example Subtitle A, Section 402 and 403. 
85  Perry, N., ‘The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many 
Grails’, (2003) 30 Journal of Legislation 249.  
86 See Subtitle B, Section 411. 
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and criticism.87 In comparison, the British anti-terrorism legislation albeit similarly 
expansive has drawn less external criticism despite becoming quite transnationally 
influential.88 
Prior to the attacks of 9/11, the UK adopted the Terrorism Act 2000 in order to 
consolidate the existing – and already extensive – counter-terrorism prevention 
legislation from the 1970s and 1980s.89 One of the core features of the Act is the 
broad definition of terrorism,90 which has influenced similarly expansive definitions 
in Australia, Canada and Israel amongst other countries.91 The existing definitions of 
terrorism have been vastly expanded from politically motivated violence to include 
politically and religiously motivated serious property damage and interference with 
electronic systems.92 The Act also outlines a proscription regime based on intelligence 
evidence and introduced offences relating to being a member of or identifying with a 
proscribed organisation.93 Other broad offences, which can be potentially applied to 
individuals suspected of terrorist activities have been introduced, appear to push the 
boundaries of inchoate or pre-crime liability by criminalising the possession of 
articles.94  
The Act further provides for broad police powers including preventative arrests on 
suspicion and without charge and random stop and search powers for articles, which 
                                               
87 On this point see further K., The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter Terrorism (2011, New York; 
Cambridge University Press), p. 238. 
88  Ibid. On internal criticism see commentary such as Ewing, K., ‘The Political Constitution of 
Emergency Powers: A Comment’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Law in Context 313; Walker, C., 
‘The Treatment of Foreign Terror Suspects’ (2007) 70 The Modern Law Review 427; Gearty, C., ‘11 
September 2001, Counter-Terrorism and the Human Rights Act’ (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 
18 and Fenwick, H., ‘The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001: A Proportionate Response to 
11 September’ (2002) 65 (5) Modern Law Review 724 amongst many others. 
89 Murphy, C. C., EU Counter-Terrorism Law (2012, Oxford; Hart Publishing), p. 24. 
90 Part I, Section 1 – Terrorism: interpretation – Terrorism Act 2000. The full text of the provision is 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/section/1  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
See also R v. Gul (appellant) [2013] UKSC 64 and Greene, A., ‘The Quest for a Satisfactory Definition 
of Terrorism: R v Gul’ (2014) 77 (5) Modern Law Review 780. 
91  Roach, K., The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter Terrorism (2011, New York; Cambridge 
University Press), p. 238; see also the Australian Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 
2002 and the Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act 2001.  Australia has also followed Britain’s introduction of 
control orders and offences that target speech associated with terrorism. Please refer to the text of Anti-
Terrorism Act (no.2) 2005 which makes a number of changes to existing counter-terrorism legislation. 
Full text available at http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2006C00754  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
92 The full text of Part I - Introductory, Section 1 Terrorism Interpretation in the Terrorism Act 2000 is 
available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
93  Part II - Proscribed Organisations of the Terrorism Act 2000, full text available at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
94  Roach, K., The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter Terrorism (2011, New York; Cambridge 
University Press), p. 241. 
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can be used in connection with terrorism. 95  Counter-terrorism measures such as 
proscription, limitations on speech, administrative detention based on secret evidence, 
emergency based legislation, the use of immigration as an aid to counter-terrorism 
and derogation from rights, which already had roots in the UK’s pre-9/11 approach to 
terrorist violence, were given a more firm basis.96 This legislative approach towards a 
permanent basis for counter-terrorism measures was followed by the Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA).97  
One of the most important features of ATCSA was the inclusion of measures adopted 
following the notification of a 15-month derogation from Article 5(1)(f) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).98 The UK was the only Council of 
Europe Member State to seek derogation under Article 15 ECHR following 9/11. The 
UK advised that as a result of a public emergency, linked to the presence of an 
unspecified number of foreign nationals who were suspected of being engaged in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, of being 
members of or having links to organisations or groups engaged in such terrorist 
activities, additional arrest and detention measures were necessary.99 Without such 
derogation, the proposed additional and necessary means for detention would have 
been inconsistent with the obligations contained in Article 5(1)(f).100 The derogation 
in question was used to authorise indeterminate administrative detention of non-UK 
citizens who were suspected of terrorist activities however could not be deported due 
to the principle of non-refoulement.101 
It is within this security-focused environment both domestically and internationally 
that extraordinary rendition was operationalised. Both the US and UK adopted very 
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muscular counter-terrorism responses relying on a number of comprehensive 
domestic legislative measures and procedures as well as transnational cooperation 
through NATO and the UNSC to pre-empt and prevent acts of terrorism. However, 
the creation of the high value detainee programme (HVDP) and reliance on 
extraordinary rendition to capture, immobilise and detain individual terrorist suspects 
suggests that within the US expansive legislative measures were not seen as 
sufficient. Thus, while the UK explored domestic and regional legal avenues and 
sought to push the boundaries of the relevant legal provisions in a more transparent 
and accountable manner,102 the US engaged in mostly clandestine and unaccountable 
national security policies operating outside the established legal framework.103 Both 
of these approaches raise questions in relation to the strength and effectiveness of the 
relevant human rights protections.  
Concurrently, the divergence of counter-terrorism tactics by close allies such as the 
US and the UK particularly considering the role of the UK in most if not all main 
strands on the ‘War on Terror’, 104  raises the question of what drives a specific 
counter-terrorism approach or what are the interpretation catalysts – legal and 
political – behind the Executive’s decision to adopt a certain counter-terrorism 
programme. To put this question in a slightly different manner – why did the US 
consider its expansive and comprehensive legislative measures as insufficient to 
combat the threat of terrorism thus opting to develop and rely on covert and 
transnational counter-terrorism operations such as HVDP and extraordinary 
rendition? This is a rather salient question when taking into consideration an 
international atmosphere accommodative and supportive of wide ranging domestic, 
bi- and multi-lateral counter-terrorism measures, an atmosphere the US contributed to 
particularly in the context of the NATO decision to trigger Article 5 as discussed 
above. Before proceeding to outline how the post 9/11 operation of extraordinary 
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rendition differs from other regular and irregular transfers and thus why it poses a 
unique challenge on the international legal framework, the section that follows will 
discuss the interpretation catalysts which have led to the construction of the ‘War on 
Terror’ paradigm within which the transnational rendition circuits could exist and the 
link between these catalysts and the reliance on hyper legalism in order to 
operationalise the circuits.105 Section 3 will also assess what hyper legalism is and the 
role of this interpretation method in the context of HVDP and extraordinary 
renditions. 
 
3. The post 9/11 Securitisation Catalysts and US Hyper Legalism 
 
In 2003, David Dyzenhaus noted that the US and a number of other states were 
gripped by a ‘moral panic’ following the events of 9/11.106 While periods of moral 
panic are not new to societies – particularly in the context of national security 
emergencies – what tends to change is the episode, person or group of persons, which 
becomes defined as a threat to society.107 The object of the panic can be quite novel; 
however it can also be something which has been in existence for a long time and has 
suddenly reappears in the limelight.108 While the threat of terrorism and public acts of 
terrorism are certainly not new, as discussed above, the events of 9/11 have been 
perceived as unique and the threat by international terrorist organisations as 
unprecedented. This approach to the events of 9/11 could be explained by the 
correlation between the volatility or intensity moral panic and the Executive decisions 
taken as a response to the event resulting in the panic.109  
For an event to be a moral panic, three key elements are required: a suitable enemy or 
folk devil,110 a suitable victim111 and a consensus that the actions being denounced 
were not insulated entities but could become integral parts of society or regular 
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occurrences unless decisive action is taken. 112  Once blame is allocated, i.e., an 
individual or a group has been identified as being responsible for causing the damage, 
the Executive will then assess the level of risk and by proxy the measures required to 
both apprehend those responsible and to pre-empt further occurrences of violence.113 
Aside from the potential longevity of the measures adopted as a response, the 
volatility or intensity of the particular moral panic could also result in an expansive 
and assertive immediate reaction targeting everyone deemed responsible for the 
events triggering the panic.114 Thus, a comprehensive and long-lasting legislative and 
executive response could follow the aftermath of a particularly intense moral panic 
such as the one immediately following 9/11.  
The events of 9/11 – the scale of destruction, the callousness of the attack and the 
number of casualties – arguably touched a chord with the international community in 
a manner previous terrorist attacks have not.115  The multi-faceted and multi-front 
response led by the US has been forceful; as noted by then President George W. Bush 
himself: “every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of 
law enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war” was 
to be used for “the destruction and the defeat of the global terror network”.116 The 
ensuing ‘War on Terror’ has resulted in severe and lengthy restrictions of the rights 
and liberties of individual terrorist suspects and has perhaps permanently 
recalibrated117 the relationship between such suspects and the state; moreover as the 
expansive domestic legislative and other measures suggest this recalibration has 
affected not only those who are suspected of terrorist activity but also those who may 
become a terrorist or a folk devil.118  
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Jenkins has argued that the entrenched post 9/11 moral panic and lingering fear of 
whether/when another attack might occur, has challenged both the ability of the state 
to provide security and the integrity of the international order in a world increasingly 
reliant on transnational networks.119  Thus the US and other states had to be seen to 
respond forcefully; the ensuing domestic and international securitisation and 
transnational intelligence and political cooperation have been some of the results.120 
There is arguably a (strong) link between the intense moral panic, which gripped the 
US and the announcement of and subsequent engagement in a multi-front 
transnational counter-terrorism campaign. However, there are other factors, which 
also need to be examined to understand what drove the construction of the ‘War on 
Terror’ as a whole as well as separate counter-terrorism measures within it such as 
extraordinary renditions.  
In recent years there have been many speculations over the Executive’s legal 
interpretation and decision-making, particularly in relation to matters of national 
security. 121  The debates on how and why the Executive arrives at a certain 
understanding of its legal constraints and the extent to which expansive national 
security and counter-terrorism measures proposed by the Executive can be adequately 
restrained by existing legal obligations have persevered. 122  The current legal 
scholarship has predominantly focused on rational, political and structural 
arguments123 to explain Executive action however the diverse manner in which legal 
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questions arise for the Executive following a moral panic such as 9/11 should also be 
considered.124 Understanding these distinct triggers or interpretation catalysts for legal 
decision-making is important as they can have a significant effect on the Executive 
process and resulting decisions.125 In particular, these catalysts can have a role in 
driving and shaping the Executive decision-making when balancing national security 
and counter-terrorism considerations against existing international law and human 
rights obligations.126  
In the immediate aftermath of an emergency and at the onset of a moral panic, the 
Executive’s positioning tends to be the initial and at times pivotal declaration of how 
the state will respond legally, politically and/or militarily. The above quoted statement 
of then President George W. Bush is an apt illustration. Such declarations can also 
provide strong indications of how existing legal obligations will be approached, i.e., 
in the context of this legal, political and/or military response what is the relevant and 
applicable area of law. Military Order of November 13, 2001127 by George W. Bush 
on the Detention, Treatment and Trial of individuals captured as part of the ‘War on 
Terror’ is a good example.128 Ingber has argued that in this context the Executive’s 
interpretation of its national security authority can often serve not only as one level of 
an inter-branch interpretive exercise but also as law making.129 Thus, how a legal 
question arises for the Executive can shape both the process of decision-making and 
the key choices made.130 This is an important consideration as the Executive choices 
and decisions made in relation to national security tend to become the entrenched 
governmental position.131  
Within the moral panic following 9/11 one of key legal questions for the US 
Executive arguably would have been what is the proper – i.e. within our existing 
international and domestic legal commitments – response to terrorism. This question 
would likely have been followed by another – would a strictly legislative approach be 
sufficient to effectively respond to 9/11 and pre-empt future terrorism threats. As 
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discussed above, the US opted for a multi-faceted and multi-front transnational 
counter-terrorism campaign with the Executive approach, particularly in relation to 
the interpretation of the applicability and scope of certain international legal 
obligations, being heavily criticised. Some of the measures adopted as part of the 
‘War on Terror’ such as components of the HVDP have consistently been referred to 
as unlawful 132  and have subsequently been dismantled. 133  However, as noted by 
Dyzenhaus, all institutional actors involved in the proposal, implementation and 
assessment of national security measures – the Executive in particular – tend to 
demonstrate a compulsion of legality or the compulsion to justify all acts of state as 
having a legal basis or the authority of law.134  
The Executive’s compulsion for legality can set in motion or catalyse two distinct 
cycles of legality. The significant difference between these two cycles can be quite 
important in the context of an intense moral panic, which can influence the Executive 
to undertake a more minimalist approach to its obligations towards the ‘folk 
devils’.135 While in the first cycle the institutions of the legal order cooperate and 
ensure compliance with legality (understood as a substantive conception of the rule of 
law), in the second cycle the content of legality or the rule of law is approached in an 
increasingly more formal or empty manner resulting in the mere appearance or 
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pretence of legality.136 Such an approach to the rule of law is problematic not just in 
itself but also in combination with what has been described by Raz as the “danger 
created by law itself”.137 He noted that the law could be uncertain, unstable or obscure 
and thus potentially infringe on individual rights and freedoms however the rule of 
law is designed to prevent such dangers.138 Thus, the rule of law could be seen as a 
negative virtue – “the evil which is avoided is evil which could only have been caused 
by the law itself”.139  
This “evil within” or uncertainty has also been described as a fault line140 within the 
international legal framework. Fault lines in this context are areas of fracture or 
ambiguity within the international legal framework, which afford states the 
opportunity to reassess and adjust their obligations.  Once identified, these fault lines 
could facilitate the adjustment (improvement) of the law or result in the exploitation 
of the law through the creation of legal grey holes.141 A legal grey hole is not a 
lawless void but is rather a legal space within which there are some legal constraints 
on state actions but these constraints are so weak that they permit governments to 
operate in the manner in which it desires. Such grey holes thus offer the appearance of 
governance in accordance with the rule of law.142 It should be noted however that as 
these areas of uncertainty or fracture can also be used to improve the law, it is the 
state’s approach to legality, which can result in the creation of such legal grey holes. 
Thus, the key consideration is how a state chooses to engage with such fault lines.  
In constructing its ‘War on Terror’ paradigm, the US Executive put forward extensive 
legal arguments in support of its interpretation of the general applicability of the 
human rights framework, relevance of specific humanitarian law provisions to 
individuals captured and detained within the ‘War on Terror’ and the use of 
extraordinary rendition.143  In addition, the US engaged in liability-limiting use of 
diplomatic assurances and private charter companies while operating the rendition 
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circuits arguably demonstrating both a normative acceptance of its obligations and a 
further attempt to provide a veneer of legality to its counter-terrorism measures. As 
will be discussed throughout this thesis starting with Chapter 1, the US aimed to 
provide legal justification for all key and distinct components of HVDP including 
extraordinary renditions and all the various rendition circuit stages as well as create an 
environment within which the applicability of the relevant human rights and 
humanitarian law provisions was uncertain or severely restricted. What could, in this 
context, be described as the US hyper compulsion for legality, or hyper legalism for 
short, triggered or catalysed the second cycle of legality.  
In respect of the scope of jurisdiction and non-refoulement obligations the second 
cycle of legality has been triggered through a very narrow and formal reading and 
application of the letter of the law. This formal reading particularly in respect of the 
concept of jurisdiction and the language and scope of Article 3 UNCAT is akin to 
legal formalism.144 As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, both have been approached 
by the US Executive as having a fixed determinative meaning145 based on the original 
text of the relevant provisions despite subsequent developments and extensions 
through case law and commentary by the relevant UN bodies. In comparison, the 
liability limiting use of diplomatic assurances and private contractors, the restrictions 
on lex specialis and lex generalis and the determination that the ‘War on Terror’ is a 
novel type of armed conflict have all been relied on to provide a veneer of legality for 
the severe restriction on individual rights. The manner in which this veneer of legality 
has been constructed however illustrates an ever more perfunctory approach to 
international legal obligations. This approach has also catalysed the second cycle of 
legality.  
This raises the question of whether this engagement with existing legal obligations in 
combination with the practical operation of expansive and violatory counter-terrorism 
programme such as extraordinary rendition has eroded international human rights 
protections. Concomitantly, it also raises another question – has the international 
human rights framework shown strength and resilience within to resist the corrosive 
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nature of such transnational and violatory counter-terrorism measures? 
 
4. Extraordinary Rendition in the post 9/11 Environment – a Unique Challenge 
to the International Human Rights Framework? 
 
Before proceeding with an assessment of the challenge posed by extraordinary 
renditions to the international human rights framework, the distinction between 
regular and irregular transfers should be outlined. The Venice Commission has 
outlined four situations in which a state may lawfully transfer an individual to another 
state: deportation, extradition, transit and transfer of a sentenced person for the 
purposes of serving their sentence in another country.146 If a transfer involves an 
action or actions which contravene to existing legal standards, it is referred to as an 
irregular transfer.147 The kidnapping of a person in violation of a state’s territorial 
sovereignty or the active or passive facilitation of kidnapping are examples of 
contravening actions. 148  Irregular transfers have also been referred to as 
‘renditions’.149 However, whether the rendition process is actually unlawful depends 
on the laws of the states involved and the applicable international legal framework.150 
The term ‘rendition’ is thus a general term, which refers to the actual result – the 
obtaining of custody over an individual – rather than the means.151  
Martin Scheinin, the UN Special Rapporteur for human rights and counter-terrorism, 
has described rendition as a process which involves the transfer of a person from one 
jurisdiction to another or from the custody of one state to another by various means.152 
A rendition to justice in circumstances where an individual is transferred outside 
formal extradition arrangements however is handed over to another state for the 
purposes of standing trial in that state may be found lawful if there was full 
compliance with non-refoulement obligations.153 However, as noted by the Special 
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Rapporteur, a rendition to justice might involve an unlawful detention. In contrast, an 
extraordinary rendition for the purposes of interrogation and/or detention without 
charge is always impermissible under international law as it places a detained 
individual at risk of ill treatment.154  
 
4.1. Historical Background of Renditions and Existing Jurisprudence 
 
‘Rendition’ or ‘Rendition to justice’ and the practice of irregular transfers are not new 
phenomena at international, regional or domestic level. A particularly public and 
well-known example is the abduction of Adolf Eichmann, Head of Operations for the 
SS. In May 1960, while living under a false identity in Argentina, he was captured by 
Mossad operatives.155 He was transferred to Israel where he faced trial in accordance 
with the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 5710–1950. UNSC 138 
found the violation of the sovereignty of a Member State to be incompatible with the 
UN Charter and declared that such acts if repeated may endanger international 
security and peace.156 Israel was asked to make appropriate reparations in accordance 
with the UN Charter and international law rules. Domestically, in discussing the 
potential impact of the transfer, the District Court of Jerusalem referred to precedents 
from the US and the UK affirming the principle of male captus bene detentus – the 
circumstances of a suspect’s arrest do not compromise the jurisdiction of the trial 
court.157   
Another illustrative example of rendition to justice was the transfer of Ilich Ramirez 
Sanchez, otherwise known as Carlos ‘The Jackal’. He was transferred from Sudan to 
France in 1994 to face a criminal trial on a number of charges relating to terrorist 
activities.158 The Indictments Division Court noted that there was no extradition treaty 
between France and Sudan at the time and the French authorities had made no request 
for the applicant to be detained pending extradition or to be extradited. A decision by 
the Sudanese authorities to transfer an individual was found to be within the sovereign 
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powers of Sudan and thus, in the absence of a treaty, the use of extradition fell within 
Sudan’s sovereign discretion. No extradition proceedings were taken against Mr 
Sanchez and the offences he was charged with were not amongst those listed within 
the extradition procedure under the French Law of 10 March 1927.159 Thus, no breach 
of a provision of a treaty could be established and the applicant was found not to have 
been subject of a ‘disguised extradition’.160 The European Commission on Human 
Rights found that the ECHR did not contain provisions either concerning the 
circumstances in which an extradition may be granted or the procedure to be followed 
before an extradition may be granted. Thus even if the transfer of Mr Sanchez from 
Sudan to France could be described as a disguised extradition, it could not, as such, 
constitute a violation of the ECHR.161 
Reportedly rendition, as part national security strategy, was approved in the US in 
1986.162 According to a classified document, originally the rendition programme was 
used in circumstances where a suspected terrorist was ‘picked up’ from either a) a 
country in which no government exercises effective control (failed state, civil war or 
substantial civil unrest), b) a country known to plan and support international 
terrorism or c) international waters and airspace.163 In 1993, President George H.W. 
Bush reportedly authorised specific procedures for renditions into the US through 
National Security Directive 77, which is still classified. 164  The State Department 
Report on ‘Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001’ lists out 10 cases of rendition of 
terrorist suspects to the US between 1993 and 2001 – in some cases the country of 
capture is not listed.165   
Extraordinary rendition is not strictly a post 9/11 phenomenon. 166  In 1995, US 
intelligence agents reportedly picked up from Croatia one of Egypt’s most wanted 
Islamic militants, placed him on a ship in the Adriatic Sea for the purposes of 
                                               
159 The Law Relating to the Extradition of Foreigners; Loi relative à l'extradition des étrangers. Full 
text available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3e68aadd4.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
160 Ilich Sanchez Ramirez v. France, Application No. 28780/95, European Commission of Human 
Rights, Decision 24 June 1996, p. 158. 
161 Ibid, p. 162. 
162 Satterthwaite, M. and Fisher, A., ‘Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice, Extraordinary Rendition, 
and Human Rights Law’ (2006) 6 The Long Term View 52, p. 55, 66. 
163 Ibid, p. 55. 
164  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc), p.14. 
165  United States Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, full text available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10319.pdf  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
166 For an overview, please refer to Weissbrodt, D. and Bergquist, A., ‘Extraordinary Rendition: A 
Human Rights Analyses’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 123. 
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interrogation and subsequently handed him over to Egyptian authorities.167 His family 
believe that he has been executed in Egypt. 168  In 1998, US agents reportedly 
transferred Tallat Fouad Qassem, a leader of an Egyptian extremist organisation to 
Egypt after he was picked up in Croatia.169  Egyptian lawyers stated that he was 
questioned aboard a US ship off the Croatian coast before he was taken to Cairo 
where a military tribunal had already sentenced him to death in absentia.170  
The post 9/11 operation of extraordinary rendition appears to have been authorised on 
17 September 2001 – just 6 days after the events of 9/11.171 In 2006 President George 
W. Bush acknowledged the existence of the extraordinary rendition programme.172 In 
comparison with the renditions to justice, the scale and span of the rendition circuits 
has been vastly expanded. 54 states provided operational support to various stages of 
the transnational rendition circuits with at least 136 individuals confirmed as rendered 
to incommunicado detention and interrogation facilities between 2001 and 2009.173 
The relatively limited number of individuals affected and the origins of the 
programme prior to 9/11 arguably suggest that extraordinary rendition was an already 
existing challenge to the international human rights framework. The complexity and 
comprehensiveness of the structures required to operate ER on a transnational level, 
the extent of the intelligence sharing and cooperation and the duration of its 
clandestine operation suggest otherwise however. During this period, the 
extraordinary rendition programme developed into a large, complex, transnational and 
multi-actor structure of rights violation including the absolute, jus cogens prohibition 
on torture. The scale, scope, operation and purpose of the renditions circuits thus raise 
severe concerns in relation to the practical enforceability and effectiveness of the 
human rights framework.  
                                               
167 The Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, 
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions” (2004, 
ABCNY & NYU School of Law; New York), p. 9. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Please refer to ACLU v. Department of Defense, 04 Civ. 4151, Sixth Declaration of Marilyn A. 
Dorn Information Review Officer (CIA), pp. 34-35 available at 
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/safefree/20070110/cia_dorn_declaration_items_1_29_61.p
df [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
172  Stolberg, S. G., ‘President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantanamo’ The New York Times 7 
September 2006, full text available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/07/us/07detain.html?pagewanted=all  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
173  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc), p.12. 
 38
 
4.2. Post 9/11 Operation and Examination of Extraordinary Rendition 
 
There has been much work done establishing the contours of the programme and 
outlining the violations that extraordinary rendition entails, however much of that 
work has characterised it as a case of ‘simple’ violation of international human rights 
law.174 The existing academic commentary as well as the various UN and regional 
reports has approached these irregular transfers by outlining the list of international 
and regional human rights provisions that have been violated and concluding that the 
operation of extraordinary rendition is detrimental to individual rights protections.  
This thesis approaches the issue from a different and original standpoint by not only 
establishing the violations but also exploring whether these violations were perhaps in 
part facilitated by practical enforcement deficiencies and areas of legal uncertainty 
within human rights law and international humanitarian law. In other words, it 
explores whether, by operationalising the extraordinary rendition programme, the US 
and other implicated counties were manipulating and exploiting perceived or existing 
gaps within the international legal system through misapplication or hyper legalistic 
interpretation of the law. Hyper legalism throughout this thesis refers to the hyper 
compulsion of the US to provide a veneer of legality to every facet of its transnational 
counter-terrorism campaign; a compulsion which resulted in either a very formal or 
empty reading and application of the letter of the law for the purposes of exploiting it, 
as discussed further above. Concomitantly, the thesis assesses what are drivers or 
interpretation catalysts behind this particular approach to the rule of law and the 
significance of these catalysts for Executive decision making. As will be 
demonstrated in the chapters that follow, hyper legalism has been used to identify 
existing or create new areas of definitional uncertainty. Once these areas have been 
                                               
174 Satterthwaite, “M. Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law” (2007) 75 
George Washington Law Review 1; Satterthwaite, M., “Extraordinary Rendition and Disappearances in 
the “War on Terror”” (2006) 10 Gonzaga Journal of International Law 70; Weissbrodt, D. and 
Bergquist, A. “Extraordinary Rendition and the Torture Convention”, (2005) 46 Virginia Journal of 
International Law 586; Council of Europe, Secretary General’s Report under Article 52 ECHR on the 
Question of Secret Detention and Transport of Detainees Suspected of Terrorist Acts, notably by or at 
the instigation of Foreign Agencies, available here 
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=976731&Site=COE [last accessed 30 March 2016]; Committee on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers 
involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2006) 16 Part II; Irish Human Rights 
Commission, “Extraordinary Rendition: A Review of Ireland’s Human Rights Obligations” (2007, 
Dublin; Irish Human Rights Commission). 
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uncovered, they have been engaged in a manner allowing for or providing legitimacy 
to violatory behaviour.  
The analysis identifies the engagement of private corporate actors as a gap within the 
international legal framework while the strict interpretation of jurisdictional rules and 
the liability-limiting use of diplomatic assurances are classified as perceived gaps 
exploited by the US through hyper legalism. These are conceptualised in the thesis in 
combination as having been utilised to create an environment within which 
extraordinary rendition was pursued. The thesis thus explores how extraordinary 
rendition — a large, complex, transnational and multi-actor structure of rights 
violation — became operational through US hyper legalism which took advantage of 
conceptual spaces of uncertainty and enforceability deficiencies within the 
international legal framework. In so doing, the operation of the extraordinary 
rendition programme raises important questions about the structures and capacity of 
international human rights provisions from an effectiveness perspective.   
The discussion of these questions will begin with an outline of the severity of the 
challenge posed by the rendition circuits through a set of four case studies. The 
relevant domestic provisions and existing jurisprudence on irregular transfers within 
the US as an authorising/sending state will be examined first. The analysis will add to 
the assessment of Executive decision making process and the interpretation catalysts 
which influenced the US hyper legalistic approach and led to the construction and 
operationalisation of extraordinary renditions in their post 9/11 iteration. The cases 
studies of Shannon Airport (Ireland) and the island of Diego Garcia will highlight 
how transit states have facilitated extraordinary renditions either by providing flyover 
rights, refuelling/stopover transit services and/or temporary detention facilities. These 
two examples will further highlight the state obligations engaged, if any, depending 
on whether a rendee is on board a rendition circuit flight during a transit stopover or 
not. The obligations of Syria as a receiving state and by proxy the US as a 
sending/authorising state will be assessed last with particular focus on the 
consequences of an extraordinary rendition once a person’s transfer is complete.  
The aim of Chapter 1 is thus to illustrate the important role that jurisdictional analysis 
has played in involving third states to facilitate extraordinary renditions, especially in 
conjunction with diplomatic assurances and the multitude of violations the 
programme engages in. The assessment of the effectiveness of the accountability 
mechanisms within the human rights framework in the post 9/11 context will start 
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within this Chapter and will be a recurring theme explored throughout the thesis. The 
assessment of the four case studies will be further used to introduce the recurring 
theme of discourse between national and international legal standards and in 
particular to what extent international legal standards influence and form an 
enforceable part of national law. The domestic enforceability of international 
provisions will also be discussed within Chapter 4 with reference to the concept of 
jurisdiction. 
The next step in assessing the challenge posed by extraordinary rendition on 
individual rights protections is the examination of the relevant international legal 
standards (international humanitarian law and international human rights law) and the 
principle of jus cogens, which should have offered protections to individuals rendered 
as part of HVDP. Chapter 1 of the thesis will first focus on the applicability of core 
human rights and humanitarian law provisions and argue that extraordinary rendition 
was illegal as the law was understood and applied by states as at 10 September 2001. 
The Chapter will then assess the post 9/11 US interpretation of what constitutes an 
‘armed conflict’ and the significance of their approach to the applicable lex specialis 
and lex generalis to the operation of extraordinary rendition. This Chapter will begin 
the examination of the fashioned or existing gaps within the international legal 
framework.  
Diplomatic assurances and memoranda of understanding and whether they constitute 
a limitation on the applicability of the international legal framework with reference to 
the anti-torture norm will then be assessed in Chapter 3. The absoluteness of the anti-
torture norm will be examined through a study of international, regional and domestic 
jurisprudence with particular emphasis on whether it should be possible to have 
diplomatic assurances or memoranda of understanding relating to the positive 
obligations of the anti-torture norm. The thesis argues that diplomatic assurances and 
memoranda of understanding are an example of the minimalist approach adopted by 
certain states after 9/11 towards international rights norms resulting in the restricted 
practical enforceability of these norms.  
As will be demonstrated through the case law analysis – in respect of regular and 
irregular transfers – within Chapter 3, due to their nature diplomatic assurances and 
memoranda of understanding are unreliable and unenforceable and thus in the context 
of the non-derogable non-refoulement obligations there is arguably a strong 
presumption that the promises contained within instruments will not be sufficient to 
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provide the necessary safeguards. Existing regional and international case law 
including the post 9/11 ECtHR cases on extraordinary renditions will be used to 
demonstrate this point. However it will also be discussed that the comprehensive 
multi-prong tests developed by the ECtHR and the relevant international bodies 
suggest that in theory diplomatic assurances could exceptionally offer the necessary 
safeguards in relation to regular transfers. It will be shown that this is not the case in 
the context of extraordinary renditions.  From this perspective diplomatic assurances 
can be seen as a milder manifestation of the minimalist approach towards 
international human rights norms and extraordinary rendition as a far more severe 
manifestation. Both however sit on a spectrum of exploitation and male fides 
interpretation of international legal obligations. 
The concept of jurisdiction and whether states and the US in particular have adopted a 
hyper legalistic approach towards it post 9/11, will be assessed through an 
examination of the evolving regional and international jurisprudence on the 
extraterritorial application of human rights provisions. Chapter 4 will also discuss the 
concept of jurisdiction as a condition necessary to engage state responsibility for 
transnational counter-terrorism programmes such as extraordinary rendition. The 
emphasis will be on whether states have attempted to limit their obligations by 
refuting the extraterritorial application of the relevant human rights treaties. The role 
and significance of transit states will be addressed with reference to how their 
involvement feeds into the extraordinary rendition landscape through an analysis of 
the recent ECtHR decisions on the matter.  
The core question of whether the international legal framework itself has facilitated 
the operation of extraordinary rendition due to practical effectiveness deficiencies will 
be further illustrated by a discussion on the use of private military contractors and the 
post 9/11 scope of intelligence cooperation in Chapter 5. The growing role of private 
operators in transnational military or counter-terrorism operations has become a 
significant contemporary challenge for the effective protections of international 
human rights law and is arguably another existing ‘gap’. In outlining the operative 
importance of these private contractors for the rendition circuits, the emphasis will be 
on the exposed practical effectiveness deficiencies of the current international legal 
framework. Private companies have also been increasingly as part of intelligence 
gathering and processing. While bilateral and multilateral intelligence sharing and 
cooperation is not a new phenomenon, the scope, span and capabilities of the 
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contemporary means of data gathering and sharing and in particular, the use of such 
data within the HDVP has raised serious concerns for the reliability of individual 
rights and protections.   
As a conclusion the accountability, transparency and protection mechanisms, which 
have been utilised to expose the operation of extraordinary rendition will be discussed 
with reference to the current initiatives seeking to strengthen the practical 
enforceability of the human rights framework. The concluding remarks will also 
assess whether despite the challenge posed by the ‘War on Terror’ paradigm in 
general and extraordinary renditions in particular the human rights framework has 
demonstrated strength and resilience within to resist the corrosive nature of ever more 
expansive and transnational counter-terrorism measures. 
All of the above discussions will then form part of the answer to the central question 
of this thesis: has extraordinary rendition through a hyper legalistic exploitation of 
perceived and existing gaps exposed practical ineffectiveness deficiencies within the 
human rights framework and thus eroded the framework in its current form?  
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Chapter 1: The Rendition Circuits in Practice – Four Case Studies  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001, both the United States (US) and 
the United Kingdom (UK) declared a ‘war on terror’.175 What was described as “a 
lengthy campaign unlike any other” 176  was aimed at defeating and eradicating 
international terrorism or “the new evil of our world” .177 A number of contentious 
counter-terrorism measures designed to pre-empt and prevent future acts of terrorism 
were introduced as part of this transnational counter-terrorism campaign. 178 
Extraordinary rendition – which has since become synonymous with multiple 
violations of human rights – was one of these measures. 179  The UN Special 
Rapporteur on Human Rights and Counter-Terrorism has expressly stated that 
extraordinary renditions resulting in the outsourcing of torture are “impermissible 
under international law”.180 Yet the rendition circuits operated transnationally with the 
strategic and operative support of a number of states. The various key stages of this 
operation will be the focus of this chapter. 
                                               
175 The phrase ‘war on terror’ was used by President George W Bush on 21 September 2001 in an 
address to a joint session of. Please see further ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address’, CNN News 21 
September 2001. British Prime Minister Tony Blair used the phrase ‘at war with terrorism’ on 16 
September 2001 as a response to reports that the death toll of British citizens was between 200 to 300 
following the events of 9/11. Please see further ‘Britain at War with Terrorism’, BBC News, 16 
September 2001. 
176 ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address’, CNN News 21 September 2001. 
177 Description by Tony Blair made on 11 September 2001 during his statement to the nation. ‘Blair’s 
statement in full’, BBC News, 11 September 2001. 
178 See for example the Annual and Quadrennial US Defence Reviews immediately following 9/11. 
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 2002 is one illustrative example as it 
emphasises expressly on the legitimacy of pre-emption and pre-emptive actions (pages 6, 15, 16 in 
particular), full text available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [last accessed 
30 March 2016]. 
179 See the strong criticisms contained in the following reports: International Commission of Jurists, 
Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (2009, 
Geneva; ICJ); All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition, Extraordinary Rendition: 
Closing the Gap - A proposal to Criminalise UK Involvement, available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2009/nov/uk-apg-extraordinary-rendition-closing-the-gap.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]; European Parliament Plenary Sessions, Extraordinary Renditions: EU 
Member States are also Responsible, MEPs say, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=IM-
PRESS&reference=20090218IPR49768&language=EN [last accessed 30 March 2016] amongst many 
others. 
180  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism: Mission to the United States of America, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, paras. 36 – 38. 
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The practice of extraordinary rendition comprises of grave and multiple violations of 
international obligations. Through an examination of four case studies each 
representing a strategic operative point of the rendition circuits – sending/authorising 
state, transit states and receiving states – the subsequent analysis will illustrate these 
violations and argue that extraordinary rendition has severely challenged the 
perception that IHRL has the capacity to effectively protect individual rights and to 
uphold the absolute, jus cogens prohibition on torture. The obligations of the US as an 
authorising and sending state will be discussed first. The analysis will focus on the 
relevant domestic provisions and jurisprudence applicable to regular and irregular 
transfers and discuss why the US choose to engage in extraordinary renditions instead 
of renditions to trial which had been previously relied on. In this context, the analysis 
will address the Executive decision making in relation to the post 9/11 iteration of 
renditions and the interpretation catalysts that drove the decision process. 
The role of transit states in facilitating rendition circuits will be discussed next 
through two case studies: the island of Diego Garcia as transit point type 1 and 
Shannon Airport as transit point type 2. The potential state obligations engaged will 
be assessed on the basis of whether there was or was not a rendee on board when a 
flight on the rendition circuit landed at a particular transit point. With reference to 
applicable reports and existing evidence, it will be argued that the regional and 
international obligations potentially engaged are distinct due to the different purposes 
Diego Garcia and Shannon Airport were used for. Shannon Airport (Ireland) offered 
airport stopover and refuelling services as well as the flyover rights the US had 
negotiated with Ireland. In comparison, the island of Diego Garcia provided 
temporary detention facilities in addition to airport stopover and refuelling. The final 
destination of an extraordinary rendition – the receiving state – will be examined with 
reference to Syria. The use of Syrian detention and interrogation facilities within the 
high value detainee programme (HVDP) demonstrates that despite the existing IHRL 
protections on non-refoulement individuals were nevertheless subjected to 
incommunicado detention and enhanced interrogation.181  
                                               
181 The enhanced interrogation techniques have been described as involving conduct amounting to a 
breach of the prohibition on torture and any form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. Please see 
further Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to the United States of America, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 33. 
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Through these four case studies, this chapter will commence the discussion on 
existing or fashioned gaps the US has relied on in order to operationalise 
extraordinary rendition. Through these four case studies, this chapter will commence 
the discussion on existing or fashioned gaps the US has relied on in order to 
operationalise extraordinary rendition. The subsequent analysis will argue that the 
liability limiting use of diplomatic assurances to fulfil non-refoulement obligations 
both in the context of transit and receiving states182 and the strictly territorial scope of 
the concept of jurisdiction183 post 9/11 demonstrate a normative appreciation by the 
US of at least some of its international legal obligations. However the US’ hyper 
legalistic approach towards these concepts has resulted in their development into legal 
grey holes. The subsequent analysis will aim to outline how the US has been able to 
operationalise a transnational counter-terrorism programme such as extraordinary 
rendition through the creation and reliance on these legal grey holes.  
 
2. Initiation of the Rendition Circuits: The ‘Authorising/Sending State’  
 
In December 2005, Condoleezza Rice described the use of renditions by the US as “a 
vital tool” in combatting international terrorism.184 She did not refer to these irregular 
transfers as extraordinary renditions but rather as renditions to justice (or trial), which 
based on precedent were permissible under international law.185 In the following year, 
George W Bush did acknowledge the use of extraordinary renditions as a core 
component of HVDP.186 He expressly stated that it was necessary to transfer certain 
individuals captured “in Afghanistan, in Iraq and other fronts of this war on terror” to 
an “environment where they can be held secretly” and interrogated outside of the 
US.187 He emphasised strongly however that HVDP and its constituent elements had 
been “subject to multiple legal reviews” by the Department of Justice, were in 
                                               
182 The suitability of diplomatic assurance and Memoranda of Understanding as a means to satisfy or 
fulfil non-refoulement obligations will be the focus of Chapter 3. 
183 The concept of jurisdiction and the reluctance of states to recognize the extraterritorial application of 
human rights obligations will be examined in Chapter 4.  
184  ‘Full Text: Rice defends US policy’, BBC News, 5 December 2005, full text available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4500630.stm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
185 Ibid. She specifically referred to the example of Carlos ‘The Jackal’, which has been discussed in 
the Introductory Chapter of this thesis. 
186 ‘Transcript: President Bush’ Speech on Terrorism’ The New York Times, 6 September 2006, full text 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all 
[last accessed 30 March 2016].  
187 Ibid. 
 46
compliance with existing US laws and legal obligations and were receiving “strict 
oversight” by the CIA’s Inspector General.188  
These, at the time, persistent links to renditions to justice and by proxy existing 
international and domestic jurisprudence as well as the adamant reaffirmations of the 
supervision and protection enforcement mechanisms in place suggest that the US 
Executive was eager to provide a veneer of legality to extraordinary renditions. This 
eagerness could have been out of perceived national security necessity – the desire to 
thwart an impending terrorist threat – or operational necessity to ensure the continued 
transnational operation of the programme without incurring the ire of US partner 
states and/or to limit reputational damage. The reason or reasons behind this 
insistence on legality is also arguably linked to the initial decision to engage in 
transnational rendition circuits rather than renditions to justice and the catalysts 
behind this decision.     
The following section will outline briefly the domestic US approach towards regular 
transfers especially of those considered to pose a threat to national security before 
discussing the existing history of the US as a state authorising and engaging in 
irregular transfers and renditions to trial. Section 2.3 will then assess the US 
Executive’s drivers for hyper legality in relation to the rendition circuits and their 
various stages post 9/11 and the interpretation catalysts which have arguably driven 
this compulsion. It will be argued that this compulsion triggered the so-called second 
cycle of legality where the legal provisions are increasingly approached in a formal or 
empty manner with just the mere pretence of legality existing.189  
 
2.1. Relevant Statutory Provisions governing Regular Transfers and General 
Approach to International Legal Standards  
 
The general US approach towards the international legal framework is one of severely 
limiting the potential impact of international obligations domestically if and when 
necessary. These limitations are achieved through a combination of the self/non-self 
executing treaties and ‘last in time’ doctrines together with the domestic 
implementation of international provisions such as those relating to transfers. The 
regulation of regular transfers under domestic US law is governed by the Foreign 
                                               
188 Ibid. 
189 See further Section 3 of the Introductory Chapter. 
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Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 (FARRA). Under Section 1242 (a) of 
the Act no person shall be expelled, extradited or otherwise returned to a country 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person would suffer ill–
treatment.190 More significantly, the provision states that an individual should not be 
subjected to such a transfer regardless of whether they are physically present in the 
US. However, aliens191 referred to in Section 241 (b)(3)(B) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) cannot rely on the protections afforded by the aforementioned 
subsections.192  Under this section of INA where there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that an alien poses a danger to the security of the US, this individual can be 
transferred or returned to a country where there is a risk that his life or freedom would 
be threatened. 193  These “reasonable grounds” include a range of terrorist related 
activities or suspected involvement with terrorist organisations as listed in Section 
212(a)(3) INA.194 
Immigration legislation especially in relation to transfers, as illustrated by certain 
provisions of INA, has been increasingly relied on as part of the US’ counter-
terrorism toolkit.195 In the US, if an immigration judge determines that an alien is 
more likely than not to be tortured upon transfer, the removal to another country could 
be withheld196 or deferred.197 However, aliens who are suspected of having engaged 
in terrorist activity including those who are suspected of having provided material 
support to terrorist organisations can be removed or denied entry to the US even if 
they face ill treatment including torture abroad. 198  Under Section 235 (c) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) such an individual may be 
removed/transferred out of the US without further hearing. Such a transfer would 
                                               
190 Section 1242 - United States Policy with Respect to the Involuntary Return of Persons in Danger of 
Subjection to Torture, Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998 full text available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105hrpt432/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt432.pdf [last accessed 30 March 
2016].   
191 Under 8 U.S. Code § 1101 (a) (3) the term “alien” refers to any person who is not a citizen or 
national of the United States.  
192 Please refer to Section 1242 (c) Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998. 
193 The full text of Article 241 (b)(3)(B) and the Immigration and Nationality Act are available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/act.html [last accessed 30 March 2016].   
194  The full text of Section 212 (a)(3)(B) is available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/iframe/ilink/docView/SLB/HTML/SLB/act.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
195 See also the Introductory Chapter on this point. 
196 Subsection 208.16, Title 8, Code of Federal Regulation.  
197 Subsection 208.17, Title 8, Code of Federal Regulation.  
198 Section 212 (a)(3)(B) and (F) Immigration and Nationality Act. 
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occur if an immigration officer or an immigration judge suspects that an alien arriving 
at the US may be inadmissible on security and related grounds.199  
If the Attorney General is then satisfied on the basis of the provided “confidential 
information” that an alien is inadmissible on these grounds and disclosure of the 
information would be prejudicial to the public interest or security, he may order the 
alien to be removed without further inquiry. 200  Under Section 235.8 (4) Federal 
Regulations Code (FRC), a removal cannot occur in circumstances, which would 
violate Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT)201 or Section 241 
(b)(3)(A) INA.202 However Section 241 (b)(3)(B), outlined above with reference to 
FARRA, also operates here as an exception to the Section 235.8 (4) FRC provisions. 
This approach to non-refoulement protections under Article 3 UNCAT is reflective of 
the overall US approach to international legal obligations. For many years the US has 
been reluctant in signing up to and/or ratifying international human rights treaties.203 
The process through which international legal instruments are incorporated in 
domestic law is quite illustrative of this reluctance. The Senate has deemed the 
majority of international treaties to which the US is a part to be non-self executing.204 
Non-self executing treaties are only binding on domestic US law if they have been 
incorporated by legislation.205 Thus if such treaties have not been incorporated, they 
cannot be relied upon in domestic proceedings as a regulatory constraint on the 
Government’s legislative powers or policies. If such a treaty has been incorporated, 
                                               
199 Section 235 (c) INA. The Section does not expand on how an immigration judge or an official are 
given access to the confidential information or how they assess it.  
200Section 235 (c)(2)(B) Immigration and Nationality Act. 
201 Under Article 3 UNCAT: “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture.” 
202 Section 241 (b)(3)(A) Immigration and Nationality Act states that “the Attorney General may not 
remove an alien to a country if the Attorney General decides that the alien’s life or freedom would be 
threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular 
group, or political opinion.” Full text of the Section available at 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/08/15/withholding.pdf [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
203 See further Gearty, C., ‘Terrorism and Human Rights’ in Gearty, C., Essays on Human Rights and 
Terrorism: Comparative Approaches to Civil Liberties in Asia, the EU and North America (2008, 
London; Cameron May Publishers), p. 580; Douzinas, C., Human Rights and Empire: The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (2007, New York; Routledge-Cavendish). 
204  See Reisman, W. M., ‘US Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator 
Bricker’, (1995) 89 American Journal of International Law 341; Paust, J., ‘Self Executing Treaties’, 
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Congress can utilise the ‘last in time’ doctrine.206 This doctrine allows Congress to 
pass an incompatible law that will overtake the effect of an incorporated treaty 
provided the law was passed ‘last in time’. Where a principle of international human 
rights law can be said to form part of customary law, it forms part of federal common 
law.207 As the ‘last in time’ doctrine also applies to federal common law, the effect of 
customary international law can be undone by legislation.208  
The overall US approach towards the international legal framework is thus one of first 
restricting the general applicability of the relevant international legal instrument and 
then through additional legislation severely limiting the potential impact of specific 
international provisions if and when necessary. The approach seems to follow what 
Grotius has described as such an adjustment that in case of a “dire necessity”, laws – 
in this case international legal provisions – are not binding.209 While this may be an 
exaggeration, the ever present possibility that international treaty provisions may 
cease to be enforceable or are limited in scope within the US due to the above 
doctrines, suggests that the institutions of legal order have devised certain controls to 
ensure that Executive and Legislative decisions can and do comply with international 
legal obligations at any given time even if there are substantial changes to national 
security policy for example. This approach is akin to the first cycle of legality where 
institutional decisions comply with the principle of legality; legality being understood 
as a substantive conception and appreciation of the rule of law.210 The comprehensive 
legislative effort – ratification of international treaties and domestic law-making 
processes – suggests that the US has a normative acceptance and understanding of its 
international obligations. However, the utilisation of legislative control mechanisms 
such as the self/non-self executing treaties and ‘last in time’ doctrines indicates a 
reluctance to fully internalise these obligations into domestic policy and an overall 
restrictive approach towards international law. Sections 1242 (a) FARRA and 235.8 
(4) FRC limiting the operation of non-refoulement protections in respect of aliens 
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suspected of terrorism is a good example of how the US has constrained or controlled 
the domestic scope of international obligations. 
Thus, while domestic regular transfer procedures have aimed to afford protections to 
individuals in compliance with international legal obligations such as those under 
UNCAT, the US government has at its disposal rather flexible legislative means to 
remove or deport terrorist suspects even in circumstances where there is a risk of ill 
treatment in the receiving country. More importantly, the US can choose to alter or 
cease its existing obligations under international treaties through the self/non-self 
executing treaties and ‘last in time’ doctrines. Concomitantly, the US has a long 
history of authorising and engaging in irregular transfers such as renditions to justice 
or trial as will be outlined in the immediately following section. Yet despite this 
domestic legislative framework, the US opted to instead operationalise extraordinary 
renditions as a more suitable response to the events of 9/11; a response which will be 
the focus of Section 2.3. 
 
2.2. Existing Jurisprudence and History of the US as an ‘Authorising State’ of 
Irregular Transfers 
 
The reliance by the US on irregular transfers such as renditions is not a post 9/11 
phenomenon. The US courts have adjudicated on irregular transfers and renditions to 
trial as early as 1886. In the earliest case of Ker v. Illinois,211 the US Supreme Court 
found that a forcible abduction was not a sufficient reason to remove the jurisdiction 
of a court to try an offence and invalidate the trial. In a subsequent 1952 case also 
involving a forcible abduction – Frisbie v. Collins212  - the Court reaffirmed the 
decision in Ker. The Court found that the power to try a person was not impaired by 
the manner in which an individual was brought to the jurisdiction of the Court.213 The 
Court further stated that the Constitution did not require a court to permit an 
individual who was rightfully convicted to escape justice on the basis of being 
brought to trial against their will.214     
The courts have however been less willing to accept jurisdiction in circumstances 
where a rendition to justice has involved ill treatment or the cooperation of the US 
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itself. In United States v. Toscanino,215 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
refused to exercise jurisdiction over an individual who was convicted on a charge of 
conspiracy to import drugs in the US. Francisco Toscanino was sentenced to 20 years 
in prison following a conviction in the Eastern District Court of New York.216 He 
argued that en route to the US he had been tortured in Brazil by his captors. With 
reference to previous precedent, the Court of Appeal did note that jurisdiction 
obtained through “an indisputably illegal act” might be exercised even though this 
would in practice be rewarding “police brutality and lawlessness” in certain cases.217  
However the Court found that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could not be reconciled with 
the Supreme Court’s expansion of the concept of due process. Thus, in circumstances 
where there was a conflict between the two principles, due process would be supreme 
and would require a court to divest itself of jurisdiction over an individual who was 
subjected to unnecessary and unreasonable violation of constitutional rights during a 
transfer. Further, the Court distinguished Ker218 and Frisbie219 on the basis that unlike 
this case, they did not involve violation of international obligations undertaken by the 
US. Both cases were decided before the Security Council 1960 Resolution 
condemning the rendition to justice (or “international kidnapping” as referred to by 
the Court of Appeals) of Adolf Eichmann as a violation of the UN Charter.220  
The 1992 case of United States v. Alvarez-Machain221 is illustrative of the pre 9/11 
domestic US courts’ approach to renditions to justice. Mr Alvarez-Machain, a 
Mexican citizen and resident, was forcibly kidnapped from his home and transferred 
to the US to stand trial for his involvement in the kidnapping and murder of a Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent in 1985. The US Supreme Court relying on the 
cases of United States v. Rauscher,222 Ker v. Illinois223 and Frisbie v. Collins,224 found 
                                               
215 500 F. 2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974). Full text available at 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2200276?seq=6 [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
216 U.S. v. Toscanino, 398 F.Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 10, 1975) (No. 73 CR 194). 
217 Ibid, 272-273. 
218 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225 (1886). 
219 342 U.S. 519, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937, 72 S.Ct. 509 (1952). 
220 500 F. 2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974), 277, rehearing denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974).  
221 504 U.S. 655 (1992).   
222 119 U.S. 407 (1886). In this case, the Supreme Court found that a person who has been brought to 
the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of proceedings under an extradition treaty, could only be tried for 
one of the offences described in that treaty, and for the offence with which he was charged in the 
extradition proceedings. 
223 119 U.S. 436 (1886). In this case, decided on the same day as Rauscher and written by the same 
justice, the court distinguished the case from Rauscher on the basis that Mr Ker was not brought to the 
US by virtue of an extradition treaty between the US and Peru.  
224 342 U.S. 519, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952).  
 52
that the language of the Extradition Treaty between the US and Mexico225 in the 
context of its history did not prohibit abductions outside of its terms. Thus, to infer 
from the Treaty that it prohibits all means of capturing an individual outside of the 
Treaty’s terms would be to go beyond the established precedent and practice. Further, 
to imply from the terms of the Treaty that it prohibited the obtaining of an individual 
in a manner outside the established procedures required a substantial “inferential leap” 
only supported by the most general principles of international law.226 In United States 
v. Best227 - a case decided post 9/11 – the Circuit Court reaffirmed that the manner of 
the capture would not ordinarily affect the court’s power to try a defendant.  
Apart from the courts’ jurisprudence, renditions to trial have also featured within US 
defence strategy since the late 1980s. In 1986, the US National Program for 
Combatting Terrorism stated that US citizens and installations, particularly abroad, 
were increasingly being targeted by terrorism and thus that US counter-terrorism 
policies had to be effective in ameliorating the threat to US people, property and 
interests. 228  Within the list of Immediate Recommendations to be implemented, 
emphasis was placed on improving intelligence sharing and international cooperation 
in combatting terrorism through both bi- and multi-lateral agreements.229 Particular 
emphasis was placed on concluding agreements for more effective measures of 
apprehending, extraditing and prosecuting known terrorists.230 The establishment of a 
clandestine capability for preventing, pre-empting and/or disrupting international 
terrorist activity was also recommended.231  
While rendition was not expressly referred to in the declassified sections of the 1986 
National Program, reportedly it was approved then. 232  Allegedly, the rendition 
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programme was originally used in circumstances where a suspected terrorist was 
‘picked up’ from either a country in which no government exercises effective control, 
a country known to plan and support international terrorism or international waters 
and airspace.233 In 1993, President George H.W. Bush reportedly authorised specific 
procedures for renditions into the US through National Security Directive 77.234 This 
Directive is still classified. The State Department Report on ‘Patterns of Global 
Terrorism 2001’ lists out ten cases of rendition of terrorist suspects to the US between 
1993 and 2001 – in some cases the country of capture is not listed.235  
Thus, the pre 9/11 operation of irregular transfers or renditions appears to have been 
very limited in scope and subject to detailed operative procedures. On the basis of the 
existing domestic jurisprudence as reaffirmed by the 2002 Best case and statutory 
provisions, the US could potentially have continued to engage in rendition to trial in a 
post 9/11 world. Sections 1242 (a) FARRA and 235.8 (4) FRC do afford non-
refoulement protections to individuals who may not be physically present in the US. 
However, in the context of other applicable statutory provisions offering limited, if 
any, protections to individual terror suspects, it appears that an extraordinary rendition 
transporting an alien suspected of terrorism to a country where there is a risk of ill 
treatment, may not be a violation of US domestic laws. Even if such a rendition could 
potentially amount to a violation of the relevant statutory provisions, the existing 
jurisprudence suggests that the US courts would be unwilling to adjudicate on the 
case. 
And yet the US chose to develop and operationalise transnational rendition circuits 
instead of relying on its existing legislative and national security counter-terrorism 
toolkit. The following section will complement the Introductory Chapter discussion 
on moral panic and interpretation catalysts in assessing further why the rendition 
circuits were seen as “a vital tool” in combatting international terrorism by the US 
Executive.236    
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2.3. Post 9/11 Use of Extraordinary Renditions: Catalysts and Hyper Legalism 
 
Following the events of 9/11, the world has been described as intrinsically insecure 
and unpredictable; a world within which the immediately following moral panic was 
an intense and collective one desperately requiring a collective enemy against whom 
forceful and decisive action could be taken.237 The threat of international terrorism 
was deemed unprecedented and resulted in a highly charged atmosphere within which 
states and international bodies alike were preoccupied with comprehensively 
improving domestic, transnational and international security. 238  Such a powerful 
triggering event was likely to compel the US Executive to both construct a swift 
response to prevent and pre-empt further security threats and to consider, determine 
and assert – publicly or not – the necessary legal interpretation required to adopt and 
operationalise such a response.239  
Thus, arguably, one of the first outcomes prompted by the post 9/11 intense and 
lingering moral panic has been the extent of US Executive involvement in the 
interpretation of US’ international obligations and the type of measures to be adopted 
in order to respond to the unprecedented terrorist threat. Through a variety of different 
instruments such as Executive Orders and Memos by the Office of the Legal Counsel, 
the Executive legal interpretation on issues such as the non-applicability of IHRL as 
lex generalis, the very restricted definition of torture240 and the irrelevance of specific 
provisions such as Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions aimed to provide 
the substantive and most relevant statements of law in these legal areas. 241 
Concomitantly, the US Executive relied on these determinations to provide a legal 
justification for every component of the HVDP including extraordinary renditions.242 
For example, torture was described as the infliction of such prolonged and severe pain 
                                               
237 Jenkins, D., et al (eds.), The Long Decade: How 9/11 Changed the Law (2014, New York; Oxford 
University Press), p. 6. 
238 Please refer to the discussion in the Introductory Chapter. 
239 Ingber, R., ‘Interpretation Catalysts and Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking’, (2013) 38 The 
Yale Journal of International Law 359, p. 367. 
240 Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for 
Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, Washington, D.C. 20530, full text available at 
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.08.01.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
241 These will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
242  See for example Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Summary of the High Value 
Terrorist Detainee Program, Washington DC 20511 and Executive Orders 13284 (2003) and 13355 
(2004). 
 55
that it results in “a sufficiently serious condition or injury such as death, organ failure, 
or serious impairment of body function” or the “most egregious conduct”. 243 
‘Enhanced’ interrogations – the end goal of an extraordinary rendition – were deemed 
not to reach the threshold of this definition.244 Diplomatic assurances were requested 
from receiving states promising not to engage in ill treatment and these assurances 
were relied on despite the poor human rights record of these states suggesting that ill 
treatment could occur as the example of Syria will demonstrate. This hyper 
compulsion to coat every stage of the rendition circuits in a veil of legality or hyper 
legalism seems to have triggered the second cycle of legality where law is understood 
in an ever more empty manner until only the pretence of legality remains.245 
Through this legalism in addition to the already existing restrictive approach towards 
its international legal obligations, the US arguably aimed to achieve the following 
objectives. One goal was to create and exploit spaces of legal uncertainty within 
which the rendition circuits could operate. In one such example, the operation of 
IHRL as lex generalis was interpreted as inapplicable to the ‘War on Terror’246 thus 
rendering IHRL protections inaccessible to individuals captured as part of HVDP. 
Then, by relying on transit points such as Diego Garcia and Shannon Airport and 
outsourcing its enhanced interrogation to receiving states like Syria, the US sought to 
limit even further its international legal obligations including non-refoulement. The 
potential obligations engaged for these transit points and Syria will be discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
3. Rendition Circuits and Transit States: Diego Garcia and Shannon Airport 
 
Following the invocation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty,247 the NATO 
Allies recommended a range of measures in order to combat and respond to the threat 
of terrorism including US access to ports and airfields on the territory of NATO 
nations and enhanced intelligence cooperation, sharing and assistance amongst 
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others.248 In addition, NATO Member States agreed to provide the US with blanket 
over-flight clearances in accordance with the relevant air traffic agreements and 
national procedures in order to assist the transnational campaign against Al Qaeda and 
related terrorist groups.249 As evidence of the operation and scale of the extraordinary 
rendition programme became more public, a number of high-profile investigations 
have subsequently concluded that many European States assisted either actively or 
passively in the transportation of suspects by providing access to airports or 
airspace.250 Implicated states have facilitated the operation of extraordinary rendition 
by assisting in the capture and detention of individuals, providing intelligence leading 
to the capture and transfer of an individual and hosting temporary detention facilities 
in addition to failing to protect rendees from a transfer.251 
The following discussion will assess the potential legal responsibility of two transit 
points each providing different operational support to the rendition circuits. This 
examination will be based on the sliding scale of participation categorisation 
identified by the Marty Report on Inter-state Transfers. 252  The sliding scale 
distinguished between four categories of aircraft landing points, which indicate 
different degrees of collusion and thus legal responsibilities by the countries involved: 
a) “stopover points” where the aircrafts land to refuel, mostly after a rendition on the 
way back home; b) “staging points” from which the operations are often launched; c) 
“one-off pick-up points” from which a detainee or a group of detainees was picked up 
but not part of a regular occurrence and d) “detainee transfer/drop-off points” which 
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were places visited often in the vicinity of a detention facility albeit far off the 
obvious route for just short periods of time.253 These can be more broadly described 
as landing points, which either directly or indirectly facilitated the operation of the 
rendition programme. In this context, potentially assigning legal responsibility to a 
state will depend on whether or not there was a rendee on board when a flight on the 
rendition circuit landed at a particular transit point. The comparative case analysis of 
the island of Diego Garcia as an example of a transit point involving a rendee on 
board and Shannon Airport (Ireland) where there have been no confirmed rendees on 
board will be used to assess the legal responsibility of different types of transit states.  
 
3.1. Transit Point Type 1 (Stopover, Refuelling and Detention Facilities): The Island 
of Diego Garcia 
 
In February 2008, David Miliband admitted that two US aircrafts carrying rendered 
suspects had landed on Diego Garcia Island in 2002.254 This admission followed a 
2007 Council of Europe Report on secret detentions and illegal transfers of 
individuals, which alleged that Diego Garcia was used within the rendition circuit.255 
In March 2008, the then Special Rapporteur on Torture, Manfred Nowak, claimed he 
had received credible evidence that between 2002 and 2003 individuals were detained 
in the large US naval base on the island suggesting that there were more than two 
rendees transferred to Diego Garcia. 256  In response to these allegations, the UK 
government emphasised the number of verbal assurances previously received by the 
US that no individuals would be transported or detained through the territory or 
territorial waters of Diego Garcia. 257 These assurances were however exposed as 
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inadequate following the admission by Mr Miliband. There have been subsequent 
claims that the UK government also shared intelligence with the US, which 
information led to the capture, extraordinary rendition and ill treatment of 
individuals. 258  In addition, evidence has emerged that the US might have held 
detainees on ships operating outside the three-mile zone, which defines British 
territorial waters and maritime jurisdiction.259 While such detention is thus immaterial 
while assessing the potential liability of the UK for facilitating extraordinary 
renditions, it does provide further support and context to the aforementioned 
allegations surrounding the Diego Garcia Island.  
The legal relationship of the island to the UK in the context of the US and UK 
agreement regarding the use of the island for a military base is essential in 
understanding the relevant human rights and jurisdictional framework. The manner in 
which the UK has opted not to extend its regional and international obligations to 
Diego Garcia is particularly important in assessing the UK’s potential liability as a 
transit state. The following section will begin with a brief history of the island as it 
informs the present day legal status of Diego Garcia and why it arguably has been 
used as a detention facility rather than as just a stopover and refuelling site.     
 
3.1.1. Legal History of Diego Garcia  
 
The Chagos Archipelago, to which the Diego Garcia geographically belongs, used to 
be part of the British Empire after the early 19th century.260 In December 1960 the UN 
General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
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Colonial Countries and People, asking countries to grant independence to their 
colonies and urged governing powers to be transferred to the people in the 
colonialized territories without any conditions or reservations. 261  By 1964, the 
Mauritius (and Diego Garcia Island as part of it) was granted an intermediate level of 
self-government and was due to attain full independence by 1968.262 The US had 
however identified the island as a potential military base due to its unique strategic 
location and in 1965 a diplomatic arrangement was offered to the Mauritius.263 Under 
the agreement, the Chagos Archipelago was to be excised from the Mauritius and 
joined with some of the neighbouring outer islands of the British Seychelles in order 
to create a new separate colonial territory. 264 This territory was to be separate from 
both the Mauritius and the Seychelles. The terms were orally agreed on the 
(un)written understanding that the Chagos Islands would revert back to the Mauritius 
when they were no longer needed for defence purposes and a new colony known as 
the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) was formed.265  
As this was however a violation of the December 1960 Declaration, UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2066 (XX) urged the UK to take no action, which would 
dismember the territory and violate the sovereignty of the Mauritius.266 Both UN 
documents were ignored and the UK and US proceeded to establish and gradually 
upgrade under joint administration of the US military facilities on Diego Garcia.267 Of 
particular significance are the express agreements that the base will be used for an 
indefinitely long period and after the initial period of 50 years, which expires in 2016, 
the agreements will remain in force for another 20 years unless terminated by two 
year’s notice.268 Such notice has not been given. The supplementary arrangements of 
1972 and 1976 specify that the agreements relating to the use of the base by the US 
would continue to be in force while the BIOT agreement itself is in force or until such 
time that the UK and US decide that Diego Garcia is no longer required for the 
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purposes of a military base. 269  The creation of BIOT and the disregard towards 
international obligations by the US and UK in the context of the island are illustrative 
of the subsequent approach taken to the extension of regional and international human 
rights standards to Diego Garcia.  
 
3.1.2. Diego Garcia and Jurisdiction: Whose Relevant Regional and International 
Obligations Apply? 
 
Following the initial agreement with the UK to excise the island, the Mauritian 
government has subsequently alleged to have been misled and has sought to reclaim 
Diego Garcia by urging the UK to end its “unlawful occupation” as recently as 
2012.270 A sovereignty claim by the Mauritius is significant as it raises the question of 
which maritime and territorial jurisdiction the US chooses to recognise in the context 
of its military base on Diego Garcia. Currently, the island is surrounded by a 200-mile 
zone claimed by the UK for fisheries management, environment protection and 
preservation and an overlapping 200-mile “exclusive economic zone” claimed by 
Mauritius.271 The British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) has a three-mile territorial 
sea except for the area surrounding Diego Garcia, where BIOT has placed a ban on all 
unauthorised vessels within twelve miles from the shore.272 Thus, the 200-mile zone 
claimed by the UK is contiguous to a three-mile zone of territorial waters while the 
exclusive economic zone declared by the Mauritius is contiguous to a twelve-mile 
territorial zone.273 
The protections of UNCAT, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the UK Human 
Rights Acts 1998 (HRA) have not been extended to BIOT by the UK. UNCAT was 
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ratified in 1988 however it has not been extended to BIOT. 274  In 2002, while 
responding to comments by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), the UK 
government stated that the ICCPR does not apply to BIOT because while the UK 
“ratified the Covenant in respect of itself and certain of its Overseas Territories, it did 
not ratify it in respect of BIOT”. 275  In its Declarations and Reservations upon 
ratification, the UK has expressly extended the application of the ICCPR to certain 
overseas territories – BIOT is not one of them.276 This position was reaffirmed in 
2007 with the UK noting that Overseas Territories retain a special constitutional 
status.277  
In 2008, the House of Lords affirmed that neither the HRA nor the ECHR applied to 
Diego Garcia and the Chagos Islands. 278  The decision was made based on an 
assessment of the applicability of Article 1 ECHR279 with reference to Article 56 (also 
known as the colonial clause Article)280. The House of Lords noted that while the 
ECHR was extended to the Mauritius in 1953, this declaration lapsed when the 
Mauritius became independent.281 No such declaration has been made in relation to 
BIOT, which since 1965 has been a “new political entity”.282 Similarly, the HRA, 
which implements within the UK the rights afforded by the ECHR, was also 
inapplicable as BIOT is not part of the UK.283 In making this finding, Lord Hoffman 
stated “the Human Rights Act, though it may be part of the law of England, has no 
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more relevance in BIOT than a local government statute for Birmingham.”284 Thus, it 
appears that there are very limited human rights protections, if any, to be afforded to 
individuals rendered through the island. 
In May 2002, the UK formally extended Protocols I and II of the Geneva Conventions 
on the Protection of Victims of Armed Conflict to the Chagos Islands.285 It did not 
however take the same approach to Geneva Conventions III and IV on the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War and the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.286 While 
the UK has not extended the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC),287 the Statute may however still apply to BIOT on the basis of 
Article 12.288 Under Article 12 (2), the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction over a State 
Party if a crime under Article 5289 has occurred on board a vessel or aircraft registered 
to that state or when an individual accused of a crime under Article 5 is a national of 
that state. 
In comparison, the Mauritius has ratified the ICCPR, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and UNCAT. The full protections of 
these international documents have been afforded to Diego Garcia, which could 
become significant in the context of the sovereignty claims over the Chagos Islands. 
The Rome Statute was also ratified in 2002 however the Mauritius subsequently 
reached a bilateral immunity agreement with the US exempting US personnel on its 
territory from the jurisdiction of the ICC.290 In relation to the disagreements on the 
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issue of sovereignty, the US has noted that legally this is an issue strictly between the 
UK and the Mauritius and not relevant to the US and its military base.291  
As Diego Garcia is still under the effective control of the UK and is considered part of 
BIOT, potential violations of individual rights will be assessed in the context of the 
application of regional and international documents extended by the UK to BIOT. 
This approach is supported by the existing agreements relating to the operation of the 
base. The BIOT bilateral agreement between the US and UK grants the US military 
authorities the right to exercise criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction over persons 
subjected to US military law. 292 However, the UK authorities retain an exclusive 
jurisdiction over members of the US forces with respect to offences including 
offences relating to security punishable by the law in force on the territory but not by 
the law of the US.293 In practice, the effective jurisdiction and control of the UK over 
the island has been tested on a number of issues including antipersonnel mines, the 
stockpiling and use of which are strictly prohibited by the Convention on the 
Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Landmines.294 During a House of Commons debate in 
the early 2000, the then Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
noted that while there were no US anti-personnel mines on the island of Diego Garcia, 
the US appears to store munitions of various kinds on US warships anchored off the 
island of Diego Garcia.295 As such vessels enjoy state immunity however they are 
outside the jurisdiction and control of the UK. This is particularly significant in 
relation to the broader enforceability of the UK legal regime over the US military 
base, operations and personnel as both the UK and the Mauritius are signatories to 
this Convention unlike the US.296 This suggests that regardless of whether the UK or 
the Mauritius has jurisdiction over Diego Garcia, they may not be able to impose any 
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obligations on US personnel if operations occur on a vessel, which enjoys state 
immunity. 
 
3.1.3. Diego Garcia as Transit Point Type 1: (Potential) Violations of Human Rights 
Standards  
 
An assessment of the applicable legal standards to Diego Garcia as part of BIOT 
suggests that the island is a legal black hole. A legal black hole creates a zone in 
which officials can act unconstrained by the rule of law and it suggests that what they 
do is legal as the official decisions are either necessary or made in good faith.297  If 
such a legal black hole is properly created, it would not cause tension within the rule 
of law.298 The decisions of the House of Lords299 and the European Court of Human 
Rights300 (ECtHR) on the applicability of HRA and ECHR to the Chagos Islands 
appear to suggest that a legal black has been properly created. Even though the 
ECtHR did not make a ruling on alternative basis for jurisdiction following the Al 
Skeini301 case, it did expressly state that the meaning of Article 56 is clear and cannot 
be ignored “merely because of a perceived need to right an injustice”.302 Thus, it 
appears that access to redress for an individual rendered and detained within Diego 
Garcia is very limited.  
The lack of transparency and accountability, which appear to permeate the US and 
UK legal, political and military approaches towards the Diego Garcia island, has been 
further emphasized by the refusal of the UK’s Foreign Office to release the minutes of 
the annual UK/US political–military meetings on the Diego Garcia island. 303 The 
refusal to release information on the use of the Diego Garcia military base under the 
Freedom of Information Act to an All Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary 
Rendition was justified with reference to potential negative effects on the bilateral 
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diplomatic relationship between the US and the UK and national security.304 The 
overall approach towards reduced accountability has also been represented by the UK 
interpretation of the applicability of the Convention on the Access of Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters.305 While the UK is a signatory to it, the position taken by the Foreign Office 
is that as there are no permanent residents on BIOT, the Convention does not have a 
practical application or relevance to it.306 
While there is a legal regime governing the actions and scope of the military base and 
operations, the practical implementation of a number of fundamental legal 
instruments protecting human rights, freedom of information and attaching 
enforcement mechanisms has been severely limited both by the UK and the US. As 
aptly noted by Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, the BIOT Courts Ordinance itself provides 
that UK legal obligations “shall apply in the Territory only so far as it is applicable 
and suitable to local circumstances, and shall be construed with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as local circumstances render necessary.”307 
Thus, it would seem that as long as the UK and US continue to require the use of 
Diego Garcia for a military base and the UK ownership is preserved, the hyper 
legalistic regime towards human rights would remain in place.  
If the protections of UNCAT, ICCPR and ECHR were extended by the UK to the 
island, renditions flights carrying an individual on board would arguably be in breach 
of non-refoulement obligations and potentially Article 5 ECHR 308  and Article 9 
ICCPR.309 The prohibition on torture is a non-derogable jus cogens norm. However as 
individuals have no practical access to an adjudicatory or state monitoring body - 
ECtHR, the HRC310 or the Committee against Torture (CAT)311 - the absoluteness of 
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its protections appear ineffective in the context of Diego Garcia. Thus, arguably, the 
hyper legalism employed by the UK and US to exploit enforcement deficiencies 
within the international legal framework has resulted in the utilisation of a legal 
vacuum or a legal black hole. 
 
3.2. Transit Point Type 2 (Stopover, Refuelling and Overflight Clearances): Shannon 
Airport  
 
The disclosure of documents as part of a 2011 court case involving a business dispute 
between Richmor Aviation Inc. and SportsFlight Air confirmed that Shannon Airport 
was used as part of the US transnational extraordinary rendition programme. 312 
According to the court records at least 13 flights operated by Richmor Aviation Inc. 
with US personnel on board landed in Shannon Airport between 2002 and 2004.313 A 
subsequent 2013 report into the programme further confirmed that flights operated by 
Richmor Aviation had been involved in extraordinary renditions.314 As early as 2005, 
the Irish Human Rights Commission recommended that the Irish government inspect 
suspect aircraft in order to safeguard the effectiveness of Irish law and practice 
towards the protection of human rights following concerns that extraordinary 
rendition flights were landing in Ireland.315  
In denouncing the practice of extraordinary rendition, the Irish Government advised 
that it had obtained extensive diplomatic assurances from the highest level in the US 
confirming that no prisoners subject to a rendition would be transported through Irish 
territory against Irish and international law.316 As noted by the Government, these 
assurances had been subsequently orally re-affirmed on a number of occasions.317 
Thus, it was claimed that the need for an inspection and monitoring regime was 
negated.318 The Government further stated that it was satisfied it could rely on clear 
and explicit factual assurances provided by a friendly state on a matter within the 
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direct control of the government in compliance with its ECHR obligations.319 The 
subsequent discussion will compare the obligations, if any, which are potentially 
engaged by a transit point such as Shannon Airport. The legal obligations of Ireland, 
which has assisted indirectly in the rendition circuits by providing flyover clearances, 
stopover and refuelling facilities when there is no rendee on board are arguably less 
clear in comparison with the obligations of a state, which has provided direct 
assistance such as Syria. However such obligations could similarly be assessed in the 
context of jurisdictional issues and a state’s positive obligations towards rights 
protections such as those imposed by the anti-torture norm. 
 
 
3.2.1. Domestic, Regional and International Obligations  
 
 
Ireland has been a signatory of the ECHR since November 1950. 320  Ireland 
incorporated the ECHR domestically through the European Convention on Human 
Rights Act 2003.321 The preamble of the Act expressly states that subject to the Irish 
Constitution, further effect is given only to certain provisions and Protocols of the 
ECHR.322 Ireland has been a signatory to the ICCPR since October 1973 and has 
recognised the competence of the HRC. 323   Ireland signed UNCAT in 1992 and 
ratified it in 2002. 324 It has also recognised the competence of CAT to receive and 
consider communications on behalf of individuals within Irish jurisdiction who claim 
to have been victims of a right violation under UNCAT. 325  All four Geneva 
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Conventions were signed in December 1949 and ratified in September 1962. 326 
Ireland signed the Rome Statute in October 1998 and ratified it in April 2002.327 
Thus, in comparison to Diego Garcia, a rendee, who was physically transported 
through Ireland and the rendition flight stopped over on Shannon Airport with the 
rendee still on board, would have access to redress under the non-refoulement and 
prevention of arbitrary detention protections of the relevant international, regional and 
domestic legal standards. Such a transfer would also engage Irish state obligations 
under the applicable legal provisions. However, there have been no confirmed cases 
of individuals on board a rendition flight when such an aircraft stopped over on 
Shannon Airport. Thus it appears that the role of Ireland as a transit state was to 
facilitate rendition planes, which were potentially either en route to capture an 
individual or after a rendee was dropped off. In these circumstances, the potential 
liability of Ireland would depend on whether jurisdiction can be established, which 
will be the focus of the subsequent discussion.   
 
 
3.2.2. Jurisdiction of Ireland as a Transit State 
 
 
Under Article 1 of the ECHR, all Contracting States are obliged to secure the 
Convention rights of individuals within their jurisdiction.328 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR 
limits the concept of jurisdiction to individuals within a state territory.329 Similarly, 
the ECtHR has previously interpreted the concept of jurisdiction to be of primarily 
territorial nature. 330  However, in its more recent jurisprudence, the ECtHR has 
confirmed the extraterritorial application of ECHR protections to cases where a 
Contracting State exercises effective control over a territory outside its national 
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borders or where its agents exercise physical control and authority over an individual 
abroad.331  
Under the formative case of Soering v. the United Kingdom, 332  a state may be 
culpable of ECHR violations extraterritorially if it transferred or by extension was 
involved in the transfer of an individual to a state where he would be subjected to ill 
treatment. The concept of incidental jurisdiction as a sub-category of 
extraterritoriality is also relevant in assessing the potential triggering of obligations in 
cases where an individual visits an embassy or interacts with members of the consular 
services.333 Thus, if a state provided direct assistance for an extraordinary rendition or 
an individual was rendered through its territory, a jurisdictional nexus could be 
established under one or more of the above categories arguably engaging the state’s 
obligations under regional and international human rights documents.334  When an 
individual is not on board an aircraft, there has been no interaction with consular 
services and a state has not provided direct assistance to an extraordinary rendition or 
had effective control over an individual, it would be difficult to establish a 
jurisdictional nexus between an individual and a state. Thus, imposing liability on a 
state for its indirect participation in an extraordinary rendition when there has been no 
rendee on board a plane flying through the territory of a transit state would be 
similarly difficult. 
The ECtHR has occasionally expanded the concept of jurisdiction through purposive 
interpretation relying on the role of the ECHR as an instrument of collective rights 
enforcement within Europe.335 Thus, if such an interpretation is applied to an aircraft 
stopping over and/or refuelling during a rendition circuit, arguably the relevant 
questions would be a) are there reasonable grounds or evidence to believe that the 
aircraft has been or will be involved in a rendition operation? and b) is it or was it 
within the effective control and authority of a transit state to investigate or prevent the 
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rendition?336 By using such an object and purpose approach, a jurisdictional nexus 
could possibly be established between a transit state and an individual outside its 
territory. However, the ECtHR jurisprudence to date suggests that such an expansion 
of ECHR obligations is unlikely.337 The concept of jurisdiction, within its application 
in Soering, 338  could potentially be expanded by the Court to include individuals 
extraordinarily rendered on aircrafts whose flight path was facilitated by a transit state 
without the individuals having entered the physical territory of the transit state.339 
There is currently however no definitive approach within the Article 1 jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR that would trigger Ireland’s non-refoulement obligations due to the use 
of Shannon Airport as an indirect transit point.  
If jurisdiction could be established over an extraordinarily rendered individual in the 
context of an indirect participation by a state, then the positive obligations under 
Article 3 ECHR could be triggered.340 In this scenario Ireland could potentially be 
found in violation as individuals rendered within HVDP for the purposes of enhanced 
interrogation are at real risk of being subjected to ill treatment. Should this occur 
however the Irish government would argue that it has fulfilled its positive obligations 
by virtue of the diplomatic assurances provided by the US. The adequacy of 
diplomatic assurances in discharging Ireland’s obligations as a transit state will be 
briefly discussed in the following section.  
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3.2.3. Potential Violations of Human Rights Standards  
 
The judicial approach towards diplomatic assurances can be summarised thus: 
provided that DAs and/or MoUs meet some, not necessarily all, of the criteria referred 
to by the courts, in certain circumstances they may be adequate in discharging state 
obligations and prove sufficient to remove any real risk of ill treatment under Article 
3 of the ECHR.341 Once the use of Shannon Airport as a transit point became known, 
the Irish Government strongly emphasised that the DAs received from the US were 
factual with the explicit promise that no prisoners would be transported through 
Ireland. 342  In the Government’s view the obtained DAs negated the need for an 
aircraft inspection regime as they were sufficient in fulfilling Ireland’s obligations.343 
The Government further argued that as the DAs were not in relation to non-
refoulement obligations, the existing regional and international jurisprudence on the 
effectiveness of assurances in protecting against ill treatment was inapplicable.344 
However, by virtue of their nature – non-legally binding diplomatic means to regulate 
bi/multi-lateral state relations – these agreements have been found to be 
unenforceable and insufficient to ensure the effective protection of individuals from 
ill treatment. 345  Thus, their capacity to discharge obligations under regional and 
international legal instruments should be assessed on a case-by-case basis irrespective 
of the content of the promise or the credibility of the promisor. The assurances 
received in relation to the use of Shannon Airport and Irish airspace can be 
distinguished from the existing jurisprudence on the basis that the US has full 
knowledge and control over its counter-terrorism operations.  
Thus, as the US is in control of the fulfilment mechanisms and was not seeking to 
transport individuals directly from Ireland to a country with a dubious human rights 
record, the promise contained in the assurances may be adequate. Further, in a letter 
to the Irish Human Rights Commission (IHRC), the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
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stated that “Ireland is in the unique position in Europe of having explicit, categorical, 
bilateral assurances” confirmed by the US Secretary of State. 346  In assessing the 
strength of diplomatic assurances in a particular case, the ECtHR has referred to the 
existing diplomatic relationship between states. Most notably in recent times, the 
ECtHR assessed the relationship between Jordan and the UK in the case of Othman 
(Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom. 347  However, in light of the diminished 
credibility of the US as a guarantor of human rights post 9/11 348  and its hyper 
legalistic attitude towards international legal standards, arguably the assurances 
provided by the US may not be sufficiently credible and enforceable if a rendee was 
found to have been on board.  
The Venice Commission has noted that states party to the ECHR are under an 
obligation to prevent an individual’s exposure to risk of ill treatment and the risk 
assessment should be carried out very vigorously. 349  Thus, if an individual is 
physically transferred through the territory of a transit state, non-refoulement 
obligations could be triggered based on such an interpretation. Potentially, these 
obligations could also be engaged if there are strong reasons to believe that an aircraft 
stopping over and refuelling without an individual on board is on a rendition circuit. 
As noted by the Irish Government however, as the aircrafts engaged in the rendition 
circuit flew or stopped over in Ireland without a rendee on board, it was impossible to 
comprehend the value of identifying and searching such aircrafts. 350  Instead, the 
Government proposed that individuals who possessed specific evidence regarding an 
extraordinary rendition or have a credible complaint of criminal activity should advise 
An Garda Siochana who would then investigate further. 351  The IHRC strongly 
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criticised these suggestions noting that without the introduction of an inspection and 
search mechanism, Ireland had left itself open to criticisms that it only has a rhetorical 
rather than an effective and practical approach towards its human rights 
obligations.352  
The CAT similarly expressed concerns at Ireland’s alleged cooperation in the 
rendition programme through the use of Irish airports and airspace.353  The Committee 
further stated that the Irish Government’s approach to investigating these allegations 
was inadequate.354 The Committee requested that further information be provided on 
the measures taken to investigate the allegations and, in particular, clarification on the 
outcome of any investigations as well as actions implemented to ensure that further 
facilitation of the extraordinary rendition programme was prevented. 355  These 
recommendations suggest that indirect participation in the rendition circuit could 
engage a transit state’s regional and international human rights obligations. However, 
this potentially will only be the case if a rendee is on board during a stopover or if 
there are strong reasons to believe that an aircraft is on a rendition circuit, which will 
result in the ill treatment of an individual.  
 
3.3. Transit State Obligations – Concluding Remarks  
 
In its post 9/11 construct, an extraordinary rendition entails the irregular transfer of an 
individual across borders for the purposes of their incommunicado detention and 
enhanced interrogation in conditions that constitute multiple violations of human 
rights, including the right to be free from torture. This thesis argues that through a 
hyper legalistic exploitation of perceived and/or fashioned gaps within the 
international legal framework, the US has sought to create spaces of legal uncertainty. 
These spaces combined with practical enforcement deficiencies of individual 
protections have facilitated the operation of the rendition circuits and have resulted in 
violations of individual rights. As illustrated by the case studies of Diego Garcia 
Island and Ireland, the reliance on transit states has not only supported the operation 
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354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid. 
 74
of the rendition circuits but it has also restricted the practical effectiveness and 
enforceability of individual rights.  
As outlined in relation to BIOT, a rendee who was transported through and/or 
detained within the Island would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to impose 
obligations or access redress through the UK due to existing jurisprudence and the 
severe limitations on the applicability of human rights standards. In the context of 
Ireland, the biggest challenge would be imposing jurisdiction for potential violations, 
which have occurred after a plane transited through Ireland. This can occur only if an 
aircraft, which flew and stopped over in Shannon Airport was a flight within a 
rendition circuit, which transferred an individual to a detention facility for the 
purposes of enhanced interrogation.  
The protections afforded by non-refoulement are designed to prevent the risk of ill 
treatment following a transfer. Based on regional and international courts’ 
jurisprudence, the existing human rights record of a state forms part of the assessment 
as to whether there is such a risk.356 However, Syria, a country with a persistently 
poor record of human rights protections was one of the receiving states within HVDP. 
Between 2002 and 2004, a number of individuals were rendered here despite Syria 
not being a signatory to UNCAT. Thus, the operation of extraordinary rendition has 
resulted in practical limitations of non-refoulement obligations. The final section of 
this Chapter will focus on Syria and how it was used as a detention facility by the US.  
 
4. Rendition Circuits and Receiving States: Syria  
 
One of the first known instances of extraordinary rendition as part of HVDP, which 
exposed the violations suffered by rendees was the case of Maher Arar.357 He was 
detained for a year and during this period suffered multiple violations of his 
individual rights.358 Within HVDP, Syria was one of the most common destinations 
for rendered suspects with at least 9 individuals being transferred there prior to Syria 
becoming a signatory to UNCAT.359 Before discussing the role of Syria as receiving 
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state within HVDP, the following discussion will outline the relevant domestic and 
international obligations applicable to Syria.  
 
4.1. Existing Domestic and International Human Rights Obligations  
 
Syria has been a party to the ICCPR through accession since 1969 without any 
Reservations or Declarations. 360  It is thus subject to all the rights protection 
obligations imposed by the ICCPR including the non-derogable prohibition against 
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment under Article 7. Syria 
is not however a signatory to the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.361 The Optional 
Protocol establishes the HRC as a body responsible to receive and consider 
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of ICCPR violations.362 Thus, 
while Syria has consented to be bound by the provisions of the ICCPR, it has not 
agreed to the additional measures ensuring more practically effective and enforceable 
ICCPR protections by assenting to the competence of the HRC.  
In its Concluding Observations in 2001, the HRC noted the considerable delay by 
Syria in submitting its second periodic report originally due in 1984.363 In particular, 
the HRC expressed regret at the lack of information on the domestic implementation 
of human rights, as it was difficult to determine whether Syria’s population was able 
to fully and effectively exercise its fundamental rights under the ICCPR.364 The HRC 
further found that rather than being an additional guarantee of the rights and freedoms 
afforded by the Syrian Constitution, the scope of the provisions of the ICCPR were 
often restricted in terms of their application.365 The HRC also noted the absence of 
any independent oversight body and non-governmental organisations able to consider 
the implementation of human rights.366 Most significantly, however, in the context of 
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the use of Syria as a receiving state were the “constant and duly substantiated 
allegations” of violations of Article 7 ICCPR by members of law enforcement.367  
In addition, the HRC raised concerns as to the conditions of detention in Syrian 
prisons and the many allegations of inhumane prison conditions. 368  The 2005 
Concluding Observations of the HRC stated that the 2001 recommendations have not 
been fully taken into consideration and in particular the continuing reports of ill 
treatment and violations of Article 7 facilitated by prolonged incommunicado 
detention in relation to individuals considered to pose a security risk.369 The HRC 
added that the state of emergency declared over 40 years ago was still in force thus 
providing for a number of derogations in law or practice from the ICCPR rights.370 
The HRC did however welcome the accession of Syria to other international human 
rights instruments such as UNCAT. 
Syria became a signatory to UNCAT in August 2004 without any Declarations or 
Reservations. However, UNCAT only applies to state signatories thus its provisions 
and protections were not enforceable prior to 2004. In assessing the initial report 
submitted by Syria, CAT noted the five year delay in submitting the report.371 The 
CAT further criticised the lack of statistical and practical information on the 
implementation of the provisions of UNCAT and relevant domestic legislation.372 
One of the principal issues raised by CAT was the lack of a domestic definition of 
torture in accordance with Article 1 UNCAT, which seriously obstructed the practical 
implementation of UNCAT in a state party. 373  Further, the domestic provisions 
criminalising torture do not impose appropriate penalties applicable to a rights 
violation such as torture as they set the maximum penalty at only three years of 
imprisonment. 374  Most significantly, CAT noted the “numerous, on going and 
consistent” allegations of routine use of torture by law enforcement and investigative 
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officials at their instigation or with their consent particularly in detention facilities.375 
In addition, it was reported that there are internal regulations, which, in practice, 
allow for the use of measures contrary to domestic legislation and are in violation of 
UNCAT provisions.376  
The Committee noted that it was gravely concerned by the absence of systematic 
registration of all individuals in places of detention under Syrian jurisdiction.377 In 
2011, the Committee requested that Syria submit a special report on the measures 
taken to ensure that all the obligations under UNCAT were fully implemented.378 In 
particular, the Committee raised a number of concerns in relation to the torture and ill 
treatment of detainees, arbitrary detention by police forces and the military and 
enforced and involuntary disappearances.379 Thus, with regards to its international 
human rights obligations both under the ICCPR and UNCAT, Syria has shown 
consistent deficiencies in protecting individual rights leading to widespread violations 
and lack of effective enforcement mechanisms.  
The US State Department expressed similar concerns in its 2001 Country Report on 
Syria.380 The Report noted that despite the existence of constitutional provisions and 
Penal Code penalties for individuals who engage in torture, credible evidence existed 
that security forces continued to use torture albeit to a lesser extent.381 A subsequent 
2005 Annual Country Reports expressed similar concerns in relation to the poor 
human rights records of Syria across a number of categories with the use of torture in 
detention, poor prison conditions, arbitrary arrest and detention and prolonged 
detention without trial being described as serious abuses. 382  However despite the 
number of domestic and international reports documenting the series of human rights 
violations, a number of individuals were extraordinarily rendered or transferred to 
Syria as part of HVDP.             
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4.2. Involvement in HVDP: Syria as a Receiving State and Detention Site  
 
A number of individuals were transferred to Syria for the purposes of incommunicado 
detention and enhanced interrogation.383 Amongst those transferred, were a student 
whose current whereabouts following his extraordinary rendition to Syria are 
unknown,384 a teenager captured in Pakistan and rendered to Syria whose current 
whereabouts are also unknown,385 a Spanish national of Syrian origin who following 
the extraordinary rendition was detained in Syria for 6 years386 amongst many others - 
some of whose current whereabouts are also still unknown.387 The most illustrative 
example of an individual rendered to Syria as part of HVDP was however Maher Arar.  
Maher Arar, a dual Canadian-Syrian citizen, was detained at JFK airport during a 
flight transit through the US on suspicion of being involved with terrorist activities. 388 
At the point of his detention he had no criminal record and was not wanted on any 
charges in any country.389 While he had been identified as a “person of interest” by 
Canadian intelligence investigators, he was not considered a “target”. 390  The 
intelligence information shared between the relevant authorities in Canada and the US, 
which led to his detention at JFK airport, included “a number of misleading or false 
statements”.391  
In October 2002, the Immigration and Naturalisation Service (INS) ordered that Mr 
Arar was to be removed from the US as he had been found to be a member of Al 
Qaeda.392 Despite the numerous reports on human rights abuses in Syria including the 
Annual US Department of State reports noted above, an INS Commissioner 
determined that the removal of Mr Arar to Syria would be compliant with the US 
obligations under Article 3 UNCAT. As the US authorities declined to be part of the 
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investigations of the Canadian Commission of Inquiry, the Commission did not obtain 
an official copy of the removal order or an explanation of why Mr Arar was 
transferred to Syria instead of Canada.  
Mr Arar was held incommunicado for approximately two weeks during which he was 
interrogated and tortured for the purposes of obtaining intelligence information.393 
The behaviour Mr Arar was subjected to is consistent with the existing pattern of 
rights violations individuals suffer while detained in Syria on national security 
grounds. Mr Arar’s detention lasted a year during which he was confined in a small 
cell with no natural light, poor sanitary conditions and no bed. Poor detention 
conditions for a prolonged period of time can constitute a violation of Article 3 
UNCAT as discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  
The decision to transfer Maher Arar to Syria appears to have been based on DAs 
received from Syrian authorities. 394  These DAs were not submitted to the 
Commission of Inquiry; neither was the content of the DAs provided. 395  In this 
context, an assessment of whether the promise contained within them was sufficient 
would amount to a hypothetical conjecture. However, the following argument can be 
made on the basis of the persistent pattern of serious human rights violations in Syria. 
If these DAs were provided by Syria and were subsequently relied on by the US, the 
ill treatment suffered by Mr Arar is illustrative of the practical unenforceability and 
ineffectiveness of DAs in the context of the anti-torture norm. 
 
4.3. Unlawful Nature of Engagement and State Response  
 
Syria chose not to cooperate with the investigation by the Canadian Commission of 
Inquiry. Further, while Syria appears to have facilitated and/or engaged in the 
detention and enhanced interrogation including torture of extraordinarily rendered 
individuals so far there are no known inquiries or investigations into its participation 
in the HVDP. Thus, despite being a signatory to the ICCPR prior to 9/11 and to 
UNCAT post 2004, Syria has not provided the necessary enforcement mechanisms to 
ensure practically effective protection of individual human rights. In addition, Syria 
has not adequately addressed the patterns of violatory behaviour noted both in UN 
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reports and the Annual US State Department reports. In its most recent report CAT 
expressed “deep concerns” that the widespread violations of UNCAT have 
continued. 396  These violations – based on consistent and substantiated reports – 
include torture and ill treatment of detainees including children.397 While this Report 
was submitted after the beginning of the on going conflict in Syria, it is illustrative of 
the persistent and severe violations of human rights and international norms. 
In this context, any diplomatic or other assurances the US may have obtained prior to 
transferring any rendees to Syria would appear insufficient in fulfilling the US’ non-
refoulement obligations. The lack of transparency surrounding the decision process 
that led to dual nationals398 being transferred to Syria combined with extraordinary 
renditions to a country with such poor human rights record illustrates the challenges 
the human rights framework faces in ensuring accountability and effective rights 
enforcement.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
After 9/11, the concept of national security has arguably become a powerful state 
discretion used to override policies and human rights when there is a perceived 
threat.399 The scope of state action has been vastly expanded both domestically and 
transnationally,400 which in the context of the ‘War on Terror’ legal and political 
paradigm offered an open-ended authorisation for a variety of pre-emptive counter-
terrorism measures. Extraordinary rendition was one such measure, which was used to 
capture, immobilise and detain incommunicado individuals considered to possess 
accurate and valuable intelligence information.401 While extraordinary rendition and 
the HVDP were described at the time as unlawful and violatory in numerous UN and 
Council of Europe reports, the US government contended that its policy is to comply 
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with all its treaty obligations.402  Once it became more public, the US Executive 
engaged in a committed defence of the programme providing a variety of legal 
justifications. Initially this defence was based on the international and domestic 
precedent relating to renditions to trial – irregular transfers with very different 
operation and purpose – and on the oversight mechanisms put in place. However, the 
2014 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Report found that the HVDP oversight 
mechanisms had been impeded, avoided or obstructed.403 This and other findings404 
by the Committee suggest that either there were deficiencies in both the supervision 
and protection enforcement mechanisms or these mechanisms were approached in a 
perfunctory or empty manner or likely both. 
Thus, while on a normative level the US appears to accept its international obligations, 
the use of expansive and violatory counter-terrorism measures such as extraordinary 
rendition, indicates a much more rhetorical rather than practical acceptance of 
obligations. This is further illustrated by the transit and receiving states relied on to 
provide strategic operational support for the rendition circuits. The practical 
operationalisation of the rendition circuits through these states was facilitated by the 
exploitation of DAs and MoUs and the lack of accountability and transparency 
mechanisms in relation to private contractors and the strictly territorial interpretation 
of the concept of jurisdiction. Each of these perceived spaces of legal uncertainty or 
gaps will be examined in turn in the following chapters. Before proceeding to these 
discussions however Chapter 2 will explore the relevant international and 
humanitarian law provisions and the US approach towards them. 
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Chapter 2: Non-Refoulement and Irregular Transfers in Peace, 
Armed Conflict and the ‘War on Terror’  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The expansive development of the international human rights and humanitarian law 
frameworks post-1945 has been one of the defining features of the 20th century. The 
number of signed Conventions, Treaties and associated documents indicates states’ 
normative acceptance of their international legal obligations. These obligations 
however tend not to be a priority when set against national security concerns.405 Post 
9/11 countries such as the United States (US) have sought to restrict individual rights 
protections and limit the applicability of international human rights law (IHRL) both 
through legislative and Executive decisions in order to engage in an expansive 
transnational counter-terrorism campaign. 406  Concurrently, the US adopted the 
language of war and proceeded to rely on a very restrictive interpretation of 
international humanitarian law (IHL) obligations. The overall US approach was to 
severely restrict the comprehensive protections offered by IHRL and IHL through the 
creation of an environment within which the general applicability of IHRL combined 
with specific core provisions of IHL was uncertain or was in flux. This uncertainty 
was then utilised to allow the US to operationalise expansive counter-terrorism 
measures such as extraordinary rendition.  
In order to understand how the US constructed this environment, the following 
discussion will first focus on the relevant legal standards as they were understood and 
applied as at 10 September 2001. The overall aim of this chapter is to illustrate that 
                                               
405 See for example Gearty, C., Liberty and Security (2013, Cambridge; Polity Press), Wilson, R. A., 
Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (2005, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), Brems, E., 
‘Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2011) 5 The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 282; UN General Assembly, ‘Joint Study on Global 
Practices in Relation to Secret Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the Rapporteur on 
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering 
Terrorism; the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment; the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances’,  UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42 amongst many texts making this argument. 
406 This has been discussed briefly in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis and will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 2.  
 83
the rendition circuits are in violation of core international legal provisions such as the 
non-derogable jus cogens anti-torture norm and the principle of non-refoulement. 
However, as the transnational multi-actor operation of extraordinary rendition 
suggests while the applicable legal provisions should robustly protect individual 
rights, practical enforcement deficiencies within the international legal framework 
exist. Thus, after the immediately following Section on the concept of jus cogens, the 
prohibition of torture and non-refoulement provisions across international legal 
instruments, Section 3 will then aim to illustrate how the US has sought to discount 
the application of the IHRL and severely limit the operation of international 
humanitarian law (IHL). What this Chapter argues is that while international human 
rights and humanitarian law provide a comprehensive framework for rights 
protections and regulation of transfer, areas of definitional uncertainty and practical 
enforcement deficiencies in the application of rights exist. These deficiencies in 
combination with the definitional uncertainties have been relied on by the US in order 
to construct its ‘War on Terror’ legal paradigm as a novel form of armed conflict; a 
paradigm within which extraordinary rendition can operate. 
 
2. The Prohibition against Torture and Non-Refoulement pre 9/11: International 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Protections 
 
The US is a signatory to a number of international legal documents regulating the 
transfer of individuals in circumstances where such a transfer may place an individual 
at the risk of ill treatment. The UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), 407  the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)408 and the Geneva Conventions of 
1949,409 all of which the US has ratified, impose a number of obligations on states 
                                               
407  The full text of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), 10 December 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46, is available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. The US signed 
UNCAT on 18 April 1988 and ratified it subject to a Declaration and Reservations on 21 October 1994. 
The significance of the US Reservations, Understandings and Declarations (RUDs) to international 
legal documents will be discussed in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
408 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 16 December 1966, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171, full text available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3aa0.html 
[last accessed 30 March 2016]. The US signed the ICCPR on 5 October 1977 and ratified it on 8 June 
1992 subject to Declarations and Reservations.  
409 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention I), Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
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relating to such transfers. Each of these treaties also prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment410 albeit with variations in the definition of what 
constitutes such treatment.  
The prohibition on torture is not just one human rights protections amongst many 
others – it is a legal archetype; a provision which is emblematic of states’ 
commitment to non-brutality in the legal system. 411  The prohibition thus has 
significance not in and of itself but also is as the embodiment of a persuasive 
principle.412  As such, the anti-torture norm has been codified as an absolute, jus 
cogens norm of international law, which is non-derogable and not subject to any 
modified application in times of peace, conflict or emergency. A transnational 
counter-terrorism measure engaging in regular violations of the anti-torture norm such 
as extraordinary rendition does however raise the question as to how practical this 
absoluteness is particularly in the context of a war.  
The immediately following subsection will first assess the concept of jus cogens 
before proceeding to outline the relevant international human rights and humanitarian 
law provisions and how they apply to the post 9/11 construct of extraordinary 
rendition. Understanding the purpose and scope of each of these provisions is 
important in contextualising the hyper compulsion for legality, which led the US to 
interpret its international obligations in a manner allowing for the operation of 
extraordinary rendition.  
 
2.1. Jus Cogens and Non-Derogable International Legal Norms 
 
The prohibition against torture and the principle non-refoulement have developed into 
jus cogens norms in the international legal framework in addition to being codified as 
non-derogable under UNCAT, the ICCPR and regional documents such as the 
                                                                                                                                      
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949 (Geneva 
Convention II), Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva 
Convention III) and Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949 (Geneva Convention IV), full text of each Convention available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp [last 
accessed 30 March 2016].  The US signed all four Conventions on 8 December 1949 and ratified them 
subject to Reservations and Declarations on 8 February 1955. 
410 The relevant provisions are Article 3 of UNCAT, Article 7 of the ICCPR, Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Convention I-IV and Articles 46-48 of Geneva Convention III. 
411  Waldron, J., ‘Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House’ (2005) 105 (6) 
Columbia Law Review 1681, pp. 1681, 1687. 
412 Ibid. 
 85
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The jus cogens status afforded to 
certain human rights norms has been central in their development and practical 
enforcement. In general, jus cogens norms can be defined as either fundamental rules 
of customary international law that cannot be modified by treaty provisions or as law 
that imports notions of universally applicable norms into the international legal 
process.413 Peremptory norms have also been described as ones which prevail within 
the hierarchy of norms in international law because they are ‘intrinsically superior’ 
and cannot be restricted or circumvented by states or through inter-state 
cooperation.414  These superior norms also determine the framework within which 
inferior norms could be valid; these inferior rules or norms must then comply with the 
content of the superior ones within the relevant framework.415  In the context of 
international law and states as lawmakers, the concept of jus cogens is a peremptory 
norm, which places limitations on the international law provisions states can adopt.416    
The concept of jus cogens was formally codified by Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties under which a treaty would be void if at the time 
of its conclusion it conflicts with a peremptory norm. 417  While many other 
international obligations have an ‘opt out’ option for states under international rules 
(jus dispositivum), jus cogens norms do not allow such freedom.418 As noted by the 
Special Rapporteur of the UN International Law Commission, jus cogens norms are 
imperative and mandatory in all circumstances while jus dispositivum norms can be 
modified in certain circumstances if such an amendment is permissible under the 
relevant legal framework and providing that the position and rights of third states are 
not affected. 419  This was observed shortly before the adoption of the Vienna 
                                               
413 De Londras, F., ‘The Religiosity of Jus Cogens: a Moral Case for Compliance?’ in Rehman, J. & 
Breau, S (eds)., Religion and Human Rights Law: A Critical Examination of Islamic Law and Practices 
(2007, Hague; Martinus Nijhof), p. 247. 
414  Orakhelashvili, A., Peremptory Norms in International Law (2008, Oxford; Oxford University 
Press), p. 8. Please see further the comprehensive discussion in this book and Chapter 1 in particular.  
415 Rozakis, C.L., The Concept of Jus Cogens in the Law of the Treaties (1976, Amsterdam; North-
Holland), pp. 19-20. 
416  Orakhelashvili, A., Peremptory Norms in International Law (2008, Oxford; Oxford University 
Press), p. 9. 
417  Article 53 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, full text available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016].   
418 Ford, C., ‘Adjudicating Jus Cogens’, (1994) 13 Wisconsin International Law Journal 145, p.147 
419 Fitzmaurice, G.G., Fourth Report on the Law of the Treaties, Document A/CN.4/120, full text 
available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_120.pdf [last accessed 30 March 
2016].   
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Convention in a dissenting opinion in the Rights of Passage420 case. Judge Fernandez 
noted that several jus cogens rules took precedence over any other special rules hence 
no special practice could prevail over the true rules of jus cogens.  
The consistent strength of jus cogens to withhold the challenges posed during times of 
national security considerations can be seen recently in the reasoning of the Court of 
First Instance (CFI) in a number of actions for the annulment of relevant EU 
regulations imposing financial sanctions on individuals or entities who were 
suspected of terrorist affiliation.421 The court indirectly reviewed the legality of the 
Security Council’s anti-terrorism resolutions against the non-derogable nature of 
human rights. The CFI held that jus cogens norms were a body of higher rules of 
public international law binding on all subjects of international law including the 
bodies of the United Nations and from which derogations were not possible.422 
Jus cogens norms have been of particular importance in recent times in the context of 
violations of the anti-torture norm and have been applied very rigorously. In the case 
of the Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija,423 the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia suggested obiter dictum that the violation of a jus cogens norm 
such as the prohibition on torture has direct consequences for the legality of all 
official domestic measures and actions relating to such a violation. What is more 
important is that the perpetrators of torture who act on or benefit from such domestic 
measures may be held criminally responsible for torture either in their own state or 
another state.424  
In addition to being a jus cogens norm, the non-derogability of the prohibition of 
torture has been reaffirmed in the provisions of UNCAT, ICCPR and ECHR as will 
be discussed in more depth in the immediately following section. The absoluteness of 
the prohibition has been of particular legal and moral significance in ensuring 
                                               
420 Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v India) [1960] ICJ Reports 6.  
421 Case T - 306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the CFI, 21 Sept. 2005; 
Case T - 315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission of the 
European Communities, Judgment of the CFI, 21 Sept. 2005; Case T - 253/02, Chafiq Ayadi v. Council 
of the European Union, Judgment of the CFI of 12 July 2006; Case T - 41/04, Faraj Hassan v. Council 
of the European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the CFI of 12 July 
2006. 
422 Case T - 306/01, Ahmed Ali Yusuf and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council of the 
European Union and Commission of the European Communities, Judgment of the CFI, 21 Sept. 2005, 
para. 277; Case T - 315/01, Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. Council of the European Union and Commission 
of the European Communities, Judgment of the CFI, 21 Sept. 2005, para. 226. 
423  Case no. IT–95–17/1–T10, Trial Chamber, Judgment, 10 December 1998, paras. 155–157 in 
particular.  
424 Ibid, para. 155. 
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practical and effective enforcement of the necessary protections. This is aptly 
illustrated by one of the seminal cases of the ECtHR – Ireland v. the United 
Kingdom.425 In this case, the ECtHR expressly noted that “a special stigma” attaches 
to the “deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering”.426 The 
court further stressed that prohibition of torture provides for “no exceptions, no 
special cases and no derogations on emergency grounds” unlike other derogable 
provisions.427  
 
2.2. International Human Rights Provisions 
 
The non-derogable prohibition against torture as stated in the texts of UNCAT428 and 
the ICCPR429 has been operationalised in practice through the prohibition against the 
refoulement or transfer of an individual to a country where they face the risk of ill 
treatment or torture. While the US is a signatory to both these documents, this is 
subject to Reservations, interpretive Understandings and/or Declarations (RUDs) 
deemed necessary.430 In the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention and the more 
recent 2001 Declaration, state parties have acknowledged the relevance and resilience 
of the international human rights framework in general and the refugee protection 
framework in particular. 431  More importantly however state parties have 
acknowledged that the principle of non-refoulement is at the core of the framework 
and its applicability is embedded in international law. 432  While the following 
discussion will focus on the language of provisions of UNCAT and the ICCPR, 
whether these documents have extraterritorial application and the US approach to 
such an application will be examined in detail in the Chapter 4. 
 
 
 
                                               
425 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 5310/71, Judgment 18 January 1978, para. 167. 
426 Ibid. 
427 Ibid, para. 14 (Separate Opinion of Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice). 
428 Article 1 UNCAT in particular.  
429 Article 7 ICCPR in particular. 
430 The full text of the US Declaration and Reservations upon ratification of UNCAT is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-
9&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec [last accessed 30 March 2016].  
431 Declaration of State Parties to the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status 
of Refugees. 
432 Ibid. 
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2.2.1 UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment 
 
The aim of UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT) is the more effective 
prevention of torture across the world. 433  In seeking to achieve this goal, the 
Convention prohibits the expulsion, extradition or refoulement of a person to a state 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that an individual would be in 
danger of being subjected to torture.434 Torture is defined as the infliction of severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering for the purposes of intimidating or coercing an 
individual or obtaining information or a confession amongst other intentions. 435 
Article 2(2) expressly states that the prohibition is non-derogable and no exceptional 
circumstances such as a state of war, threat of war, internal political instability or any 
other public emergency could be invoked as a justification for torture.436 The scope of 
Article 3 indicates an intention to encompass all types of regular transfers to which 
any individual may be subject to. In addition, Article 3 imposes procedural 
obligations to ensure compliance by requiring the competent authorities to take into 
consideration all relevant factors.  
Initially, the US had intended to include a reservation to the effect that they would be 
bound by UNCAT only to the extent that Article 3 does not conflict with US 
obligations towards states not party to the Convention under bilateral extradition 
treaties with such states. 437  This Reservation did not form part of the final US 
ratification.438 Other RUDs which limit the scope of the protections to be afforded 
under the anti-torture norm however were part of the ratification process. The US 
                                               
433 The particular section of the Preamble states: “…Desiring to make more effective the struggle 
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world…” 
The full text of the preamble and the Convention itself is available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
434  Article 3 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, UN Doc. A/RES/39/46. 
435 The full text of Article 1 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment, UN Doc. A/RES/39/46 is available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
436 Ibid, Article 2. 
437 United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment, 
Senate Treaty Doc. No. 100-20, 100th Congress 2d session, full text available 
http://libguides.law.umn.edu/FCThumanrights [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
438 The full text of the US Declaration upon signature and Reservations upon Ratification, please refer 
to https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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understanding of the scope and text of Article 1 UNCAT439 is that non-compliance 
with the applicable legal procedural standards does not per se constitute torture.440 In 
addition, the provisions of Articles 1–16 have been declared non-self executing.441  
In accordance with the provisions of Article 3 UNCAT, the US has enacted statutes 
and regulations prohibiting the transfer of aliens to countries where they may be 
subjected to ill treatment such as the provisions of FARRA 1998 as discussed in 
Chapter 1. Thus, under its obligations as a signatory to UNCAT, the US is prohibited 
from transferring or removing individuals to a country where they might face torture. 
While the US implemented UNCAT domestically, it did so subject to the 
understanding that the phrase “substantial grounds for believing that an individual 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture” means “if it is more likely than not 
that an individual would be tortured”.442  
The Committee against Torture (CAT) has interpreted “substantial grounds” as 
meaning that the risk of torture must be assessed by the state and the Committee on 
grounds extending beyond mere suspicion or theory.443 The risk does not have to meet 
a test of being highly probable.444 The Committee has further determined that the 
“substantial grounds for belief” requirement incorporates an objective assessment of 
the conditions in the state to which an individual is to be transferred and a subjective 
assessment of the danger of torture to the individual to be transferred.445 Evidence of a 
consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights and whether 
the domestic approach towards human rights has changed would fall within the 
objective assessment.446 The credibility of the individual and whether he has engaged 
in an activity within or outside the receiving state, which makes him vulnerable to the 
                                               
439  Article 1 UNCAT provides a definition of what ‘torture’ is. Full text is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
440  The full text of this particular Understanding is available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
441 Ibid. 
442  The full text of the US Declarations and Reservations is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?mtdsg_no=IV-9&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
443 Report of the Committee against Torture, Annex IX: General Comment on the Implementation of 
Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, UN Doc. A/53/44, p. 52. 
444 Ibid. 
445 The Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of new 
York and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, 
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions” (2004, 
ABCNY & NYU School of Law; New York), p. 38. 
446 Report of the Committee against Torture, Annex IX: General Comment on the Implementation of 
Article 3 of the Convention in the Context of Article 22, UN Doc. A/53/44, p. 53. 
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risk of torture would form part of the subjective assessment.447  
Article 16 places an additional obligation on states to protect prisoners from abuses 
and it requires the prevention of any acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment in any territory under its jurisdiction.448 The text of Article 16 refers to 
these as other acts of ill treatment which do not amount to torture however are also 
committed by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity. The US considers itself bound 
by the obligations imposed under Article 16 UNCAT449 only in so far as the term 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment equates to cruel, unusual and 
inhumane treatment or punishment prohibited by the US Constitution.450 The UN 
Committee against Torture has found that depriving someone of food and/or water451, 
long periods of detention (two weeks or more) in detention cells that are sub-
standard452 or the use by prison authorities of instruments of physical restraint that 
may cause unnecessary pain and humiliation 453  to amount to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.  
In the context of the goal of UNCAT – more effective prevention of torture – it is 
important to note that the application of the Convention is restricted to signatories 
only. Under Article 24 (3) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties all 
treaties can only impose obligations on states post ratification. 454 This can restrict the 
protection and practical enforceability mechanisms under UNCAT as discussed in 
Chapter 1 with reference to Syria. The Committee against Torture (the Committee) 
                                               
447 Ibid. 
448 Article 16, United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment, UN Doc. A/RES/39/46. 
449  The full text of Article 16 UNCAT is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CAT.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
450  The full text of the US RUDs upon ratification of UNCAT are available at 
https://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/usdocs/tortres.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
451  Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Germany (1993), UN. Doc. No. 
A/48/44 (SUPP), paras. 161–180; Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: New 
Zealand (1998), UN Doc. No. A/53/44 (SUPP), paras. 167–178. 
452 Report of the Committee against Torture, Summary Account of the Results of the Proceedings 
Concerning the Inquiry on Peru under Article 20, UN Doc. No. A/56/44, paras. 144–193. The 
Committee found that this conduct might amount to torture if the period of detention was extremely 
long (para. 178). 
453 Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Australia (2000), UN Doc. No. A/56/44, 
paras. 47-53. 
454 Article 24(3) states that “When the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty is established on a date 
after the treaty has come into force, the treaty enters into force for that State on that date, unless the 
treaty otherwise provides”. See also Article 4 – Non-Retroactivity of the Present Convention as well as 
Articles 14–18. Full text of the Vienna Convention is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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did however address this issue prior to 9/11. In Khan v. Canada,455 the Committee 
determined that by transferring an individual to a country not a party to UNCAT 
(Pakistan), Canada had violated Article 3. The Committee stated that such a transfer 
would subject a person to the risk of ill treatment and make it impossible for that 
individual to apply for protections under the Convention. This approach has been 
reaffirmed post 9/11 in Agiza v. Sweden456 where the Committee found that Sweden’s 
transfer of Mr Agiza to Egypt in December 2001 violated Article 3. It was noted that 
Sweden should have known that the risk of torture was particularly high and that there 
was a lack of an effective and impartial review and appeal mechanisms to challenge 
the transfer order.  
Within the HVDP, the role of extraordinary renditions was to transport individuals to 
various detention facilities for the purposes of their enhanced interrogation. The 
techniques used within these enhanced interrogations involved physical and 
psychological coercion such as stress positions, extreme temperature changes and 
‘waterboading’; the detention further included physical restraints that cause 
unnecessary pain and humiliation and deprivation of water and/or food.457 In 2014, 
the CIA Select Committee Senate Report described the enhanced interrogations of 
CIA detainees as “brutal” with waterboarding being so physically dangerous that one 
detainee became “completely unresponsive”. 458  With reference to courts’ 
jurisprudence as well as established practice by the UN Human Rights Committee and 
the UN Committee against Torture, these techniques involve conduct amounting to a 
breach of the absolute prohibition on torture and any form of cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment.459 Thus, while extraordinary rendition as a form of irregular 
                                               
455 Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, Communication No. 15/1994, UN Doc. A/50/44 (1994) available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cat/decisions/catD-Canada1.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
456 Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, UN Committee against 
Torture (CAT), 24 May 2005, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/42ce734a2.html [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
457  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism: Mission to the United States of America, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 33. Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in 
Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations 
(2006, Ottawa; Public Works and Government Services Canada) and El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Application No. 39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012. 
458 Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program, p. 3. Full text available at 
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113srpt288/pdf/CRPT-113srpt288.pdf [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
459  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism: Mission to the United States of America, UN 
Doc. A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, para. 33. See further the following sections of this chapter.  
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transfer is not expressly prohibited by international law, when it results in the above 
described incommunicado detention and enhanced interrogation of an individual for 
the purposes of intelligence gathering, it is a practice violatory of UNCAT. 
 
2.2.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
The US has been a signatory of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) 460  since 1992 subject to a number of RUDs. These include the 
Declaration that Articles 1 to 27 ICCPR were not-self executing and thus would 
require implementation through domestic legislation.461 However while the US has 
yet to implement the provisions of the ICCPR into domestic legislation, upon 
ratification under Article VI of the US Constitution the ICCPR as a treaty made under 
the authority of the US arguably becomes part of federal common law.462 Following 
the Paquete Habana463 case, international law forms part of domestic US law and 
should be administered by domestic courts. Where there is no signed treaty, executive 
or judicial decision or domestic legislation, reference should be made to customary 
international law to ensure correct interpretation. However even if international 
obligations are not legislated for domestically or are not deemed to be binding within 
the US, they are still relevant and arguably enforceable at international level.    
Article 7 of the ICCPR prohibits torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. The prohibition is non-derogable. Unlike UNCAT, the ICCPR does not 
define what may constitute torture. While the Covenant does not expressly prohibit 
refoulement in its text, the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has interpreted Article 7 
as imposing an obligation on states not to expose an individual to the danger of ill 
treatment in another country through an extradition, expulsion or refoulement.464 The 
HRC has further stated that the obligations under Article 2 – to respect and to ensure 
to all individuals within a state party territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
                                               
460 Full text available at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
461  The full list and text of these reservations, understandings and declarations is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&src=treaty&mtdsg_no=iv-
4&lang=en#EndDec [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
462  The full text of Article VI and the US Constitution is available at 
http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_transcript.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
463 175 U.S. 677 (1900).  
464 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 20: Article 7 (Prohibition of 
Torture, or Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fb0.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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recognized in the ICCPR465 - include a non-refoulement obligation.466 The HRC has 
applied this interpretation consistently in a number of cases.  
In A.R.J. v. Australia,467 the HRC found that to surrender a prisoner knowingly to 
another state where there are substantial grounds for believing that that person would 
be in danger of torture, is contrary to the object and purpose of the ICCPR. The HRC 
has further determined that where a transfer may create a risk of treatment contrary to 
Article 7, countries conducting such transfers would violate the ICCPR provisions.468 
Such risk is heightened when a state party has already determined that the detainee 
has a well-founded fear of persecution upon return.469  
In Ahani v. Canada,470 the HRC expressly emphasized that the right to be free from 
torture requires that a state not only refrain from torture but take steps of due 
diligence to avoid a threat to an individual of torture from third parties. Further, where 
the right to be free from torture is at stake, the closest scrutiny should be applied to 
ensure fairness of procedure and adequate review to determine whether the risk of 
torture is substantial.471  
In Kindler v. Canada,472 the HRC found that if a state party extradites a person within 
its jurisdiction to another country where the individual faces a “real risk” of breach of 
their ICCPR rights, the state party itself might be in violation of the ICCPR. While the 
HRC has provided limited guidance on what constitutes “a real risk” of a violation of 
Article 7, it has noted that a real risk could be deduced from the intent of the country 
to which an individual is being transferred as well as from the pattern of state conduct 
in similar cases.473 The “real risk” assessment thus appears to entail both an objective 
and subjective element comparable to the relevant assessments under UNCAT. It has 
been argued that the HRC terminology looks to follow that of the European Court of 
                                               
465 Article 2 ICCPR states in full: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and 
to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” 
466 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general 
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473 Mrs. G.T. v. Australia, Communication No. 706/1996, UN Doc. CCPR/C/61/D/706/1996 (1997). 
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Human Rights (ECtHR) hence Article 7 should be interpreted in a manner reflective 
of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence under Article 3 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).474 
Decisions of the ECtHR such as Soering v. United Kingdom,475 Chahal v. United 
Kingdom476 and Cruz Varas v. Sweden,477 suggest that the “real risk standard” is more 
stringent than UNCAT’s “in danger of” standard. In comparison to UNCAT, which 
only prohibits refoulement in relation to torture, the obligations of the ICCPR and the 
ECHR encompass all forms of ill treatment. In addition, the HRC has noted that state 
parties should not discriminate between their own citizens and aliens.478 In particular, 
aliens must not be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment and should be afforded equal protection by the law.479 These provisions 
are particularly relevant in the context of some of the domestic US regulations 
regarding aliens and the level of protection afforded to aliens who may be suspected 
of terrorist activities.  
Furthermore, if a state party handed over an individual to another state in 
circumstances where it was foreseeable that torture would take place, the state party 
would itself be in violation of the ICCPR.480 The HRC has also found that state 
obligations are activated when a person is within the power or effective control of that 
                                               
474 Nowak, M., U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (1993) as discussed 
in The Committee on International Human Rights of the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York and the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University School of Law, 
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to “Extraordinary Renditions” (2004, 
ABCNY & NYU School of Law; New York), p. 56. 
475 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, Judgment 7 July 1989, paras. 91. The 
assessment of “real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
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requesting country against the standards of Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention.” 
476 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 22414/93, Judgment 15 November 1996, paras. 96, 
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However, in view of the political evolution, which had taken place in Chile, it was found that no real 
risk that he would again be exposed to such treatment. 
478 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens 
Under the Covenant, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45139acfc.html [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
479 Ibid.  
480 Chitat Ng v. Canada, Communication No. 469/1991, UN Doc. CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991 (1994). 
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state.481  As such the application of the ICCPR does not necessarily depend on a 
strictly territorial jurisdiction test. The process of extraordinary rendition entails a 
number of violations of the relevant ICCPR procedural obligations from the manner 
of the capture, the subsequent transfer outside standard extradition procedures to the 
incommunicado detention and interrogation of individual terrorist suspects. Thus, if a 
person, being subjected to an extraordinary rendition is in the effective control of a 
state party to the ICCPR or is knowingly transferred to be enhancedly interrogated in 
an ICCPR state party, the obligations of both the transferring state and the receiving 
state will be triggered. In other words, by engaging in extraordinary renditions the US 
is in violating of its ICCPR obligations.  
The human rights standards discussed above form part of the comprehensive state 
obligations under the non-derogable jus cogens anti-torture norm. The principle of 
non-refoulement in particular is an important practical aspect of these obligations in 
order to ensure effective enforcement during time of peace and an emergency.  
International humanitarian law (IHL) compliments these protections with a number of 
state obligations regulating the transfer of protected categories of individuals during 
an armed conflict. The aim of the immediately following section is to outline the 
relevant regulations on transfers in respect of certain categories of individuals under 
IHL before proceeding to discuss how the US sought to fully discount its IHRL 
obligations and severely limit core IHL obligations.  
 
2.3. International Humanitarian Law protections regulating Transfers 
 
The four Geneva Conventions of 1949482 (Geneva Conventions I – IV) and their 
Additional Protocols483 set out the core IHL provisions including those relating to the 
                                               
481 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), General comment no. 31 [80], The nature of the general 
legal obligation imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 26 May 2004, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 
para. 12. 
482 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field, 12 August 1949 (Geneva Convention I), Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, 12 August 1949 (Geneva 
Convention II), Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 12 August 1949 (Geneva 
Convention III) and Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 12 
August 1949 (Geneva Convention IV), full text of each Convention available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp [last 
accessed 30 March 2016].   
483 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed 
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transfers of individuals in the context of an armed conflict. The US ratified all four 
Geneva Conventions in 1955.484 The core aim of IHL is to limit the effects of an 
armed conflict for humanitarian reasons and to provide affected persons with the 
necessary legal protections against the effects of violations committed during an 
armed conflict.485 The protections afforded under the Geneva Conventions I – IV 
apply to the actions of a state party in a territory under its control during an armed 
conflict and to individuals who fall within the specified categories of protected 
persons. Under Common Article 2, IHL provisions should be implemented both in 
times of peace as well as all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict and 
all cases of partial or total occupation of the territory of a state party, even if such 
occupation has met no armed resistance.486 
Geneva Convention III focuses on the treatment of certain categories of detainees 
during an armed conflict.487 Under the relevant provisions, individuals falling within 
the specified categories of protected persons should at all times be treated humanely 
and must not be endangered or placed at risk of death, ill treated488 or subjected to 
serious endangerment of health from the time of their capture to their final release.489 
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions I – IV is one of the core provisions, 
which sets out a minimum baseline standard for protection of individuals who are not 
taking part in the hostilities to be treated humanely and without discrimination in all 
circumstances.490 Violence to life and person and in particular cruel treatment and 
                                                                                                                                      
Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977 and Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem (Protocol III), 8 December 
2005, full text of each protocol available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-
law/geneva-conventions/index.jsp [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
484  The US ratified all four Geneva Conventions on 2 August 1955, see further 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/States.xsp?xp_viewStates=XPages_NORMStatesParties&xp_tre
atySelected=375 [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
485 Rehman, J., International Human Rights Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Essex; Pearson Education Limited), p. 
764; Cassesse, A., International Criminal Law, 2nd ed., (2008, Oxford New York; Oxford University 
Press), p. 81–84. 
486  The full texts of the Geneva Conventions I – IV and their provisions are available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/ [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
487 The full texts of the Geneva Conventions I – IV and the Additional Protocols are available at 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions/ [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
488  Article 13 Geneva Convention III. Full text available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=CD863DC518
A5E1D7C12563CD0051AB7A [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
489 Articles 5, 12, 13, 14 Geneva Convention III.  
490 Under Common Article 3 such individuals include: “Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, 
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed ' hors de combat ' 
by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause …” 
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torture as well as humiliating and degrading treatment are specifically prohibited at 
any time for the specified categories of individuals.491 Under Article 5 of Geneva 
Convention IV, individuals who have engaged in an activity threatening the security 
of an occupying state should be treated with humanity and afforded the right to fair 
trial.492 In particular, Articles 31 and 32 of Geneva Convention IV prohibit coercion 
for the purposes of obtaining information and torture or any measure that causes 
physical suffering or death respectively. 
Article 4 of Geneva Convention III outlines the necessary conditions for an individual 
or a combatant to qualify for a Prisoner of War (POW) status and thus be afforded the 
relevant protections. Under Article 13 of Geneva Convention III, all POWs must be 
treated humanely at all times – causing death or seriously endangering the health of a 
POW in custody constitutes a grave breach.493 In the context of an interrogation of a 
POW, Article 17 expressly prohibits physical or mental torture or any other form of 
coercion for the purposes of obtaining information.494 In relation to transfers of POWs, 
Article 12 states that individuals may only be transferred by a detaining state to 
another state party to the Geneva Convention III after the detaining state is satisfied 
that the receiving state can comply with the provisions of Geneva Convention III. If 
the receiving state is not affording the required protections, the sending state should 
take effective measures to correct the situation or request the return of the POW. If 
there is doubt as to whether an individual is a POW, he should still be treated as such 
until his status is established by a competent and properly constituted tribunal under 
Article 5.495  
In a decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY), it was held that if an individual is not entitled to the protections of Geneva 
Convention III as a POW (or Geneva Conventions I and II) then such a person 
necessarily falls within the protections of Geneva Convention IV.496 In addition, all 
                                               
491 Common Article 3 (1) (a) and (c). 
492 Article 5 Geneva Convention IV. 
493  The full text of Article 13 Geneva Convention III and prohibited treatments is available at 
https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=CD863DC518
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495 Article 5 Geneva Convention III. Please also refer to Public Prosecutor v. Koi [1968] AC 829. 
496 Prosecutor v. Zdravko Mucic aka "Pavo", Hazim Delic, Esad Landzo aka "Zenga", Zejnil Delalic 
(Trial Judgement), IT-96-21-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 16 
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four Conventions expressly specify that torture and inhumane treatment of POWs and 
civilians qualified as protected persons constitute grave breaches of Geneva 
Conventions I – IV.497 In addition, Geneva Convention IV states that the unlawful 
deportation or transfer or unlawful detention of a protected person also amounts to a 
grave breach.498 Thus, the combined application of Geneva Conventions I – IV aims 
to provide a core baseline standard of protections to both civilians and combatants 
(with or without POW status) during an armed conflict. The US has fully ratified all 
four Geneva Conventions and thus it is bound by their provisions during an armed 
conflict of either international or non-international nature.   
The rendition circuits operated within the ‘War on Terror’ legal and political 
paradigm. On the basis of the above outlined international legal provisions, the 
practice of extraordinary rendition is in violation of the individual protections 
governing humane treatment and transfers codified in IHRL and IHL. The 
transnational operation of extraordinary renditions, initially undetected, for a number 
of years does however raise severe concerns as to how effective the absoluteness of 
the anti-torture norm is in practice. In parallel, it raises the question of how the US 
were able to operationalise the programme on a transnational scale with the support of 
54 states. The answer partly lies in the liability-limiting use of diplomatic assurances 
and private contractors as illustrated in Chapter 1. However the starting point was 
creation of an environment of legal uncertainty within which the applicability of the 
relevant legal standards was in flux allowing for the use of expansive counter-
terrorism operations such as extraordinary rendition. The construction of this 
environment will be the focus of the subsequent section followed by a discussion on 
whether the ‘War on Terror’ is an armed conflict. 
 
3. General Applicability of International Human Rights Law and International 
Humanitarian Law to the ‘War on Terror’ 
 
In response to the events of 9/11, the US designed the ‘War on Terror’ legal and 
                                                                                                                                      
November 1998, available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/41482bde4.html [last accessed 30 March 
2016] and Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić (Appeal Judgement), IT-94-1-A, International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 15 July 1999, available at 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/40277f504.html [last accessed 30 March 2016].   
497 Article 50 Geneva Convention I, Article 51 Geneva Convention II, Article 130 Geneva Convention 
III and Article 147 Geneva Convention IV. 
498 Article 147 Geneva Convention IV. 
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political paradigm in order to create operational spaces for some of its counter-
terrorism programmes such as extraordinary rendition. The first step in creating these 
spaces was George W. Bush’s Address to the nation equating the 9/11 attacks to an 
act of war against the US.499 Shortly after his Address to the Nation, Military Order of 
13 November 2001 identified IHL as the only applicable legal standard to the counter-
terrorism operations due to be undertaken by the US.500 The Order stated that the 
actions of international terrorists including Al Qaeda had created a state of armed 
conflict, which required the use of US Armed Forces.501 Further, in order to protect 
the US and its citizens, conduct effective military operations and prevent future acts 
of terrorism, the US would detain and try individuals subject to this Order for 
violations of the laws of war and other applicable laws by military tribunals.502  
In a subsequent 2002 Memorandum, George W. Bush, stated that the ‘War against 
Terror’ had ushered in a new paradigm, which while requiring a new approach 
towards the laws of war, should be consistent with the principles of the Geneva 
Convention.503 International human rights protections were not referred to or noted as 
relevant to HVDP within these documents. This position will be discussed in more 
detail below with reference to the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Contrary to the above outlined position, the protections offered by IHRL and IHL are 
complimentary. 504  If a conflict arises between the provisions of these two legal 
regimes and their applicability to a particular situation, the relevant lex specialis 
should be identified and applied.505 Thus, the operation of IHL within an international 
or non-international armed conflict as the lex specialis does not exclude the continued 
applicability of IHRL as lex generalis.506 This is the approach adopted by the ICJ and 
subsequently confirmed in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
                                               
499 President George W Bush in September 2001 in an address to a joint session of Congress. Please see 
further ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address’, CNN News 21 September 2001.  
500 Military Order of November 13, 2001, Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 222.   
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In its Advisory Opinion on The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,507 
the ICJ was asked by the UN General Assembly to assess whether the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons is permitted in any circumstances under international law. The ICJ 
noted that in order to answer the question set, it must decide what the relevant law is 
within the corpus of international law norms. 508  In its considerations, the Court 
focused on the right to life as guaranteed under Article 6 ICCPR and whether the 
applicable international law regarding the use of nuclear weapons stemmed from the 
ICCPR or the laws of armed conflict. The argument that the ICCPR was directed to 
the protection of human rights in peacetime rather than the unlawful loss of life 
during hostilities was also noted.509  
The ICJ stated however that the protections of the ICCPR do not cease during an 
armed conflict unless and to the extent that there have been derogations under Article 
4 of the ICCPR. The Court proceeded to advise that as the right to life is non-
derogable, in principle the right not to arbitrarily be deprived of one’s life also applies 
in hostilities.510 However, the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life is to be 
determined by the relevant lex specialis namely the law applicable in armed conflict 
as it is specifically designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus whether a 
particular loss of life is arbitrary contrary to Article 6 ICCPR can only be decided by 
reference to the law of armed conflict rather than the terms of the ICCPR itself.511         
In a subsequent Advisory Opinion while considering the rules and principles of 
international law applicable to measures taken by Israel – The Legal Consequences of 
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory512 – the ICJ rejected 
the argument that the human rights instruments to which Israel was party were not 
applicable to the occupied territory. Israel, a signatory to both the ICCPR513  and 
                                               
507 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, International Court of Justice 
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International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights,514 had argued that 
neither of these Covenants was applicable to the occupied Palestinian territory.515 
While Israel had acknowledged that the protections of IHL are relevant to a conflict 
situation such as the one in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, it argued that human rights 
treaties were intended to protect citizens from their own governments during 
peacetime.516 The ICJ referred to its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons and 
noted more generally that the protections afforded under human rights Conventions 
do not cease during an armed conflict unless there has been a permissible derogation 
such as one under Article 4 ICCPR.517 The Court further noted that there are three 
possible scenarios with regards to the relationship between IHL and IHRL: 1) “some 
rights may be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law”, 2) “others may 
be exclusively matters of human rights law” and 3) “yet others may be matters of both 
these branches of international law”.518 In answering the particular question set to it, 
the ICJ noted that it had to consider human rights as lex generalis and international 
humanitarian law as lex specialis. This decision was reaffirmed in the ICJ judgment in 
the Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo.519  
The ECtHR has taken a similar view in its jurisprudence in the 2001 case of Al-
Adsani v. the United Kingdom520 and subsequently in the 2009 case of Varnava v. 
Turkey.521 Most recently, the ECtHR has reaffirmed that IHRL and IHL can apply 
concurrently with reference to the jurisprudence of the ICJ in Hassan v. the United 
Kingdom.522 In its decision, the ECtHR held that both the ECHR and IHL must be 
interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law. 523  The ECtHR 
acknowledged its previous case law and the jurisprudence of the ICJ before 
proceeding to state that during an armed conflict ECHR provisions continue to apply 
however the provisions needed to be interpreted with reference to the applicable IHL 
protections.524  
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The ICJ and ECtHR’s discussion of the relationship of lex specialis and lex generalis 
in the context of IHL and IHRL provisions is helpful in understanding the minimum 
baseline of protections to be afforded to individuals during an armed conflict. In all of 
the above cases the ICJ (reaffirmed by the ECtHR) expressly stated that human rights 
provisions continue to operate during an armed conflict. In comparison, the 
applicability of IHL is conditional on the presence of either an international or a non-
international armed conflict. Under Article 4 of the ICCPR, a state party can derogate 
from certain provisions during an officially declared public emergency threatening the 
life of the nation.525 A state of declared war or an armed conflict would satisfy the 
criteria for derogation. Thus, while the rules of IHL are applicable in the particular or 
special circumstances of an armed conflict, they do not displace entirely the 
protections afforded by IHRL. Rather, the operation of IHL can have a role in the 
application of human rights standards such as in interpreting what ‘arbitrary’ is or 
expanding on the grounds allowing for detention of individuals.526 
However, despite the above jurisprudence, in 2006, while addressing the UN 
Committee against Torture, John Bellinger527 reaffirmed the US position that IHL was 
the relevant lex specialis governing the US detention operations in Guantanamo Bay, 
Afghanistan and Iraq.528 While acknowledging the similarity between certain IHL and 
IHRL protections, he explicitly restated this position twice in his address.529 Further, 
when referring to the provisions of UNCAT, John Bellinger expressly stated that at 
the conclusion of negotiations on UNCAT the US had clearly noted that UNCAT was 
not intended to apply during an armed conflict.530 He emphasised that if UNCAT 
were applicable to armed conflicts, this would result in an overlap of different treaties 
and undermine efforts to eradicate torture.531 A similar view was adopted towards the 
obligations of the ICCPR.  
Thus, the overall position endorsed by the US post 9/11 in relation to its international 
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527 Legal Adviser of the US Department of State and head of the US delegation to the Committee 
against Torture. 
528 US Meeting with UN Committee against Torture, Opening Remarks by John Bellinger, full text 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68557.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016].   
529 Ibid. 
530 The US has regularly resisted the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. The impact of 
this resistance on the enforceability of rights will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 4 – 
Jurisdiction.  
531 Ibid. 
 103
legal obligations appears to be as follows: when IHL is operating as lex specialis, 
IHRL is deemed not applicable. However, in seeking to severely restrict the operation 
of the IHRL and IHL, the US did not just focus on the principles of lex specialis and 
lex generalis. Following the determination that IHL as the applicable lex specialis 
fully displaced the operation of IHRL, the US then proceeded to adopt a hyper 
legalistic interpretation of the language, text and scope of the concept of ‘armed 
conflict’ as well as other core provisions in order to limit its obligations under the four 
Geneva Conventions.532  
Section 4 will first address the debate surrounding the concept of armed conflict and 
in particular how the US interpreted the events of 9/11 to be of an intensity triggering 
the operation of the laws of war.533 It will be argued that the US hyper compulsion for 
legality in outlining why the War on Terror is an armed conflict – it will be argued in 
Section 4.2 that it is not – is not the most problematic issue. What is more concerning 
however is how the term ‘war’ can be manipulated to provide an escape route from 
the constraints of international law.534  The discussion on this point in Section 4.3 will 
first address how the US sought to limit the applicability of Common Article 3 – a 
baseline standard of protections – to individuals captured, detained and subject to 
transfer during the US-led transnational counter-terrorism campaign. Section 4.4 will 
outline the severe limitations in other core IHL provisions before addressing 
extraordinary renditions in the context of this ‘armed conflict’. 
 
4.  The ‘War on Terror’ – an Armed Conflict under IHL? 
 
On 13 November 2001, the then US President George W. Bush declared that the 
attacks carried out on 9/11 were on “a scale that has created a state of armed 
conflict”.535 This determination was made on the basis that the terrorist attacks were 
“a sufficiently organised and systematic set of violent actions”, which have reached a 
level of intensity amounting to an armed conflict.536 While construing IHL as the only 
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relevant legal framework, the US Attorney General’s Office stated that a declaration 
of war was not required to create a state of war or to subject persons to the laws of 
war.537 In addition, the US could be engaged in an armed conflict with a non-state 
actor.538 The scale of the 9/11 attacks, the number of casualties and necessary military 
response required were found to be sufficient to create a state of war de facto, which 
allowed the application of IHL.539  
IHL applies in “all cases of declared war and any other armed conflict” of either 
international or non-international character.540 Even if IHL was the only applicable 
legal framework, the US would still be obligated to comply with the rules governing 
transfers of protected individuals and treat detainees humanely. However, by relying 
on a hyper legalistic interpretation of domestic and international legal sources, the US 
challenged the core understanding of the concept of armed conflict in order to create a 
legal environment within which the War on Terror was the relevant conflict; a novel 
type of armed conflict to which core IHL provisions were not applicable. In order to 
achieve this, the US claimed that the operation of IHL is in actuality more malleable 
than the texts of the four Geneva Conventions suggest. By fashioning a broad 
rhetorical fault line541 within the international legal framework in this manner, the US 
aimed to create spaces of legal uncertainty within which expansive counter-terrorism 
activities such as the HVDP and extraordinary rendition could operate. The focus of 
the following sections is to examine how the US created this fault line. The discussion 
will also assess the scope of the limitations imposed on the applicability of IHL 
protections.  
 
4.1. The Concept of Armed Conflict under IHL 
 
Under Common Article 2, IHL and its protections apply to “all cases of declared war 
and any other armed conflict” which may arise between two or more states signatories 
                                               
537 Ibid. 
538 Ibid. 
539 Ibid. 
540  The full texts of Common Article 2 and 3 and the four Geneva Conventions is available at 
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
541 Please refer to the discussion in Section 3 of the Introductory Chapter. 
 105
to the Geneva Conventions. 542 This is the case even if one party does not recognise 
the state of war. 543  In addressing the scope of Article 2, the 1960 Conventions 
Commentary notes that a formal declaration of war or the recognition of the existence 
of a state of war are not necessary to trigger the application of IHL.544 Rather the 
occurrence of de facto hostilities is sufficient.545 In addressing the concept of armed 
conflict, the Commentary adds that the use of this wording was chosen deliberately in 
order to avoid uncertainties or disputes.546 Any difference arising between two states, 
which lead to the involvement of members of the military forces, would thus amount 
to an armed conflict within the meaning of Common Article 2 even when one of the 
parties denies that a state of war exists.547 More recently, an armed conflict has been 
found to exist when states resort to the use of armed force or when there is protracted 
armed violence between governmental forces and organised armed groups.548     
Under Common Article 3, the provisions of the Geneva Conventions are extended to 
armed conflicts of a non-international character. While the 1960 Commentary 
acknowledges that the phrasing might be too vague, it notes that isolated events 
involving the use of force and requiring a response by members of the armed force 
would not trigger the operation of Article 2 or 3.549 What is within the scope of 
Article 3 however are “armed conflicts, with armed forces on either side engaged in 
hostilities – conflicts, in short, which are in many respects similar to an international 
war, but take place within the confines of a single country”.550 In the Tadić case, the 
International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) adopted a similar interpretation 
and referred to extended armed violence between organised armed groups within a 
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544  Pictet, J.S., Commentary on the Geneva Conventions 12 August 1949 (1960, International 
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began a project to update the Commentary on all four Geneva Conventions, the 1960 Commentary is 
the relevant one in the context of the ‘War on Terror’. 
545 Ibid, p. 23. 
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Jurisdiction), IT-94-1, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 2 October 
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state.551 The core aim of Common Article 3 during such a conflict is to provide a 
minimum baseline of protections for individuals no longer engaging in hostilities. 
These protections have been interpreted as being automatically applicable without 
prior determination as to the nature of the conflict.552 
In a subsequent ICTY case of Haradinaj,553 the ICTY elaborated on the criteria for 
non-international armed conflict. The Trial Chamber when discussing armed groups, 
emphasised on characteristics such as the existence of a General Staff with the powers 
to appoint commanders, give directions and issue public statements on behalf of the 
organisation, and the capacity to issue ceasefire orders as well as conclude ceasefire 
agreements.554 Furthermore, the ability to engage in armed clashes across a certain 
territory was interpreted as an indicator of a sufficient level of organisation.555 The 
Appeals Chamber concluded that an armed conflict could only exist between parties 
that are sufficiently organised to confront each other with military means.556  
The concept of armed conflict as defined and interpreted above is not easily 
reconciled with the arguments that a large-scale terrorist attack could amount to a 
conflict triggering IHL obligations. State practice suggests that acts of terrorism do 
not amount to an armed conflict. 557  This approach is supported by the Venice 
Commission findings that the activities of terrorist networks such as sporadic 
bombings and other violent acts and ensuing counter-terrorism responses (even when 
military units are engaged) do not amount to an armed conflict.558 Similarly, Article I 
of Additional Protocol II to the UN Convention on Conventional Weapons states that 
isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of similar nature do not constitute 
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an armed conflict.559 The US nonetheless deviated from this established practice and 
interpreted the War on Terror to be an armed conflict exclusively governed by IHL.  
 
4.2. The War on Terror – an Armed Conflict? 
  
On the 18 September 2001, a Joint Resolution by the US Senate and House of 
Representatives authorised the use of the US Armed Forces as a response to the 
events of 9/11.560 Under Section 2 of the Resolution, the US President was permitted 
to use all necessary and appropriate force against nations, organisations or persons 
considered to have been involved in the 9/11 attacks.561 The determination of whether 
a state, organisation or an individual had planned, aided, authorised or committed the 
terrorist acts rested with the President.562 On 20 September 2001 while declaring a 
global war on terrorism, then President George W. Bush also stated that this would be 
a lengthy multifaceted campaign involving US military and intelligence services.563     
At the core of the War on Terror legal paradigm was the assessment by the Office of 
the Legal Counsel that the terrorist attacks of 9/11 amounted to an armed conflict 
triggering the applicability of the four Geneva Conventions.564 By relying on relevant 
domestic provisions and legal precedents, the Memorandum stated that where an 
organised force has engaged in a campaign of violence that reaches a sufficient level 
of intensity, the US President could regard such a campaign as an armed conflict 
justifying the operation of IHL.565 In addition, the determination whether the laws of 
war applied in this context was also within the purview of the President.566 This was 
                                               
559  The full text of the Article is available at 
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the first step in determining whether IHL was applicable to the “present conflict with 
terrorist forces”.567  
The Memorandum then assessed the relevant international legal standards. With 
reference to previous terrorist attacks attributed to Al Qaeda,568 it was argued that the 
events of 9/11 were the culmination of a “lengthy and sustained campaign” against 
military and civilian targets in the US.569 Viewed from this perspective, the 9/11 
attacks were said to be part of a systematic campaign of hostilities rather than an 
isolated or sporadic event. Thus, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 were sufficient to create 
a de facto state of war triggering the operation of IHL. In addition, the scale of the 
military response following the Joint Congress Resolution and the declaration of war 
by President Bush further justified the conclusion that IHL could be invoked.  
The final factor considered was NATO’s immediate response to 9/11. On 12 
September 2001, NATO invoked for the first time in its history the principle of 
collective self-defence under Article 5 570  of the North Atlantic Treaty. 571  While 
initially the invocation of Article 5 by NATO was considered to be provisional,572 
following a number of classified briefings by the US the conditional clause was 
removed.573 In October 2001, the NATO Allies declared a unanimous assessment that 
the 9/11 attacks activated Article 5 provisions.574  This was described as a factor 
“virtually conclusive in itself” in establishing that the attacks of 9/11 reached the level 
of hostilities required to be classified as an armed conflict.575 This determination was 
made without any reference to the US involvement, which appears to have strongly 
influenced the invocation of Article 5 in the first place.576 
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The manner in which the US has interpreted what constitutes an armed conflict and its 
subsequent application to the events of 9/11 is illustrative of the hyper legalism 
employed by the US. While assessing the applicability of IHL, the US adopted a very 
strict and narrow reading of the text of the Geneva Conventions and attaching 
Commentary. The analysis of the concept of armed conflict appears to have followed 
very closely, if not mirrored exactly, the language used within the Commentary in 
order to illustrate that the events of 9/11 constitute an armed attack. The phrase “de 
facto hostilities”577 was relied on in the 1960 Commentary to describe what would 
trigger the application of Common Article 2 Geneva Conventions I-IV. Isolated 
events involving force and requiring a response by members of the armed forces were 
expressly noted as not amounting to either an international or non-international armed 
conflict.578 The attacks of 9/11 were described thus: the culmination of a widespread 
and sustained campaign of hostilities, which required the engagement of US troops on 
a massive scale.579 In other words – these were not isolated or sporadic events but 
rather de facto hostilities, which would engage IHL.580 Protracted armed violence 
between governmental forces and organised armed groups has been found to trigger 
the applicability of IHL.581  
The decision to declare a ‘war’ on terrorism has been criticised as a normative and 
pragmatic error.582 However, the above definitions provided by the ICTY are broad 
enough to encompass conflicts between a state and a terrorist group provided that the 
latter is sufficiently organised and more importantly capable of sustaining military 
operations.583 The core question that needs to be examined is whether various acts 
attributed to Al Qaeda are sufficiently related to each other to be interpreted as acts of 
war in the same conflict.584 The US Executive determination that it is at war with Al 
Qaeda and international terrorist groups in general has been criticised on the basis that 
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it lacks any geographical delimitation.585 Even if the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre in 1993, Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and US embassies in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998 could be attributed to Al Qaida or categorised as linked, serious 
questions nonetheless arise as to the geographical proximity and temporal closeness 
of these attacks.586 The identification of one core target – Al Qaeda and its affiliates – 
does not help to delimit the location of war but rather seems to broaden it. For the 
‘War on Terror’ to amount to an armed conflict under IHL, there should be a more 
specified geographical connection and more substantial or closer temporal links. 
However four benefits of the paradigm of war stand out in particular. As part of a war 
it is permissible to use lethal force against enemy troops regardless of the degree of 
involvement such troops have with the enemy, thus, vastly expanding the number of 
individuals who can be legitimate targets.587 Further, collateral damage, which is the 
unintended but foreseen killing of non-combatants, is permissible as part of 
operations against military targets provided the principle of proportionality is 
followed.588 Quite significantly, the requirements in relation to evidence and proof in 
terms of detaining individuals or subjecting them to other restrictive practices are far 
less stringent than in comparison with the criminal justice system.589 Thus, an enemy 
combatant can be captured and imprisoned without having to reach the beyond 
reasonable doubt standard of proof. Finally, within the context of war, legitimate 
targets are those who are considered to pose a threat and cause harm rather than only 
those who have already caused harm. 590  Under Military Order of 13 November 
2001,591 the individuals subject to this Order were non-US citizens who had been 
determined a) to be or have been members of Al Qaeda, b) to be or have been 
engaged in aiding, abetting or conspiring to commit acts of international terrorism or 
have aimed to cause adverse effects on the US and c) to have knowingly harboured 
such individuals.592 Individuals whose capture and detention was in the interest of the 
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US were also subject to the Order.593 The significance of these determinations to 
individuals identified as subjects to this order will be discussed in Section 4.3. 
Having developed a multi-faceted argument that the events of 9/11 activated the laws 
of war, the US proceeded to severely restrict the protections afforded to individuals 
captured, detained and potentially subject to transfer under Common Article 3 and 
Geneva Convention III. This was achieved through a determination that while the 
‘War on Terror’ was the relevant armed conflict, it was a type of armed conflict not 
expressly governed by either Common Articles 2 or 3. Concurrently, the US 
proceeded to restrict other core IHL protections linked to the operation of Common 
Articles 2 and 3. 
 
 4.3. Restrictions on Common Article 3 and other core IHL protections 
 
Common Article 3 or as it has also been described - a “Convention in miniature” - 
expresses the fundamental core principles governing all four Geneva Conventions.594 
It applies automatically without a prior determination of the nature of the conflict and 
sets a compulsory minimum standard ensuring the humane treatment of detained 
individuals. 595  In assessing the applicability of Common Article 3, the ICTY in 
Prosecutor v. Tadić596 found that the rules contained in the Article applied outside the 
narrow geographical context of the actual zone of combat operations.597 In addition, 
some of the language in Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions was found to imply a 
broad scope of application beyond actual hostilities.598 The nexus required was a 
relationship between the conflict and deprivation of liberty; it was not necessary for 
the deprivation to occur within the conflict zone. 599  The tribunal found that the 
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character or nature of a conflict was irrelevant to the applicability of the minimum 
baseline obligations of Common Article 3.600  
This interpretation was challenged on the basis that it ignored the text and context 
within which Common Article 3 (and the Geneva Conventions) was ratified by the 
US.601 According to the US, Common Article 3 obligations traditionally applied to 
internal conflicts within one territory between a State Party and an insurgent group 
amounting to a large-scale civil war rather than to all forms of armed conflict not 
covered by Common Article 2.602 Thus, an armed conflict between a state and a 
transnational terrorist organisation should not trigger the applicability of Common 
Article 3. It was argued that under the decision in the Tadić case, Common Article 3 
would apply to all conflicts, which do not satisfy the provisions of Common Article 2. 
By interpreting Article 3 in this manner, the ICTY was effectively expanding its 
scope beyond the original text of the Geneva Conventions without the approval of 
state parties to the Geneva Conventions.  
While the actual text of Common Article 3 has not been amended since the adoption 
of the Conventions, two Additional Protocols have been drafted to adapt the 
Conventions to more contemporary forms of warfare.603  The US has signed both 
Protocols, however it has not ratified either one yet.604 In this context it was argued 
that the broader scope of Article 3 promoted by the two Protocols should be deemed 
inapplicable to the US.605 A state signature606 to an international treaty subject to 
ratification does not establish consent to be bound. 607  It does however create an 
obligation on a state to refrain, in good faith, from acts which would defeat the object 
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and purpose of the treaty.608 The strict and narrow interpretation of the processes 
relating to the creation of binding international obligations in combination with the 
existing domestic implementation approach is further illustration of how the US have 
aimed to restrict the scope and applicability of the relevant IHL provisions.  
As discussed earlier in Section 3, the US adopted the position that the operation of 
IHRL protections was fully displaced by IHL as the relevant lex specialis during an 
armed conflict. Having proceeded to then severely limit core IHL provisions such as 
Common Article 3, the US created a broad rhetorical fault line within which 
individual detainees – in particular those considered to have links with Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban – were afforded very restricted if any individual rights and protections. In 
a 2002 U.S. Department of Justice Memorandum (DoJ Memo) advocated that the 
provisions and protections afforded under Geneva Convention III were not applicable 
to detainees associated with Al Qaeda.609 This conclusion was reached on the basis of 
three factors.  
It was first reiterated that as the “novel” nature of the conflict precluded the operation 
of Common Article 3, the military treatment of members of Al Qaeda was thus not 
restricted or governed by Common Article 3.610  In addition, as Al Qaeda was not a 
state but rather a non-governmental terrorist organisation operating across a number 
of countries, the provisions of Geneva Convention III were also not applicable to Al 
Qaeda detainees. This argument was made on the basis that Common Article 2, which 
triggers the provisions regulating the detention and POWs was limited to cases of 
declared war or armed conflict between two or more states signatories to the 
Conventions.  
It was further argued that Al Qaeda members failed to satisfy the eligibility 
requirements for treatment as POWs.611 The reasoning was based on interpretations of 
Article 4(A)(1), 4(A)(2) and 4(A)(3) in combination with the contention that Al 
Qaeda members have demonstrated clear disregard for the basic requirements of 
lawful warfare.612 As Common Articles 2 and 3 were deemed inapplicable, Al Qaeda 
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members also could not request POW status.613 It was determined that the scope of 
Article 4 did not expand beyond the circumstances expressly addressed in Common 
Article 2 and 3.614 Both Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees were thus deemed ineligible 
for POW status as a matter of domestic law.615  
In addition to this Executive interpretation of the applicability of the Geneva 
Conventions, §948a Military Commissions Act of 2006 codified the above outlined 
determinations by defining two categories of combatants – lawful enemy and 
unlawful enemy combatants. Lawful enemy combatants were deemed to be subject to 
the U.S. Code616 and by proxy the Geneva Conventions; unlawful enemy combatants 
however, subject to a trial by a military commission under the Act, could not invoke 
the protections of the Geneva Conventions.617  Individuals who were linked to Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban or associated forces were specifically listed as falling under the 
category of unlawful enemy combatant. 618  Consequently, despite the Taliban’s 
generally accepted status as the official armed forces of the then de facto Afghanistan 
government,619 Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees could not be granted POW status.620 
Thus, through the hyper legalistic approach adopted by the US in interpreting the 
concept of armed conflict and by proxy the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, 
individual terrorist suspects captured during military operations were effectively 
denied the protections afforded by Common Article 3. 
In this context the decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld621 is of particular significance.622 
Mr. Hamdan was captured in Afghanistan in 2001 and subsequently transferred to 
Guantánamo Bay in 2002.623 In 2003 he was deemed eligible for trial by a military 
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commission for then-unspecified crimes. In 2004 he was charged with conspiracy to 
commit offences triable by a military commission. In his habeas corpus petition, he 
argued that the procedures adopted to try him violated basic aspects of military and 
international law. The District Court granted the habeas relief and stayed the 
commission proceedings finding that the Presidential authority to establish military 
commissions extended only to offenders or offences triable under the law of war.624 
As the laws of war include Geneva Convention III, Mr. Hamdan was thus entitled to 
the full protections of the Convention until his status was determined. However 
regardless of whether he was classified as a POW, the commission convened to try 
him was established in violation of both the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) and Common Article 3 Geneva Conventions as it had the power to convict 
based on evidence the accused had no access to.  
The D.C. Circuit reversed the decision ruling that the Geneva Conventions were not 
judicially enforceable.625 The Circuit Court further noted that Mr. Hamdan’s trial 
before a military commission would not violate the UCMJ or the Armed Forces 
regulations, which implement the Geneva Conventions. In particular, the Circuit 
Court noted that Common Article 3 was inapplicable in this case as the conflict with 
Al Qaeda was of an international character rather than a non-international character 
within the text of the Article.  
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, finding that Common Article 3 affords 
minimal protection to individuals associated either with a signatory or a non-signatory 
of the Conventions who are involved in a conflict on the territory of a signatory.626 
The Court further disagreed with the contention of the US government that the 
conflict with Al Qaeda does not fall within the scope of the Geneva Conventions.627 It 
noted that the term “conflict not of an international character” under Common Article 
3 is applied in contradistinction to a conflict between nations, which is demonstrated 
by the fundamental logic of the Convention’s provisions.628 The phrase should thus be 
read in its literal meaning and interpreted as having as wide a scope as possible.629 
The Court did acknowledge that the scope and application of Common Article 3 and 
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in particular the meaning of “not of an international character” is not expressly 
defined within the text of the Conventions. Rather, it has been explained by additional 
treatises and commentaries relied on by the US Supreme Court itself.  
The Court’s decision has been criticised on the basis that it has not clarified the legal 
status of the conflict to which IHL applies.630 In particular, while sustained references 
were made to the term ‘war’ and the applicability of IHL, there appeared to be limited 
engagement with the status of the relevant conflict and by proxy the appropriate status 
of the parties involved in the conflict.631 The goal of Common Article 3 is to protect 
core humanitarian values for both state and non-state actors hence conflicts which fall 
under the scope of Common Article 3 should be formally recognised. 632  In this 
respect the decision was a missed opportunity as it did not assess comprehensively the 
thresholds of violence, which formally trigger the applicability of IHL.633  Thus, until 
a formal judicial determination on the particular conflicts, which fall within the 
mandate of Common Article 3 is made, states can continue to interpret the application 
of Common Article 3 in a manner restricting Geneva Convention obligations. 
However, while the Court may not have grounded its conclusions in a particularly 
rigorous legal argumentation, it has arguably tried to constrain or close the fault line 
exploited by the US in the context of the War on Terror in order to operate the 
rendition circuits.634 
 
4.4. IHL, Hyper Legalism and Irregular Transfers  
 
The 2013 Open Society Report on extraordinary rendition and the 2014 Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence have both noted that a number of the individuals were 
captured, detained and rendered from/through Afghanistan.635  A significant number 
                                               
630 Ni Aolain, F., ‘Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get it Right?’ (2006-2007) 
91 Minnesota Law Review 1523, p. 1546.   
631 Ibid, p. 1551. 
632 Ibid, p. 1560. 
633 Ibid. 
634  De Londras, F., Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (2011, 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p. 256. 
635  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc) and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 
Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive 
Summary, full text available at http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/executive-
summary_0.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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of the known rendees were detained due to suspected Al Qaeda involvement.636 As 
noted previously, the Venice Commission report advised that the transnational US-led 
counter-terrorism operations post 9/11 did not constitute an armed conflict.637 The 
armed operations in Afghanistan do however constitute an international armed 
conflict under Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions. 638  This view is 
supported by the US Quadrennial Defence Reviews post 2001, which have 
consistently referred to the operations in Afghanistan as a war.639 The application of 
IHL should thus be triggered for any detainee or rendee captured and detained within 
this conflict who has been transferred from/through Afghanistan.640 However, this is 
where one particular benefit of the reliance on a war paradigm stands out – the 
operation of HVDP and the long-term detention of persons captured outside the 
battlefield of Afghanistan.641 The US determinations relating to the inadequacy and 
“quaintness” of IHL primarily related to this element of the ‘War on Terror’.642  
As discussed above, the crux of the US argument relating to detainees and rendees has 
been to strip them of POW status. However, if the War on Terror is an armed conflict, 
in the context of irregular transfers of individuals, the relevant IHL protections are 
consistent with the generally applicable IHRL rules on transfer. In such circumstances, 
IHL as lex specialis will compliment and not displace IHRL as lex generalis.643 Thus, 
while les specialis within an armed conflict would mean that certain individuals 
facing a transfer might have greater protection under IHL, no individual should have 
less than the protections afforded under IHRL.644 
Instead however, the US adopted an approach limiting the relevant obligations for 
individuals captured and detained in Afghanistan. While Afghanistan has been a 
                                               
636  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
637 Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council Member States in 
Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, Opinion no. 363/2005, 
CDL–AD (2006), paras 78–80. 
638 Ibid, para 78. 
639  The full text of the reports is available at 
http://archive.defense.gov/Home/features/2014/0314_sdr/qdr.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
640 Ibid. 
641  Lehto, M., ‘War on Terror – Armed Conflict with Al-Qaida?’ (2010) 78 Nordic Journal of 
International Law 499, p. 506. 
642 Ibid. 
643  Satterthwaite, M., ‘The Legal Regime Governing Transfer of Persons in the Fight against 
Terrorism’ Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, New York University School of Law, 
Working Paper No. 10-27 (2010) 11, p. 11. 
644 Ibid, p. 12. 
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signatory of the Geneva Conventions since 1956, 645  it was argued that the US 
President had “ample grounds” to suspend partially or in full Geneva Convention III 
obligations towards Afghanistan during the period of conflict.646 Such an exercise of 
Presidential authority was justified on the basis of Afghanistan being described as a 
“failed state” which territory had been largely held by a violent militia during the 
period in question. 647  It was additionally argued that the Taliban leadership had 
become increasingly associated with, if not fully dependent upon, Al Qaeda thus 
rendering the Taliban more akin to a terrorist organisation.648 In such circumstances, 
the US President could unilaterally decide that none of the Geneva Convention III 
obligations were applicable.649  
Thus, through a hyper legalistic interpretation by the US on the applicability of the 
Geneva Conventions, detainees and rendees associated with Al Qaeda could not 
benefit from the provisions governing the transfers of POWs and other protected 
persons. 650  Further, while the US recognised its IHRL responsibilities such as 
preventing ill treatment and torture, it argued that in the context of its transnational 
counter-terrorism operations the only applicable rules under the lex specialis principle 
were those of IHL. The application of the relevant human rights protections was 
hence blocked. The US then argued that while the War on Terror was an armed 
conflict, the nature of this “novel” armed conflict did not fall within the recognised 
categories under Common Articles 2 and 3.651 Thus core IHL protections relating to 
allowed transfers of protected categories of individuals under IHL as well as 
procedural mechanisms while in detention were severely restricted. 652  Having 
fashioned a broad rhetorical fault line based on the perceived definitional uncertainty 
of the armed conflict concept, the US created a non-regulated legal space within 
which extraordinary rendition could operate.  
                                               
645  See further list of IHL related Treaties Afghanistan is signatory to here 
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=AF [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
646 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to William J. Haynes II, General 
Counsel, Department of Defence and Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President on the Application 
of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-laws-taliban-detainees.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
647 Ibid.  
648 Ibid. 
649 Ibid. 
650 Articles 46–48, 109–111 Geneva Convention III, Articles 127–128 Geneva Convention IV. 
651 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General to William J. Haynes II, General 
Counsel, Department of Defence and Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President on the Application 
of Treaties and Laws to Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees. 
652 Please see further Articles 45 (4), 49 (1) and 147 of the Geneva Convention IV. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
Following 9/11, the US Executive engaged in a comprehensive set of legal arguments 
and legal interpretations specifically designed to deny the applicability or substantive 
content of the relevant international legal protections.653 The transnational operation 
of expansive US-led counter-terrorism operations such as HVDP was facilitated by 
the determination that the War on Terror was the relevant armed conflict. As this was 
a “novel” type of armed conflict, the “quaint” provisions of IHL had limited, if any 
applicability, to individual terrorist suspects captured and detained as part of the War 
on Terror.654 Concomitantly, the comprehensive protections of IHRL were deemed 
inapplicable to this particular armed conflict. Through a hyper legalistic approach to 
its obligations triggering a formal or empty application of its obligations, the US 
sought to limit or entirely bypass both its IHRL and IHL obligations. The aim of this 
approach was two-fold: construct the War on Terror legal and political paradigm and 
provide a veneer of legality to the operation of extraordinary renditions as a means of 
outsourcing torture. Having created this broader atmosphere within which the 
rendition circuits were palatable, the US proceeded to operationalise these transfers 
on a transnational scale through non-justiciable legal agreements, limitations on the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties and private flight operators. These 
three key components to the transnational operation of extraordinary renditions are 
the focus of the next three chapters to follow starting with Chapters 3 and the use of 
non-justiciable agreements such as diplomatic assurances and memoranda of 
understanding. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
653  For a broadly similar argument see also Scheinin, M., ‘Terrorism’ in Moeckli, D., et al. 
International Human Rights Law (2010, New York; Oxford University Press), p. 599–600. 
654 Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 25 January 2002 available at 
http://lawofwar.org/torture_memos_analysis.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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Chapter 3: Diplomatic Assurances and Memoranda of 
Understanding – Limiting Liability under the Anti-Torture Norm 
and Non-Refoulement Obligations  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since 9/11 states have increasingly faced the dilemma of complying with their non-
refoulement obligations while still being able to deport or return individual terrorist 
suspects to countries with dubious human rights records. This dilemma seems to be 
particularly challenging in cases where an individual who is considered to pose a risk 
to national security either cannot be deported to his country of origin due to the risk of 
torture or it is perceived that he cannot be successfully prosecuted in a national court 
due to the nature of the evidence against him and its security sensitivity. 655 
Extraordinary rendition, as part of the high value detainee programme (HVDP), was 
used as one solution to this dilemma with individual terrorist suspects being 
transferred outside the established extradition procedures.656   
The increasing reliance on non-justiciable legal agreements such as diplomatic 
assurances (DAs) and memoranda of understanding (MoUs) post 9/11 both in respect 
of regular transfers and irregular transfers within HVDP657 has been another solution. 
States have increasingly resorted to these bi- and multi-lateral agreements in their 
efforts to both transfer suspected terrorists and fulfil their positive and negative 
obligations 658  under the anti-torture norm including non-refoulement. 659  The 
assessment of states’ approaches via the regional and international jurisprudence in 
                                               
655 Jones, K., ‘Deportations with Assurances: Addressing Key Criticisms’, (2008) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 183; Skoglund, L., ‘Diplomatic Assurances against Torture – An Effective 
Strategy?’, (2008) 77 Nordic Journal of International Law 319; Michaelsen, C., ‘The Renaissance of 
Non-Refoulement? The Othman (Abu Qatada) Decision of the European Court of Human Rights’, 
(2012) 61 (3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 750, p. 751. 
656 For an overview of regular transfers, please refer to the Introductory Chapter. 
657 Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 1.  
658 The anti-torture prohibits the use of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; in the 
context of non-refoulement it requires states not to deport an individual thus creating a negative 
obligation. Positive obligations in this context require states need to take direct action to ensure 
effective protection of human rights. See further Mowbray, A.R., The Development of Positive 
Obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights by the European Court of Human 
Rights (2004, Portland; Hart Publishing), Chapter 3 in particular and Dickson, B., ‘Positive Obligations 
and the European Court of Human Rights’, (2010) 61(3) Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 203. 
659 Johnston, J., ‘The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use of Diplomatic 
Assurances to Protect against Torture after 9/11’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law Review 1; 
Moeckli, D., ‘Saadi v. Italy: The Rules of the Game Have Not Changed’, (2008) 8 (3) Human Rights 
Law Review 534, p. 537; Martin, J., ‘Lies, Damned Lies and Diplomatic Assurances: The Misuse of 
Diplomatic Assurances in Removal Proceedings’, (2006) 8 European Journal of Migration and Law 9. 
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Section 3 suggests that for states such as the US and the UK, assurances are another 
step in the on-going development and specification of state human rights 
obligations. 660  The relevant adjudicatory bodies at domestic, regional and 
international level have assessed the reliability of these agreements with reference to 
the particular circumstances surrounding mostly regular transfers. This Chapter will 
argue that the reliance on DAs and MoUs is problematic from a practical 
effectiveness of rights perspective in the context of all types of transfers. The 
potential impact on the anti-torture norm and restrictions on non-refoulement does 
however vary depending on whether these agreements are being used to proceed with 
a regular transfer or operate extraordinary renditions.   
By their diplomatic and non-justiciable nature, DAs and MoUs are unreliable and 
unenforceable, which creates a strong presumption that they will not provide the 
necessary safeguards. However, in theory – as the comprehensive international, 
regional and domestic jurisprudence tests suggest – these agreements could offer the 
necessary protections. As the Othman (Abu Qatada) 661  case illustrates, there are 
exceptional circumstances where these agreements could be sufficient to fulfil non-
refoulement obligations in the context of regular transfers. Nevertheless, while DAs 
and MoUs are subject to stringent assessment by the courts in respect of regular 
transfers, there is no such scrutiny when these agreements are relied on to ensure the 
operation of a rendition circuit or circuits. It is within this context, as illustrated by the 
case studies in Chapter 1, that DAs and MoUs become much more problematic. 
The theoretical possibility that these agreements could potentially fulfil non-
refoulement obligations, informs their use in the context of the rendition circuits as 
will be argued further below. However unlike their use in respect of regular transfers, 
the promises and guarantees provided in DAs and MoUs regarding extraordinary 
rendition operations are not evaluated in the transparent and accountable manner a 
court case provides. In this context, these agreements appear to have been utilised as 
legal grey holes by the US – there is an appearance of legality however the constraints 
on states, in this case both sending662 and receiving663 state, are weak.  
                                               
660 Noll, G., ‘Diplomatic Assurances and the Silence of Human Rights Law’, (2006) 7 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 104, p. 106. 
661 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 
2012. 
662 Please refer to the case study of the US as a sending state in Chapter 1. While the US made 
promises and provided DAs and MoUs to transit states that it will not render individuals through these 
countries, it nevertheless did.    
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The following discussion will begin by outlining the nature of DAs and MoUs in 
Section 2 before proceeding to examine in depth their use within the human rights 
framework with reference to the relevant international, regional and domestic 
jurisprudence in Section 3. As the ECtHR jurisprudence offers the most thorough 
examination of DAs and MoUs in terms of regular transfers, its jurisprudence will be 
discussed in comparatively more detail. While the US is not a Contracting State to the 
ECHR, assessing the jurisprudence of the ECtHR is needed as it provides a rigorous 
and comprehensive evaluation of the reasons behind the (un)reliability and 
(un)enforceability of these non-justiciable agreements in practice. What the case-by-
case analysis of the ECtHR illustrates is that even in the context of regular transfers 
governed by extradition treaties or deportation orders, in order to ensure compliance 
with non-refoulement, the Court will engage in a meticulous examination of the 
strength and adequacy of these agreements.  
Outlining the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence is relevant not 
just in the context of regular transfers however; a number of European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR) Contracting States, aside from the UK and Ireland, facilitated 
various stages of the operation of the rendition circuits.664 As such understanding the 
ECtHR approach towards DAs and MoUs in respect of regular transfers, is important 
in then assessing the (un)reliability and (un)enforceability of these non-justiciable 
agreements in the context of irregular transfers. Section 4 will then focus on the use of 
DAs and MoUs for the purposes of operationalizing extraordinary renditions. 
 
2. Diplomatic Assurances and Memoranda of Understanding: Definitions, 
Established Practice and (Lack of) Enforcement Mechanisms   
 
Reliance on DAs has been a long-standing practice in extraditions where assurances 
have been used to enable the requesting state to transfer an individual in compliance 
with existing human rights obligations.665 In this context, the DAs are an undertaking 
                                                                                                                                      
663 The example of Syria as a receiving state which provided DAs to the US that it would not engage in 
ill treatment of detainees is a particularly illustrative one. 
664 According to the Open Society Report, 15 other ECHR member states facilitated the rendition 
circuits including Italy, Lithuania, Macedonia and Poland, which subsequently have had judgments 
made against them. See Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and 
Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc), p.6. 
665 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International 
Refugee Protection, August 2006, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44dc81164.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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by the receiving state to the effect that a particular individual will be treated in 
accordance with both the conditions set by the sending state and the relevant human 
rights obligations.666 The use of these agreements appears particularly desirable for 
states where such international, regional and domestic obligations may otherwise 
preclude an extradition. 667  Increasingly however DAs have been used in cases 
involving the transfer of an individual to a country where there is a risk that they will 
be subjected to torture or other forms of ill treatment.668  
Post 9/11, as part of HVDP, DAs have been linked with rendition circuits in cases 
where individuals have been transported to countries for the purposes of enhanced 
interrogation and incommunicado detention.669 As outlined in Chapter 1, transit points 
such as Ireland (Shannon Airport) and the UK (Diego Garcia) were provided with 
DAs promising that no rendees will be transported through the territory of either 
country. DAs were also reportedly secured by the US from Syria confirming that 
individuals detained in Syrian prisons following an extraordinary rendition would be 
treated humanely in accordance with the applicable international legal standards.670 In 
both cases, these DAs have proven to be ineffective. As the nature of these 
agreements is essential in understanding why DAs and MoUs are unenforceable in 
practice, the following discussion will first outline what DAs and MoUs are before 
proceeding to assess the relevant courts’ jurisprudence. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
666 Ibid. 
667 See further Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights on the Protection of Human Rights and Liberties while Countering Terrorism, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/4/88; Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council Member 
States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, Opinion no. 
363/2005, CDL–AD (2006) and many others. 
668  See for example the commentary by Amnesty International, Association for the Prevention of 
Torture, Human Rights Watch, International Commission of Jurists, International Federation of Action 
by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, International Federation of Human Rights, International 
Helsinki Federation for Human Rights and World Organization against Torture, Call for Action against 
the Use of Diplomatic Assurances in Transfers to Risk of Torture and Ill-Treatment, Joint Statement, 
12 May 2005, available at http://www.statewatch.org/cia/documents/ai-hrw-joint-statement.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
669 Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 2 of this thesis. See also High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, On Terrorists and Torturers, 7 December 2005, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2117&LangID=E [last 
accessed 30 March 2016] and numerous other reports by the UN Commission on Human Rights.  
670 Ibid. 
 124
2.1. Understanding Diplomatic Assurances and Memoranda of Understanding   
 
Traditionally, DAs have been sought on an individual basis with reference to a 
specific person or persons whom a state was seeking to extradite.671 More recently 
however DAs forming general clauses concerning the treatment of deportees have 
been included in agreements relating to the transfer of persons between states.672 
These bi- or multi-lateral agreements do not normally constitute legally binding 
obligations. 673  Further, the DAs generally do not provide for enforcement 
mechanisms or a legal remedy for the individual who is being transferred if the 
receiving state is not complying with the terms of the DAs once the individual is 
transferred.674  When states pursue a policy of obtaining assurances as a means of 
facilitating transfers of individuals, the assurances may be provided in the form of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).  
MoUs are informal international instruments, commonly used to set out operational 
arrangements under a framework agreement or for the regulation of technical or 
detailed matters.675  Usually MoUs are in the form of a single instrument and do not 
require ratification. 676  Further, they can be entered into either by states or 
international organisations. 677  MoUs typically express a diplomatic and political 
commitment at senior level that the individual or individuals to whom they apply will 
be treated in accordance with the international human rights standards (IHRL) as 
outlined in the MoUs.678 They can be supplemented by specific assurances based on 
the circumstances of an individual case.679  
Under international law DAs and MoUs could potentially form legally binding 
agreements between states. Article 2(1)(a) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in written 
form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or 
                                               
671 Ibid. 
672 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Note on Diplomatic Assurances and International 
Refugee Protection, August 2006, para. 4 available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/44dc81164.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
673 Ibid, para.5. 
674 Ibid. 
675 United Nations, Treaty Handbook, (2006, New York; Treaty Section of the Office of Legal Affairs). 
676 Ibid. 
677 Ibid, p. 61. 
678 Jones, K., ‘Current Developments’, (2008) 57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 183, p. 
184.  
679 Ibid, p. 184. 
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in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation.”680 The 
text of the Article also suggests that the particular designation of the treaty is not of 
relevance.681 The decisive factor thus is whether the parties to a treaty actually intend 
to create legal obligations and be legally bound by such a treaty.682  
In the context of removing individual terror suspects, DAs and MoUs have been 
relied on by states in order to provide additional guarantees or promises that 
individuals will be treated in accordance with already existing international 
obligations.683 DAs and MoUs have thus not been designed or used to create new or 
legally binding obligations rather have served as bi- and multi-lateral diplomatic 
reaffirmation of existing and accepted human rights obligations. 684  From this 
perspective, in theory, these agreements could provide the necessary safeguards. 
Practice however suggests otherwise. The unreliability and unenforceability of these 
agreements in actuality will be illustrated in the comprehensive examination on the 
relevant courts’ jurisprudence with reference to the promises provided by receiving 
states in Section 3. Before this detailed assessment of relevant case law, Section 2.2 
will outline whether there may be international mechanisms through which a 
receiving state can ensure enforcement of DAs and MoUs. 
 
2.2. Potential Enforcement Mechanisms  
 
The criticisms levelled at the use of both DAs and MoUs have stemmed from their 
diplomatic, hence non-justiciable, nature. The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights has noted that the human rights framework obliges states to refrain from 
supporting or tolerating methods of inter-state cooperation that fail to conform with 
                                               
680  The full text of the Vienna Convention is available at 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201155/volume-1155-I-18232-English.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
681 Ibid. This is supported by Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), 1976 ICJ Report, para. 
107. 
682 Please see further Qatar v. Bahrain (Jurisdiction and Admissibility), 1994 ICJ Reports, paras. 23-25 
and Oppenheim, L. and Lauterpacht, H., International Law: A Treatise (1995, London; Longmans), p. 
900. 
683 See for example High Commissioner for Human Rights, On Terrorists and Torturers, 7 December 
2005, full text available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=2117&LangID=E [last 
accessed 30 March 2016] amongst numerous other reports by the UN Commission on Human Rights. 
684 In this context, the term ‘agreement’ within this chapter is not being used as synonymous to the term 
‘treaty’ or within the meaning of Article 2 Vienna Convention. 
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their commitments.685 The Commission has further added that states should ensure 
that there are effective protection and enforcement mechanisms to guarantee the rights 
of individuals.686 Sending, transit and receiving states within the rendition circuits 
have however argued they have relied on DAs and MoUs precisely to confirm that 
they are complying with their human rights obligations and are affording the 
minimum baseline standard of protections governing transfers to individuals.687 Yet, 
as numerous state, UN, NGO and regional body reports suggest, violations of 
individual human rights including the right to be free from torture have occurred.  
The crux of the debate is thus not the substantive content of the DAs and MoUs per se 
but rather the lack of an effective mechanism to guarantee that the promise(s) 
contained within these agreements can be enforced. International human rights bodies 
do monitor IHRL compliance in general. As illustrated by the case study of Syria 
however, DAs and MoUs have been requested in a context where the monitoring 
bodies have identified persistent patterns of human rights violations yet individuals 
have not been in a position to seek any redress or even access a mechanism such as a 
complaints process through which to potentially enforce their rights. Thus, the general 
monitoring of IHRL compliance may not be sufficient to ensure effective protections 
in practice.  
The UN Committee against Torture (CAT) – an example of an international treaty 
based enforcement mechanism – can consider communications by states alleging that 
another state is not giving effect to the obligations imposed by UN Convention 
against Torture (UNCAT). 688  However, if the competence of CAT has not been 
accepted by a state, the Committee cannot receive or assess communications alleging 
rights violations by this state.689 Further, a complaint can be made only by a state 
which itself has accepted the competence of CAT. 690  In addition, even if the 
preceding two requirements have been fulfilled, CAT will examine the complaint 
only after it has been ascertained that all domestic remedies have been invoked and 
                                               
685 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, (2002) 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, p.159.  
686 Ibid. 
687 Please refer to the discussion of Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
688 Article 21, United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. See also Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. A/RES/57/199. 
689 Ibid. 
690 Ibid. 
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exhausted in conformity with international legal standards. 691  Similar rules apply 
under Article 41 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
in relation to the competence of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as a treaty 
enforcement mechanism.692  
Thus, it appears, that if a state providing DAs has not accepted the competence of 
CAT and has engaged in ill treatment in violation of UNCAT despite the promises 
provided, CAT cannot investigate a complaint relating to the ill treatment and by 
proxy the breach of assurances. In this context, the state receiving the DAs, may 
arguably have to assume responsibility itself for monitoring compliance, investigating 
potential breaches of assurances and seeking penalties to ensure that the DAs are 
practically effective.693 It is difficult to envisage however that states would willingly 
acknowledge a breach of DAs as it would amount to an admission that there has been 
a failure to comply with non-refoulement obligations. This might explain why it is 
usually the individuals in questions who have sought a remedy or challenged the 
strength of DAs and MoUs, as will be discussed later on in this chapter.  
International, regional and domestic adjudicatory bodies have assessed in depth 
whether these agreements could be sufficient in fulfilling state non-refoulement 
obligations and comply with the anti-torture norm.694 The strength and reliability of 
these agreements has been found to depend on a number of factors including the 
history of state compliance with human rights obligations and post transfer 
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms as will be outlined further below.695 The 
thorough case-by-case assessment of the courts suggests that the presence of these 
agreements does not automatically guarantee that non-refoulement requirements will 
be satisfied. While the courts have accepted that DAs and MoUs could in theory be 
used to fulfil non-refoulement obligations, the below outlined decisions show that in 
practice these agreements have been found to be insufficient as a means of 
                                               
691 Ibid. 
692 The full text of Article 41 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
693 For a broadly similar point, please refer to Amnesty International, Dangerous Deals: Europe’s 
Reliance on ‘Diplomatic Assurances’ against Torture, (2010, London; Amnesty International 
Publications), p. 9. 
694 See further cases such as Agiza v. Sweden, Opinion of the Committee against Torture, 24 May 2005, 
CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, Alzery v. Sweden, Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1416/2005, 
CCPR/C/88/ D/1416/2005, Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, 
Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment 15 November 1996 and J1 v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 279. 
695 Ibid. 
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demonstrating compliance with the anti-torture norm. The rationale behind this 
approach could be found in the non-justiciable and thus unenforceable nature of DAs 
and MoUs; this unenforceability in the context of the non-derogable jus cogens 
prohibition on torture creates a strong presumption that these agreements will not 
provide the necessary safeguards.    
Section 3 will proceed to examine the legal tests regulating the use of these 
agreements at international, regional and domestic level.  The discussion will focus on 
whether DAs and MoUs have been deemed sufficient in fulfilling non-refoulement 
obligations and ensuring compliance with the anti-torture norm. The purpose of this 
analysis is to gauge how the traditional reliance on these non-justiciable agreements 
informs the post 9/11 use of DAs and MoUs within HVDP. What this assessment 
aims to illustrate is the difference in the use of DAs and MoUs by the US and its close 
strategic partner the UK particularly post 9/11.696 This thesis will argue that while the 
US has attempted to entirely circumvent its non-refoulement obligations and transfer 
individuals outside the established legal framework, the UK has instead argued for an 
adjusted interpretation of non-refoulement, which includes a balancing of national 
security considerations against individual rights in certain circumstances. 
 
3. Transferring Individuals with Diplomatic Assurances – Existing 
Jurisprudence  
 
The absolute non-derogable prohibition against torture as stated in the texts of 
UNCAT,697 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)698 and 
the ECHR699 has been operationalised in practice through the prohibition against the 
refoulement or transfer of an individual to a country where they face the risk of ill 
treatment or torture.700 Similarly, albeit during a time of armed conflict, the combined 
application of all four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I aim to provide a 
                                               
696 Please see further the relevant discussion in the Introductory Chapter, which refers to the “unique 
relationship” of the US with the UK. Full text of the 2006 US Quadrennial Defense Report where this 
phrase is used is available at http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/QDR20060203.pdf [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
697  Full text of the UNCAT and Article 1 in particular is available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/39/a39r046.htm  [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
698  Full text of the ICCPR and Article 7 in particular is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
699  Full text of the ECHR and Article 3 in particular is available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
700 Please also refer to the comprehensive examination of the relevant standards in Chapter 1. 
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core baseline standard of protections to both civilians and combatants during an 
armed conflict.701 Geneva Convention III prohibits against ill treatment of Prisoners 
of War while Geneva Convention IV prohibits ill treatment and the unlawful transfer 
of civilians. 702  These protections apply both during an international and non-
international armed conflict. 703  As discussed in depth in Chapter 2, IHRL as lex 
generalis and IHL as lex specialis would apply concurrently during an armed conflict. 
Thus, a minimum baseline of rights and protections regulating humane treatment and 
transfers operates and imposes obligations on states at times of peace, conflict and/or 
a state of emergency.704 
If a state requires specific DAs and MoUs requesting confirmation that an individual 
will be treated in compliance with existing regional and international obligations 
before a transfer, the following can arguably be inferred. First, there is an implicit 
acknowledgment by the sending state that the individual in question may be at risk of 
ill treatment in the receiving state. Second, despite the risk, it has been determined 
that the transfer of the individual needs to proceed while fulfilling state non-
refoulement obligations. And third, the sending state has decided that in the particular 
circumstances the presence of DAs and/or MoUs could fulfil these obligations. In 
practice in the context of extraordinary renditions, as illustrated in Chapter 1, the 
presence of such agreements has not been sufficient to ensure effective enforcement 
of individual rights. Very few of the DAs and MoUs provided in respect of renditions 
have been examined by adjudicatory bodies, however, the ones that have, have been 
found to be insufficient and unreliable. For a number of years, courts at domestic, 
regional and international level have sought to regulate the use of these agreements in 
respect of regular transfers by imposing multi-prong legal tests with which sending 
states need to comply when relying on DAs and MoUs. The following subsections 
                                               
701  The full texts of all four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I are available at 
https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/geneva-conventions [last accessed 30 
March 2016].  
702 Articles 2, 130 and 131 Geneva Convention III and Articles 2, 146 and 147 Geneva Convention IV. 
703 Ibid. 
704  Under Article 4 of the ICCPR and Article 15 of the ECHR, if there is a public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation, state can opt to derogate from certain provisions under each of these 
two rights treaties. However, both Articles expressly state that the prohibition on torture remains non-
derogation even if states have triggered other derogations. The full text of Article 4 ICCPR is available 
at http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx; the full text of Article 15 ECHR is 
available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [both last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
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will outline and assess these tests before the examination in Section 4 of the use of 
these agreements outside established legal contours. 
 
3.1. International Approach to Diplomatic Assurances 
 
An examination of the UN human rights bodies’ approaches to DAs and MoUs, 
which is directly applicable to the US, suggests that there are minimum baseline 
procedural requirements governing their use.705 DAs that do not meet this standard are 
considered to be a violation of the sending state’s human rights obligations.706 
In a case arising under UNCAT, Agiza v. Sweden, the CAT dealt with a complaint 
arising from the expulsion of a suspected terrorist on national security grounds from 
Sweden to Egypt.707 Mr Agiza attempted to claim asylum in Sweden during a transit 
stopover in Stockholm while travelling to Canada in September 2000. He argued that 
if he were returned to Egypt, his country of origin, he would be subjected to ill 
treatment in violation of Article 3 UNCAT. On 18 December 2001, his and his wife’s 
asylum applications were rejected. He was deported on the same day while his wife 
went into hiding from the police. Sweden had obtained DAs from Egypt guaranteeing 
that Mr Agiza and his family would be treated in accordance with international law 
upon return in Egypt. Sweden noted that without such assurances, Mr Agiza would 
have not been transferred. Following the expulsion, Mr Agiza claimed that he was ill 
treated and tortured while in prison. 
CAT found that the DAs provided were not sufficient and that the expulsion was in 
violation of Article 3 of UNCAT. 708 There were a number of signs that should have 
alerted Sweden to the potential unreliability of the assurances provided. As torture 
and other inhumane practices were systematically used as part of interrogations in 
Egypt, particularly in relation to prisoners detained for political or security related 
reasons, Sweden should have known that the DAs were inadequate.709 Further, Egypt 
had breached a clause in the provided assurances relating to a fair trial and fairness of 
                                               
705  Satterthwaite, M., ‘The Legal Regime Governing Transfer of Persons in the Fight against 
Terrorism’ Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, New York University School of Law, 
Working Paper No. 10-27 (2010), p. 12.  
706 Ibid, p. 12. 
707 Opinion of the Committee against Torture, 24 May 2005, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003.  
708 Ibid. 
709 Ibid. 
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procedure, which undermined the weight and integrity of the assurances as a whole.710 
Thus, Egypt as a promisor could not reach the necessary level of credibility rendering 
the assurances provided unreliable.711 In the months preceding the trial, the CAT was 
presented with additional information concerning Mr Agiza’s removal and his 
subsequent mistreatment in Egypt.712 This led CAT to change its earlier decision that 
the assurances concerning Mr Agiza were adequate.713 The receipt of new evidence of 
mistreatment and the discovery of further information led CAT to find that the 
assurances relating to Mr Agiza provided no mechanism for their practical 
enforcement and thus did not suffice to protect against the manifest risk of torture.714  
In a separate opinion, one of the CAT members offered a partially dissenting opinion 
in relation to some of the findings under Article 3.715 He noted that Sweden was 
clearly aware of its obligations under Article 3 and the prohibition on refoulement 
hence it had sought DAs at senior level from the Egyptian government. He then 
referred to a report from the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights 
on Torture,716 which had been accepted by the Commission. The report noted that 
before extraditing or transferring individuals under terrorism or other charges, in all 
appropriate circumstances717 the sending state should request unequivocal guarantees 
from the receiving state that the individual in question would not be subjected to 
torture or other forms of ill treatment upon return.718 In addition, a monitoring system 
should be in place to ensure effective protection of the individual’s rights.719 The 
partially dissenting Committee member thus found that as Sweden had requested such 
assurances and had engaged in monitoring Mr Agiza’s treatment after the expulsion, 
the refoulement had not been in violation of Article 3.  
In a similar case arising under the ICCPR, Alzery v. Sweden,720 the HRC had to assess 
whether there had been a violation of the prohibition against torture and ill treatment 
under Article 7. Mr Alzery, as Egyptian national, had sought asylum in Sweden. He 
                                               
710 Ibid. 
711 Ibid, paras. 13.4 and 13.5. 
712 Jones, M., “Lies, Damned Lies and Diplomatic Assurances: The Misuse of Diplomatic Assurances 
in Removal Proceedings”, (2006) 8 European Journal of Migration and Law 9, p. 22. 
713 Opinion of the Committee against Torture, UN Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, paras. 13.4–13.5.  
714 Ibid, paras. 13.4 – 13.5 
715 Ibid, Separate Opinion of Committee Member Mr. Alexander Yakovlev. 
716 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the Question of Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. A/57/173. 
717 The report did not expand further on the phrase “all appropriate circumstances”. 
718 Ibid, para. 35. 
719 Ibid. 
720 Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1416/2005, CCPR/C/88/ D/1416/2005. 
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claimed that around 1991, he had been temporarily detained by the Egyptian Security 
Services and mistreated before being released. While deciding on his asylum 
application, Sweden requested and received DAs by a senior representative of the 
Egyptian government. The assurances guaranteed that Mr Alzery would be treated 
humanely and in compliance with international and domestic human rights 
obligations. In addition, the Swedish government requested that a Swedish Embassy 
representative would be allowed to attend the trial. On 18 December 2001, he was 
handed over to US and Egyptian security agents at Bromma airport where he was first 
handcuffed, hooded and blindfolded before then being transferred in Egypt. 
Following his release from prison, Mr Alzery argued that his expulsion from Sweden 
had breached Article 7 of the ICCPR as Sweden was or should have been aware that 
he faced a real risk of torture if returned to Egypt despite the assurances provided.  
The HRC noted that in determining whether a real risk of torture or other ill treatment 
exists, it must consider all the relevant elements including the general approach 
towards human rights in a state. 721  The existence of DAs, their content and the 
existence and implementation of enforcement mechanisms were factual elements 
relevant to the overall determination whether real risk of ill treatment existed. The 
Committee noted that Sweden itself had conceded that there was a real risk of ill 
treatment, which without additional guarantees would have prevented the deportation 
under Sweden’s international obligations.722 Thus, the Swedish government’s reliance 
on DAs was based on the belief that the assurances provided sufficiently reduced the 
risk of the alleged ill treatment to avoid a breach of the non-refoulement 
prohibition. 723  The HRC found that the assurances contained no mechanism for 
monitoring their enforcement and there were no arrangements made for the effective 
implementation of the assurances.724   
In both of the above cases, the DAs obtained by Sweden were found to be inadequate 
to ensure effective protection against ill treatment. The decisions focused on the 
credibility of the promisor and adequacy of the promise by assessing the general 
approach of a state to human rights and whether there is history of rights violations. 
The existence of an enforcement and monitoring mechanism following the transfer of 
an individual was another important element in assessing the strength of DAs. In 
                                               
721 Ibid, para 11.3. 
722 Ibid, para 11.4. 
723 Ibid. 
724 Ibid. 
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addition, both Committees referred to the existence, content or breach of DAs as a 
relevant factor in assessing whether there is a risk of ill treatment. Thus, the IHRL 
principles relating to DAs are as follows: if the promisor is credible, the promise is 
adequate, monitoring procedures have been provided, sufficient enforcement 
mechanism exists and all of these elements have been complied with, a DA could be 
found to satisfy non-refoulement obligations.  
The ECtHR has similarly developed a multi-prong test in assessing the reliability of 
DAs and MoUs. While the US is not a Contracting State to the ECHR, the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR offers the most established and thorough examination of 
DAs and MoUs in terms of regular transfers. As such it provides the most rigorous 
and consistent assessment and opportunity for analysis of the (un)reliability and 
(un)enforceability of these non-justiciable agreements. What the comprehensive case-
by-case analysis of the ECtHR illustrates is that even in the context of regular 
transfers governed by extradition treaties or deportation orders, in order to ensure 
compliance with non-refoulement, the Court will engage in a meticulous examination 
of the strength and adequacy of these agreements. Thus the ECtHR does not 
automatically consider DAs and MoUs to be sufficient to fulfil non-refoulement. 
Rather it assesses all relevant facts of the case and as will be demonstrated in Section 
3.2 it has found on many occasions that the provided DAs and MoUs were unreliable 
for reasons such lack of enforceability mechanisms or lack of credibility of the 
promisor. More significantly perhaps, such determinations in most cases were made 
before an individual was transferred. In comparison, in respect of extraordinary 
renditions, in the limited cases were DAs and MoUs were evaluated, this evaluation 
was ex post facto. 725  As such the jurisprudence of the ECtHR – as the most 
comprehensive and influential in relation to DAs and MoUs – will be used to provide 
a basis for comparison for the post 9/11 use of these agreements in the context of 
extraordinary renditions which will be the focus of Section 4. 
 
 
 
 
                                               
725 See further Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006, Ottawa; 
Public Works and Government Services Canada). 
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3.2. Regional Approaches to Diplomatic Assurances 
 
In its efforts to both respect the confidentiality inherent in diplomatic relations and 
enforce the provisions of ECHR, the ECtHR has been treading a careful path through 
a politically delicate field.726 
In the formative case of Soering v. the United Kingdom,727 the UK was seeking to 
extradite Jens Soering to the US where he was due to face charges for two murders. 
Before proceeding with the extradition, the UK sought DAs from the US that if he 
were convicted, the death penalty would not be imposed as a sentence. 728 
Alternatively, if the death penalty was imposed as a sentence, the UK sought an 
assurance that he would not be executed. In its submissions, the UK stated that Article 
3 does not create positive obligations to protect an individual from ill treatment 
outside a state’s jurisdiction.729 In addition, the UK argued that if the risk of a death 
sentence was found sufficient to trigger the applicability of Article 3, the DAs 
received from the US significantly reduced the risk of a death sentence being imposed 
or carried out.730   
In assessing the potential violation under Article 3, the ECtHR accepted that in the 
particular circumstances the DAs received might have been the best the UK could 
have obtained from the US.731 The Court noted that the existing UK-US Extradition 
Treaty of 1972732 applied to situations where an individual suspect sought by the US 
was facing charges carrying the death penalty. Under Article IV of the Treaty, the 
Secretary of State could allow for an individual to be transferred to the US on 
assurance from the prosecuting authorities that the judge in the case would be advised 
that the UK was against imposing and/or carrying out the death penalty. 733  The 
effectiveness of such assurances had not yet been tested in practice.734 The Court 
found that despite the existing extradition relations between the US and the UK the 
                                               
726 Brems, E., ‘Transitional Justice in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights’, (2011) 5 
The International Journal of Transitional Justice 282, p. 303. 
727 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
728 Ibid, para. 15. 
729 Ibid, para. 83. 
730 Ibid, para. 93. 
731 Ibid, para.97. 
732 Please note that the UK and US signed a new Extradition Treaty in 2003, in force since April 2007, 
which has replaced the 1972 Treaty. See further 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201012/jtselect/jtrights/156/15608.htm and 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187784.pdf [both last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
733 Ibid, para. 37. 
734 Ibid, paras. 37 and 97. 
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assurances offered in this particular case did not satisfy Article 3 as the promise 
contained within the assurances was inadequate.735 In particular, the Court stated that 
the undertaking to inform a judge of the wishes of the UK at the sentencing stage did 
not eliminate the risk that the death penalty would be imposed. In addition, the 
legitimate purpose for extradition - combatting crime and punishment for two murders 
- could be achieved by other means.736 Mr Soering could be transferred and tried in 
his home country of Germany, which would remove the risk of intense and prolonged 
suffering on death row. 
The Court found that in the particular circumstances of the case the extradition to the 
US would expose the applicant to a real risk of ill treatment triggering Article 3 
obligations.737 The Court based its reasoning on the need for effective safeguards to 
give full effect to the guarantee contained in Article 3 and referred to any potential 
violations of Article 3 as being of “serious and irreparable nature”.738  The Court 
stated that it was not compatible with the underlying values of the ECHR to surrender 
an individual to another country where there was a substantial risk of violations under 
Article 3.739  This principle was then extended to include cases of expulsion and 
deportation.740 
In a subsequent case arising under Article 3 ECHR - Chahal v. United Kingdom741 - 
the ECtHR assessed whether the activities and potential dangerousness of an 
individual should be balanced against non-refoulement obligations. Since 1984 Mr 
Chahal had been a prominent figure in the Sikh community in the UK and was 
involved in a number of activities. In October 1985, he was detained under the 
Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (PTA) on suspicion of 
involvement in a conspiracy to assassinate the then Indian Prime Minister during an 
official visit of the UK. Mr Chahal was released due to lack of evidence. In August 
1990, the UK Home Secretary reached a decision that Mr Chahal’s continued 
presence in the UK was posing a threat to national security and to the international 
fight against terrorism and as a result he was served with a deportation notice. Mr 
                                               
735 Ibid, para. 98. 
736 Ibid.  
737 Ibid, para. 111. 
738 Ibid, para. 90. 
739 Ibi,. pp. 440–442. 
740 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden (1992) 14 EHRR 1, pp. 1-2. The approach to state responsibility 
for human rights violations was further endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada in the case of United 
States v. Burns [2001] 1 SCR 283. 
741 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment 15 November 1996.  
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Chahal applied for political asylum within the terms of the 1951 UN Refugee 
Convention on the basis that he had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned to 
India. He argued that he would be also subjected to torture and ill treatment. Unlike 
UNCAT, the Refugee Convention does not expressly prohibit deportation where there 
is a risk of torture or cruel or degrading treatment. The Home Secretary denied the 
asylum application and following a judicial review process this decision was upheld. 
Mr Chahal lodged an application against the UK claiming that his deportation to India 
would constitute a violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
The UK government argued that no real risk of ill treatment had been established.742 
In their submissions, they emphasised that the intended deportation was due to 
national security considerations. In this context, the UK stated that the guarantees 
afforded under Article 3 were not absolute in cases where a Contracting State was 
seeking to remove an individual from its territory. In cases of removal, which required 
an uncertain prediction of future events in the receiving state, various factors should 
be taken into consideration including the danger to national security posed by the 
individual to the host state. In particular, the UK stated that based on these recognised 
implied limitations of Article 3, a state could expel an individual even where risk of 
ill treatment exists, if national security grounds necessitated such a removal. 743 
Alternatively, the threat posed by an individual to national security should be weighed 
against the risk of ill treatment when considering the applicability of Article 3. Thus, 
where substantial doubt existed in relation to the risk of ill treatment, the threat to 
national security could weigh heavily in balancing individual rights and the interests 
of the community. In addition, the UK had twice sought and received DAs from the 
Indian government guaranteeing that Mr Chahal would not be ill treated.744     
The ECtHR stated that the prohibition on refoulement as construed from Article 3 in 
the Soering case was of an absolute and non-derogable nature.745 Thus, whenever 
substantial grounds had been shown that an individual faced a real risk of ill treatment 
if removed, the responsibility of the sending state to protect this individual was 
engaged regardless of the individual’s conduct. In assessing the risk of ill treatment, 
the ECtHR referred to the violations of human rights by certain members of the 
                                               
742 Ibid, para. 76. 
743 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment 15 November 1996, para. 76. 
744 Ibid, para. 37. 
745 Ibid, para. 79. 
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security forces in India as a recalcitrant and enduring problem.746 In this context, the 
Court felt that while the DAs were offered in good faith, they were unlikely to 
provide an adequate guarantee of safety.747  Thus, an adequate promise will not be 
sufficient to meet state obligations if the promising state does not have effective 
control over the relevant authorities to ensure that the promise is actually fulfilled, 
even if the promise is given in good faith. A majority of 12 judges found that if Mr 
Chahal were deported to India, despite the existence of DAs, the UK would be in 
violation of Article 3.  
In Mamatkulov and Askerov v. Turkey, the ECtHR accepted that DAs as part of 
extradition or deportation proceedings can be sufficient to reduce the risk of torture 
even in circumstances where monitoring procedures were not extensive.748 In this 
particular case there was no substantiated evidence that the individuals in question 
had been tortured during their imprisonment in Uzbek prisons. The court noted that 
the existence of the risk must be assessed primarily with reference to the facts, which 
were known or ought to have been known to the state at the time of expulsion. The 
court found that the non-refoulement principle was not violated.749  
In Saadi v. Italy, the ECtHR was asked to re-assert the absoluteness of Article 3 
ECHR.750 Italy had obtained DAs from Tunisia and submitted (agreeing with the 
submissions of the UK as a third part intervener) that taking into account the scale of 
the terrorist threat in the world today, the benefit of the doubt should rest with the 
country seeking to deport a person on grounds of national security.751 The assurances 
provided by Tunisia promised that Mr Saadi would be treated in compliance with 
domestic laws and that his right to fair trial would be respected.752 The DAs also 
referred to Tunisia’s voluntary accession to the relevant international treaties and 
Conventions. Italy had however also requested assurances that Mr Saadi would not be 
ill treated in violation of Article 3 ECHR, that he would have access to a lawyer and 
that a post transfer monitoring mechanism would be put in place.753 These guarantees 
were not provided in the assurance accepted by Italy. 
                                               
746 Ibid, para. 105. 
747 Ibid. 
748 Application Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Judgment of 4 February 2005, 24–25.  
749 Ibid. 
750 Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, Judgment 28 February 2008. 
751 Ibid, paras. 114 – 116.  
752 Ibid, paras. 51 – 55. 
753 Ibid. 
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In its submissions as a third party intervener, the UK argued that the ECtHR’s 
approach was too rigid and needed to be altered and clarified.754 As acts of terrorism 
seriously endangered the right to life, states had an obligation to protect their citizens 
from terrorist acts and this protection might require deportation.755 According to the 
UK, the judgment in Chahal prevented states from protecting their citizens by 
removing foreign terrorist suspects to countries where they might be subjected to ill 
treatment. The UK also emphasised that a state could obtain DAs that an individual 
would not be subjected to ill treatment in violation of Article 3 ECHR. Referring to 
the Chahal 756  case, the UK noted that identical assurances could be interpreted 
differently depending on the circumstances of the case.757 
The ECtHR reasserted the absoluteness of Article 3 and refused to draw a distinction 
between the treatment inflicted directly by a sending state and the treatment that 
might be inflicted by a receiving state – Article 3 was deemed clear and unequivocal 
on this point. The Court rejected unanimously the argument that the risk of ill 
treatment in the receiving state should be weighed against the threat posed by the 
actions of the person in question.758 While assessing the strength of the DAs, the 
ECtHR stressed that these assurances did not contain a promise that Mr Saadi would 
not be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR. 759  The existence of 
domestic laws and accession to international treaties guaranteeing compliance with 
individual human rights in principle without enforcement in practice was found not to 
be sufficient to protect against the risk of ill treatment if there was a history of rights 
violations in a particular state.760 The ECtHR further noted that the weight to be given 
to the DAs provided depends on all of the circumstances in a particular case. Thus, in 
each case, the Court would assess whether the DAs provided included a sufficient 
practically enforceable guarantee that an individual would be protected against ill 
treatment.761 In this particular case, if Mr Saadi were deported to Egypt, this would 
amount to a violation of Article 3.762 
                                               
754 Ibid, paras. 117 – 123. 
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756 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment 15 November 1996. 
757 Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, Judgment 28 February 2008, para. 123. 
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In the case of Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom,763 the applicants were 
detained in the UK awaiting extradition to the US, where they had all been indicted 
on terrorism charges. The US government had provided assurances that the applicants 
would be prosecuted before a federal court rather than a military commission and 
would not be treated as enemy combatants. The ECtHR (Fourth Section) found that 
the DAs were provided in good faith and refused to accept the submission that the US 
Government would dishonour its commitments and “commit such a serious breach” to 
an extradition partner such as the UK.764 The Court noted that the US’ “long term 
interest in honouring its extradition commitments alone would provide sufficient 
dissuasion from doing so.”765 As such, there was no real risk that the applicants would 
be designated as enemy combatants or would be subjected to extraordinary rendition 
to countries where their ECHR rights could not be safeguarded.766 The strength and 
longevity of diplomatic relations between two states is thus a relevant and potentially 
a decisive factor in deciding whether DAs and MoUs can be sufficient to fulfil 
obligations. This has been illustrated in one of the more recent ECtHR cases 
involving the use of DAs.  
One of the most debated cases in relation to the reliance on assurances, certainly 
within the UK, has been the case of Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom.767 
The case involved the long-term battle of the UK to extradite the radical cleric Abu 
Qatada to Jordan on the basis of MoUs signed by both countries. In 1999, he was 
convicted in absentia of conspiracy to cause explosions. In late 2000, he was tried and 
convicted in absentia in Jordan of conspiracy to cause explosions at Western and 
Israeli targets coinciding with the millennium celebrations. He argued that a return to 
Jordan would likely result in a retrial of the offences he was convicted for in absentia, 
lengthy pre-trial detention and long-term imprisonment upon conviction, which in 
turn would put him at real risk of treatment breaching Article 3 ECHR. The decision 
                                               
763  Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 and 
36742/08, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility of Applications, Judgment 6 July 2010.  
764 Ibid, para. 108. 
765 Ibid. 
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of the ECtHR was highly anticipated in the context of the constantly increasing use of 
DAs and MoUs by the UK and other ECHR Contracting States. In relation to Article 
3 ECHR, the Court had to assess the sufficiency of the DAs given by Jordan. In 
relation to Article 6 ECHR, the Court had to assess whether a state signed up to the 
Convention could deport an individual to a country not bound to the ECHR to face a 
trial falling short of the standards expected under Article 6. In his submissions, the 
applicant argued that there ought to be an enhanced requirement for transparency and 
procedural fairness if DAs were relied upon as the burden fell on the state to dispel 
any doubts about the risk of ill treatment.768  
In its decision, the Court emphasised that it was acutely aware of the difficulties faced 
by states in pre-empting acts of terrorism hence states should be allowed to deport 
non-nationals whom they consider to be a national security threat.769 Thus, it was not 
for the Court to rule upon the propriety of seeking assurances or to assess the long-
term consequences of the use of assurances.770 Rather, the task for the Court was to 
examine whether the assurances obtained in a particular case were sufficient to 
remove any real risk of ill treatment.771  The Court also noted that there was no 
requirement for transparency and procedural fairness when assessing the adequacy of 
the DAs rather what was required by the existing jurisprudence was the independent 
and rigorous scrutiny of assurances.772 In assessing the quality of the assurances given 
and whether compliance could be objectively verified through diplomatic or other 
monitoring mechanisms, the Court noted that it was necessary to consider the bilateral 
relations between the sending and receiving state.773 The Court found that the MoUs 
between the UK and Jordan were sufficiently specific and comprehensive, were given 
in good faith by a government whose bilateral relations with the UK had been 
historically strong and were approved by the highest levels of the Jordanian 
government.774 Thus, there would be no real risk of ill treatment and there would not 
                                               
768  ‘Case comment – Deportation of Foreign National – Safety on Return – Othman v. United 
Kingdom’ (2012) European Human Rights Law Review 339, p. 341. 
769 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 
2012. 
770 Ibid, para.186. 
771 Ibid, para. 186. 
772 ‘Case comment – Othman v. United Kingdom’, (2012) European Human Rights Law Review 339, p. 
341. 
773 Ibid, para. 189. 
774 Ibid, paras 195–206. 
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be a violation of Article 3 ECHR if Abu Qatada were deported subject to assurances 
of this kind.775  
 An assessment of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence suggests that similar to the international 
approach towards DAs and MoUs, the reliability of a particular assurance would 
depend on the adequacy of the promise, the credibility of the promisor, existence of 
enforcement and monitoring mechanisms, the good faith by the promisor and the 
guarantees within DAs and MoUs provided by the receiving state must observe in full 
the request by the sending state. Recently, following the Babar Ahmed776 and Othman 
(Abu Qatada) 777  cases, existing extradition arrangements between states and/or 
historically strong diplomatic relationship have evolved into an important factor in 
deciding whether the DAs or MoUs provided would be respected.  
Most significantly perhaps, the latest jurisprudence of the ECtHR has acknowledged 
that DAs and MoUs could be sufficient to fulfil non-refoulement obligations if they 
are provided in good faith, are specific and comprehensive and comply with the above 
listed requirements.  The Othman778 case is of particular note here as even though the 
MoUs were found to be more wide-ranging than ones provided in previous cases, the 
MoUs had practical weaknesses. The nominated monitoring body had little 
experience in such tasks and there was no guarantee that it would be granted regular 
access to the deportee.779 Nonetheless, the ECtHR stated its role is to assess the 
strength of the particular assurances provided in each individual case rather than 
examine whether DAs and MoUs should ever be used to fulfil state non-refoulement 
obligations. Thus there are exceptional circumstances were DAs and MoUs could be 
sufficient to fulfil non-refoulement obligations. Nonetheless, as the majority of the 
ECtHR jurisprudence suggests DAs and MoUs tend to be unenforceable due to the 
lack of effective monitoring mechanism and unreliable due to the poor human rights 
                                               
775 Ibid, paras 195–206. Following this case, Mr Qatada brought a second appeal to SIAC and the 
appeal was allowed on Article 6 grounds (Othman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
SIAC Appeal No. SC/15/2005). The Court of Appeal confirmed SIAC’s decision that that Mr Qatada 
would face difficulties in discharging a burden of proof that statements were obtained by torture 
(Othman v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 277). In April 2013 a new 
treaty was signed between Jordan and the UK and on 7 July 2013, Abu Qatada was deported to Jordan.  
776  Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, Applications Nos. 24027/07, 11949/08 and 
36742/08, Partial Decision as to the Admissibility of Applications, Judgment 6 July 2010. 
777 Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8139/09, Judgment of 17 January 
2012. 
778 Ibid. 
779 Michaelsen, C., ‘The renaissance of non-refoulement? The Othman (Abu Qatada) decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights’, (2012) 61 (3) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 750, 
p. 764. 
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record of the promisor. These findings in a number of cases combined with the non-
justiciable nature of these agreements reinforce the presumption that DAs and MoUs 
are not sufficient to adequately protect individuals from ill treatment.   
Before proceeding to assess the domestic approaches to DAs and MoUs, it should 
however be noted that the arguably muscular assertion of the absoluteness of Article 3 
in ECtHR cases is somewhat undermined by its contemplation of national security 
considerations in several cases. The significance of these observations is not strictly 
limited to Contracting States of the ECtHR as the next two brief paragraphs will 
illustrate. In Soering, the ECtHR stated that inherent to the whole ECHR was the 
search for a fair balance between the demands of the public interest and the 
requirement for protection of individual rights.780 The Court further acknowledged 
that national security interests must be included among the factors taken into account 
in the interpretation and application of the notions of inhuman and degrading 
treatment or punishment in extradition cases, even if they were not to be balancing 
factors in the decision whether or not deportation was permissible per se.  
This, in essence, dilution of the meaning of inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment suggests that Article 3 ECHR is not viewed as being absolute in its 
entirety, but rather that its absoluteness is tiered based on the severity of the ill 
treatment. If this is the case, then these tiers may work as follows. The top tier 
(torture) merits strict or absolute application and rigorous enforcement, the middle 
(inhuman and degrading treatment) and bottom tier (punishment) may be subject to 
balancing exercises. This reasoning of the ECtHR is hard to reconcile with the text 
and spirit of Article 3. Article 3 establishes a strict prohibition for all forms of ill 
treatment that meet the severity threshold for inclusion within the Article’s 
prohibition as outlined in Ireland v. the United Kingdom.781 
The dissenting judgment in the Chahal782 case stated that where a state is seeking to 
remove an individual from its jurisdiction, it might legitimately strike a balance 
between the nature of a national security threat and extent of the potential risk of ill 
treatment. The security balancing arguments presented by the UK in the subsequent 
Saadi 783  case arguably echoed the minority opinion in Chahal and parts of the 
                                               
780 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
781 Application No. 5310/71, Judgment of 18 January 1978. 
782 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 22414/93, Judgment 15 November 1996, p. 48. 
783 Saadi v. Italy, Application no. 37201/06, Judgment 28 February 2008. 
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Soering784 judgment. Both of these decisions appear to have influenced similar cases 
in Canada785 and the US.786 If the courts at domestic and regional level are to ensure 
effective protection of non-derogable norms, mixed-message court decisions 
regarding the practical application of non-derogable norms need to be avoided if 
possible. Otherwise, states may be tempted to challenge a non-derogable norm in 
national security exigencies and restrict its application if they believe that there is 
jurisprudence, which implies support for their cause. As the US approach towards 
core IHRL and IHL provisions post 9/11 has demonstrated if there is even the 
perception of an area of legal uncertainty or possibility to adjust obligations, a state 
will engage an interpretation which limits the scope and applicability of a particular 
provision if it is deemed necessary for the purposes of national security. 
 
3.3. Domestic Courts’ Assessment of Diplomatic Assurances  
 
Domestic courts have also addressed the question of whether these non-justiciable 
agreements could be sufficient to fulfil state non-refoulement obligations. The below 
Section will focus on the legal practices within the UK and US and in particular, 
whether domestic courts have aimed to follow the international and regional tests 
regulating the use of DAs and MoUs. This Section will provide further basis for 
comparison between the US and UK approach to transfers on the basis of non-
justiciable legal agreement post 9/11. 
The domestic UK approach towards DAs and MoUs is well illustrated within the 
decision of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC). 787  SIAC has 
purview over asylum and immigration decisions made in the interest of national 
security and it has the same status as the High Court. 788 As a general rule, SIAC must 
be satisfied that there are no substantial grounds for believing that an individual will 
face a real risk of ill treatment in violation of Article 3.789 SIAC analyses assurances 
on a case-by-case basis and has rejected the argument that assurances can never be 
                                               
784 Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
785 In Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [2002] 1 SCR 3. 
786 In Arar v. Ashcroft 414 F.Supp.2d 250. See also Kathrine Hawkins, ‘The Promises of Torturers: 
Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of “Rendition”’, 20 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 
(2005 - 2006) 214, p. 216.   
787 Please refer to the relevant discussion in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis, which outlines how 
and why SIAC has been created.  
788 Section 5, Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997. 
789 Ibid, 378. 
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relied upon when given by countries with dubious human rights record. 790  In 
particular, the prospect of breach of assurances is held by SIAC to be a matter for an 
evidence-based judgment taking into account the strength, intent and incentive to 
adhere to the assurances and the attaching penalties if the assurances are breached.791 
As assessed domestically, the precision or firmness of the DAs has been found to 
depend on the diplomatic relationship between states amongst other criteria.792 SIAC 
has developed a four-part test, which in general needs to be satisfied if assurances are 
to prove adequate in preventing a violation of Article 3 ECHR to the satisfaction of 
the Court:793 
 
a) The terms of the assurances must be such that, if they are fulfilled, the person 
returned will not be subject to violations under Article 3 ECHR; 
b) There must be a sound objective basis for believing that the assurances will be 
fulfilled; 
c) The assurances must be given in good faith; 
d) The fulfilment of the assurances must be capable of being verified. 
 
These principles are applied in an ex ante fashion and generally not ex post facto. 
In the recent case of J1 v Secretary of State for the Home Department, SIAC appeared 
to take a less stringent approach towards the use of assurances however.794 In this case 
SIAC found that the Ethiopian government could be trusted to comply with the 
assurances provided even though only one human rights monitoring organisation 
existed in Ethiopia. SIAC noted that this organisation had not yet developed the 
capacity for monitoring and could not be relied upon to report deliberate breaches by 
the Ethiopian government. However, SIAC did uphold its decision to deport J on the 
basis of undertakings by the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State accepted not to 
deport J until the necessary work had been done to develop the monitoring capacity of 
the Ethiopian organisation. The Court of Appeal found that SIAC had not been 
                                               
790 Ibid, p. 378. This view has been endorsed by the House of Lords in RB (Algeria) and OO (Jordan) 
[2009] 2 WLR 512 [114]. 
791 Y v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1223 [394]. MS (Algeria) v. 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 306. 
792 Y v. Secretary of State [339]. 
793 G v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] SC/02/05. Y v. Secretary of State. Y, BB 
and U v. Secretary of State for the Home Department Appeal Nos. SC/32/36/39/2005.  
794 J1 v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 279. 
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entitled to conclude that the deportation of J would be compliant with Article 3 
ECHR.795 SIAC was obliged to determine compliance on the basis of current evidence. 
In particular, the decision whether the Ethiopian organisation was competent to 
monitor the conduct of officials fell to SIAC and not to the Secretary of State. Thus, 
SIAC should have held that the deportation would be a violation of Article 3. While 
re-affirming the above four-prong test in assessing assurances domestically, the Court 
of Appeal noted that in many cases a monitoring regime would not be required.796 In 
cases of countries with dubious human rights records, however, such as Ethiopia, such 
a regime would be required.797  
Domestically in the US, the provisions of UNCAT are implemented within Section 
208.18 of the US Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.).798 This Section contains a 
specific reference to DAs as a means of complying with non-refoulement and anti-
torture norm obligations. In seeking to remove an alien or a non-US citizen to another 
country, the Secretary of State can obtain DAs guaranteeing that the individual in 
question would not be tortured. These assurances are then forwarded to the Attorney 
General who determines in consultation with the Secretary of State whether the 
assurances are sufficiently reliable to allow the transfer in compliance with Article 3 
UNCAT. Once the DAs have been provided and are under review, a claim by the 
individual seeking protection under UNCAT would not be considered further by an 
immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals or an asylum officer. 
The case of Arar v. Ashcroft799 was one of the first cases within the US to challenge 
the deportation of an individual terrorist suspect (also an alien) to a country with 
dubious human rights record. Arar’s lawsuit alleged that after solitary confinement for 
a number of days, he was deported first to Jordan and then to Syria where he was 
allegedly subjected to ill treatment in violation of Article 3 UNCAT.800 Separately, 
Mr Arar alleged that he had been subjected to an extraordinary rendition in violation 
of domestic and international legal standards. 801  The US claimed that they had 
obtained assurances from the Syrian government that Mr Arar would not be tortured 
                                               
795 Ibid [67] in particular. 
796 Ibid [66]. 
797 Ibid [66]. 
798  The full text of Section is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2012-title8-
vol1/pdf/CFR-2012-title8-vol1-sec208-18.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
799 414 F.Supp.2d 250. 
800  The lawsuit was filed against the then US Attorney General, the directors of the FBI and 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and other federal law enforcement officials. 
801 Ibid, p. 570. 
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and cited the subsequent denials of the Syrian government that torture took place 
during interrogations.802 The District Court judge dismissed the case.803  
In November 2009, the Second Circuit United States Court of Appeals upheld the 
ruling by the District Court.804 The Court restated the US Supreme Court position805 
that matters of foreign policy and national security were within the purview of the 
Executive and not the judiciary. 806  The Court noted that Congress had expressly 
limited the review of transfer proceedings when these involve the removal of aliens 
such as Mr Arar due to national security considerations.807 The Court then referred to 
Section 208.18 C.F.R. and reaffirmed that the removal of an alien could proceed 
following the receipt of sufficiently reliable DAs guaranteeing that the individual 
would not be tortured.  
In relation to the claim of extraordinary rendition, the Court found that such a 
rendition involves multilevel cooperation between the US and the relevant ministries 
and agencies of other countries on diplomatic, security, and intelligence issues. Thus, 
without a clear Congressional authorisation, judicial review of extraordinary rendition 
would impact on the US’ foreign policy and be in breach of separation of powers.808 
If the Court were to assess whether DAs were in fact provided and relied on in good 
faith during the extraordinary rendition process, it would be engaging in an inquiry in 
the work of several federal agencies and foreign governments.809 Such an analysis 
would involve access to certain classified information and an inquiry into secret 
diplomatic relations. Taking into account the role and authority of the Executive in 
matters of foreign policy and limited experience of the federal judiciary, such an 
examination of the DAs could result in a breach of the separation of powers 
                                               
802 See Shane, S., ‘Torture Victim had no Terror Link, Canada told U.S.’ The New York Times 25 
September 2006, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/25/world/americas/25arar.html?pagewanted=all [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. See also Hawkins, K., ‘The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and the 
Legality of “Rendition”’, (2005 - 2006) 20 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 214, p. 216.   
803 Hawkins, K., ‘The Promises of Torturers: Diplomatic Assurances and the Legality of “Rendition”’, 
(2005 - 2006) 20 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 214, p. 216.   
804 Arar v. Ashcroft 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir 2009). 
805  Reference was made to Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, p. 192 (1993) (quoting Franklin v. 
Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, p. 819 (1992)) and Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, pp. 529-30 
(1988) (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, pp. 293-94 (1981)).  
806 Ibid, p. 575. 
807 Ibid, p. 573. See also 8 U.S.C. 1225(c).  
808 Ibid, p. 576. 
809 Ibid, p. 578. 
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doctrine.810 In comparison, the Arar Commission in Canada reached the conclusion 
that the extraordinary rendition of Mr Arar was a concrete example that assurances 
from countries with dubious human rights record such as Syria were completely 
insufficient and inadequate and should not be relied upon in order to discharge the 
obligations under UNCAT.811 
The comprehensive jurisprudence of domestic, regional and international adjudicatory 
bodies regulating the use of these non-justiciable agreements suggests that where they 
are used, DAs and MoUs do not release states from their obligations under 
international human rights standards.812 However, domestic courts have at times been 
more willing to accept national security considerations while assessing DAs and 
MoUs. While in the US the domestic courts would not engage in an examination of 
the reliability of DAs, in the UK SIAC and other domestic UK courts have aimed to 
follow the existing regional and international jurisprudence and have regulated the use 
of these agreements via multipronged tests. The different domestic judicial review 
mechanisms governing the reliance on DAs and MoUs arguably contextualises why 
the US and the UK have sought to adjust and limit their non-refoulement obligations 
differently. This is will be focus of the last section of this Chapter. 
 
4. Limiting Non-Refoulement Obligations – DAs, MoUs and Extraordinary 
Rendition  
 
In a report on the impact of counter-terrorism on human rights, the Eminent Jurist 
Panel noted that the attacks on 9/11 and 7/7 had influenced many states to introduce a 
number of counter-terrorism measures, which undermine the core values of the 
international legal framework and hinder the effective implementation of human 
rights.813 In this environment, the widespread use of DAs and MoUs as means of 
justifying or seeking to legitimise counter-terrorism measures has been described as a 
                                               
810 Ibid. On this point, the Court referred to the Kiyemba v. Obama 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010), 555 F.3d 
1022 (2009) case, where it was stated that separation of powers principles preclude the courts from 
reviewing Executive's assessment of the likelihood a detainee would be tortured by a foreign sovereign. 
811 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background, (2006, Ottawa; Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services), p. 176. 
812 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/148, UN Doc. A/RES/60/148, para. 8. 
813 Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, Assessing 
Damage, Urging Action, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/16_02_09_ejp_report.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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“new normal”.814 In a similar vein, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, 
Theo van Boven, has questioned whether the practice of resorting to DAs or MoUs 
post 9/11 has become a politically inspired substitute for non-derogable principles of 
non-refoulement and the anti-torture norm.815  
As they have been used in the context of non-refoulement obligations, DAs and MoUs 
can thus be seen as an adaptable tool adjusting the boundaries of existing transfer and 
extradition procedures by seeking to limit the sending state’s liability under the anti-
torture norm. The reliability and adequacy of these non-justiciable agreements has 
however been challenged in domestic, regional and international adjudicatory bodies. 
Thus, in this context, DAs and MoUs have arguably been a mild manifestation of the 
restrictive state approaches to non-refoulement obligations, to which the courts’ have 
mostly responded strongly. However, the deployment of DAs and MoUs to facilitate 
the operation of rendition circuits has posed a more fundamental challenge to the 
practical effectiveness of human rights in general and the anti-torture norm in 
particular.  
The post 9/11 US approach towards IHRL obligations in general, and established 
extradition and regular transfer rules in particular, indicates that the US sought to 
entirely limit its liability under the anti-torture norm and circumvent its non-
refoulement obligations.816 In comparison, while the UK has attempted on a number 
of occasions to deport or extradite individuals who were perceived to pose a threat to 
national security, these attempts have been made through domestic and regional legal 
systems. In order to achieve a non-regulated legal space within which the rendition 
circuits could operate, the US have relied on what was identified as a broad fault line 
within the framework. The US first approached IHRL thus: as lex generalis, IHRL 
provisions were not applicable within an armed conflict thus resulting in no violations 
under the relevant treaties.817 While IHL was identified as the exclusively applicable 
                                               
814 Arbour, L., ‘In Our Name and on Our Behalf’, (2006) 55 (3) International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 511, p. 514. 
815 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, 30 August 2005, UN Doc. A/59/324, para. 31. 
816 Please refer to the preceding discussions in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 and the specific examination of 
US domestic legal standards as well as the creation and exploitation of broad fault lines within the 
framework. 
817  See Memorandum Opinion for the Counsel to the President, Opinions of the Office of Legal 
Counsel, Vol. 25, 6 November 2001, Military Order of November 13, 2001, Federal Register, Vol. 66, 
No. 222 and US Meeting with UN Committee against Torture, Opening Remarks by John Bellinger, 
full text available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68557.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016] discussed 
in depth in Chapter 1.   
 149
lex specialis,818 the applicability of core provisions such as Common Article 3 was 
severely restricted.819 Having established this environment of legal uncertainty, the 
US nonetheless proceeded to rely on DAs from receiving states to demonstrate 
normative compliance with the relevant legal standards regulating transfers. The case 
study of Syria is a particularly illustrative example of a receiving state with 
consistently poor human rights record whose DAs were accepted as adequate.820 As a 
sending/authorising state, the US provided assurances to transit states such as the UK.  
and then proceeded to breach them and transport rendees through the Diego Garcia 
Island without the permission of the UK.821 Overall, little is known about the content 
of DAs and MoUs used within the rendition circuits; of the content that is known, the 
promises appear to simply reaffirm existing obligations and go no further.822 In this 
context, DAs and MoUs were relied on as legal grey spaces – while there was the 
appearance of legality, the relevant promises or constraints were weak and merely 
perfunctory.  
Within the HVDP, transit states allowing for stopovers, refuelling and temporary 
detention facilities were provided with DAs and MoUs by the US. The US in turn 
requested DAs and MoUs by the receiving states who detained incommunicado and 
enhancedly interrogated rendees.823 While there is some clarity on the assurances 
offered to transit states such as Ireland,824 it is uncertain what type of assurances, if 
any, have been agreed with receiving states and in particular, the content of such 
                                               
818 Ibid. 
819 Please refer to the in depth discussion in Chapter 1 of this thesis. 
820 Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher Arar, Report of 
the Events relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background, (2006, Ottawa; Minister of Public Works 
and Government Services and Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret 
Detention and Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
821 See further comments by then Foreign Secretary David Miliband, Hansard HC Deb, 21 February 
2008, cols. 547–548.   
822 See further Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar: Analysis and Recommendations (2006, Ottawa; 
Public Works and Government Services Canada) and the Irish Human Rights Commission, 
“Extraordinary Rendition: A Review of Ireland’s Human Rights Obligations” (2007, Dublin; Irish 
Human Rights Commission). 
823 Please see further the cases of Maher Arar (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background, 
(2006, Ottawa; Minister of Public Works and Government Services) and Khaled el Masri (El Masri v. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09, Judgment 13 December 
2012. 
824 Irish Human Rights Commission, Extraordinary Rendition: A Review of Ireland’s Human Rights 
Obligations (2007, Dublin; Irish Human Rights Commission). 
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assurances.825 Further, as discussed further above, the reliability of such DAs is not 
subject to judicial review as the domestic courts have deferred such assessment to the 
Executive. The reliance on DAs and MoUs in this context and the involvement of 
transit states illustrates how detrimental the use of these agreements can be for the 
effective accountability and enforcement of human rights protections. The UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights has described this particular use of DAs and MoUs 
as threatening to empty IHRL of its content. 826  Thus, while in comparison to 
extraordinary rendition, DAs are a milder manifestation of restrictive state approaches 
towards non-refoulement, DAs and MoUs are nonetheless part of the post 9/11 
spectrum of exploitation and male fide interpretations of international legal 
obligations. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
After 9/11, both the US and UK have attempted to reduce the scope of the relevant 
legal provisions relating to regular transfers by seeking to adjust non-refoulement 
obligations and limit their liability under the anti-torture norm.827 The UK’s approach 
to these non-justiciable agreements suggests that rather than seeking to limit or 
circumvent entirely its obligations under the anti-torture norm, the UK has instead 
consistently argued for an adjusted interpretation of non-refoulement, which includes 
a balancing of national security considerations against individual rights in certain 
circumstances.828 Thus, despite attempting to extradite individuals to countries where 
a risk of ill treatment exists, through the use of these non-justiciable agreements the 
UK has sought to comply with their obligations albeit at a more nominal normative 
level. In comparison, rather than seeking to adjust its non-refoulement obligations in a 
                                               
825 See for example Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and 
Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc), p.6. 
826 As quoted in Johnston, J., ‘The Risk of Torture as a Basis for Refusing Extradition and the Use of 
Diplomatic Assurances to Protect against Torture after 9/11’ (2011) 11 International Criminal Law 
Review 1.  
827 See for example Fitzpatrick, J., ‘Speaking Law to Power: The War against Terrorism and Human 
Rights’, (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 214. Hoffman, P., ‘Human Rights and 
Terrorism’, (2004) 26 (4) Human Rights Quarterly 932. Langbein, J.H., ‘The Legal History of Torture’ 
in Levinson, S. (ed.), Torture: A Collection (2004, Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
828 For broadly similar comments see further Cole, D., ‘English Lessons: Analysis of UK and US 
Responses to Terrorism’, (2009) 62 (1) Current Legal Problems 136; Fenwick, H., ‘Recalibrating 
ECHR Rights and the Role of the HRA post 9/11: Reasserting Human Rights Norms in the ‘War on 
Terror?’, (2010) 63 (1) Current Legal Problems 153; Roach, K., The 9/11 Effect: Comparative 
Counter-Terrorism (2011, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press). 
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similar manner, the US adopted the extraordinary rendition programme. Extraordinary 
renditions post 9/11 – a complex, transnational and multi-actor structure – have 
involved the irregular covert transfers of individuals across borders for the purposes 
of their incommunicado detention and interrogation in conditions that constitute 
multiple violations of human rights, including the right to be free from torture.829  
Thus while the UK has explored domestic and regional legal avenues and has sought 
to adjust the boundaries of the existing legal framework in a more transparent and 
accountable manner, the US have engaged in mostly clandestine and unaccountable 
counter-terrorism measures such as HVDP operating outside the established legal 
frameworks. 830  The difficulties rendees have subsequently faced in obtaining a 
remedy following their extraordinary rendition, incommunicado detention and 
enhanced interrogation illustrate the challenge posed by HVDP on the practical 
effectiveness of the applicable protections.831 Much of this difficulty has been linked 
to the scope of the concept of jurisdiction and in particular the potential 
extraterritorial application of human rights obligation, which is the focus of the 
following chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
829 Satterthwaite, M., ‘Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendition and the Rule of Law’, (2007) 
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Chapter 4: The Concept of Jurisdiction and the Rendition Circuits 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After 9/11, the concept of national security has become a powerful state discretion 
used to restrict the scope of human rights when there is a perceived threat.832 The 
United States (US) decision to engage in a ‘War on Terror’ is an apt example. Within 
this legal and political paradigm, through a combination of legislative measures and 
Executive decisions, national security considerations appear to have offered an open-
ended authorisation for a variety of pre-emptive counter-terrorism measures severely 
limiting individual rights.833 As illustrated by the use of extraordinary renditions as 
part of the high value detainee programme (HVDP),834 state security and terrorism 
prevention measures have expanded beyond US national borders with the operation of 
the rendition circuits being of an entirely transnational nature. Over the course of the 
so-called ‘War on Terror’, hundreds of suspected terrorists were captured and 
extraordinarily rendered to various detention facilities where they were subjected to ill 
treatment.835 The difficulties such rendees have subsequently faced in obtaining a 
remedy is illustrative of the challenges posed by extraordinary rendition on the 
enforceability of the applicable protections.836 Much of these difficulties have been 
linked to the scope of the concept of jurisdiction and in particular whether the relevant 
human rights protections have an extraterritorial application.  
The question whether a state can be held responsible for extraterritorial human rights 
violations has frequently occupied regional courts and international bodies. 837  As 
                                               
832 Douzinas, C., Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (2007, New 
York; Routledge-Cavendish), p.184. See also the discussion on the post 9/11 securitisation in the 
Introductory Chapter of this thesis. 
833 Please refer to the relevant discussions in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis and in Chapter 1.  
834 Apart from the HVDP and its transnational reach, the US engaged in military operations against 
“nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism”; such nations have included Iraq and Afghanistan. 
See further http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/21/september11.usa13 and 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf [both last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
835  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
836 Please see further the cases of Maher Arar (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background, 
(2006, Ottawa; Minister of Public Works and Government Services) and Khaled el Masri (El Masri v. 
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09, Judgment 13 December 
2012. 
837 See cases such as Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other States, Application no. 52207/99 
Judgment 12 December 2001, Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 
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states are increasingly asserting their power abroad in a manner that engages 
individual human rights beyond national borders, this question is likely to remain a 
pressing issue. 838  While defending the use of extraordinary renditions, the US 
government at the time vigorously asserted that its policy is to comply with all its 
treaty obligations.839 The rendition circuits have however been described as unlawful 
and violatory in numerous UN and Council of Europe reports.840 In rejecting these 
criticisms the US, represented by John Bellinger841 at a Committee against Torture 
(CAT) hearing, denied the use of extraordinary rendition as a means of outsourcing 
torture and first noted that: “…Article 3 does not prohibit the return or transfer of 
individuals to countries with a poor human rights record per se, nor does it apply with 
respect to returns that might involve “ill treatment” that does not amount to 
torture.” 842  He then proceeded to state that “…To the extent that the [CAT] 
Committee’s question is directed to returns or transfers of individuals that are effected 
outside of U.S. territory, the U.S. reiterates its view that Article 3, by its terms, does 
not apply to individuals outside of U.S. territory.”843  
This Chapter argues that in adopting a strictly territorial and mechanical approach to 
the concept of jurisdiction and the scope of human rights obligations, the US designed 
the post 9/11 construct of extraordinary renditions to circumvent state borders and by 
proxy the relevant human rights obligations. This interpretation by the US has 
arguably been facilitated by the underdeveloped international and inter-American 
regional jurisprudence, which unlike the ECtHR case law, offers little in terms of 
guidelines. As will be discussed in Section 3, the evolution of the international and 
                                                                                                                                      
7 July 2011, Coard et al. v. the United States Case 10.951, Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev (1999), Munaf v. Romania, Human Rights 
Committee Communication 1539/2006 UN Doc CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006 amongst others. 
838 Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 20. 
839 ‘Full Text: Rice defends US policy’, BBC News, 5 December 2005; ‘Transcript: President Bush’ 
Speech on Terrorism’ The New York Times, 6 September 2006; 
840  See for example Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of 
America, UN Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1, Report of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/7; International Commission of Jurists, Report of the Eminent Jurists Panel on 
Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights (2009, Geneva; ICJ); Committee on Legal Affairs 
and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-state Transfers involving Council of 
Europe Member States AS/Jur (2007) 36 amongst others. 
841 Mr Bellinger served as the Legal Adviser for the U.S. Department of State and the National Security 
Council within the administration of the George W. Bush administration. 
842 Please see United States’ Response to the Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture: U.S. 
Delegation Oral Responses to CAT Committee Questions 5 May 2006 (Answers to Questions 16-20 in 
particular), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68561.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
843 Ibid. 
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inter-American regional approaches is still in the early stages of its development and 
thus restraints on states are somewhat limited. Nonetheless, the most recent approach 
of the relevant bodies has been clear – states can have extraterritorial obligations. As 
such to ensure that the transnational operation of extraordinary renditions as a means 
of outsourcing torture has a veneer of legality at every stage of the circuits, the US 
have persistently ignored these developments and engaged in a very traditional 
interpretation of what is jurisdiction.             
Section 2 will first outline the traditional approach to jurisdiction within international 
law before proceeding to examine the following question in Section 3: can a state be 
said to be responsible under the international and regional legal framework for its 
extraterritorial activities?  This question will be addressed by examining when a state 
has jurisdiction to act extraterritorially with particular reference to the competence of 
recognised regional and international treaty bodies to assess human rights violations 
abroad. In addition, the analysis will discuss whether specific rights enforcement 
mechanisms such as the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) or the UN 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) have jurisdiction to consider potentially violatory 
states’ activities abroad. The cases discussed within this Chapter are predominantly 
from the ECtHR jurisprudence as to date most of the jurisprudence assessing whether 
states have extraterritorial obligations have arisen under the ECHR regime. Cases 
such as Banković844 decided in late 2001 are significant in understanding the scope of 
ECHR Contracting States’ obligations particularly as a number of them contributed to 
various components of the ‘War on Terror’ including strategic operative support for 
the rendition circuits. 
The significance of some of these cases has not however been limited to just other 
ECtHR case law. ECtHR decisions have been discussed and cited by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) in adopting a personal 
jurisdictional model in cases where states have exerted their power over individuals 
abroad. UN bodies have similarly begun interpreting human rights treaties and 
provisions as having an extraterritorial scope based on a personal jurisdiction model. 
As such it will be illustrated how the comprehensive ECtHR jurisprudence has 
influenced the current IACHR and international approaches to extraterritoriality. In 
addition, as a number of ECHR Contracting States facilitated the operation of the 
                                               
844  Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other States, Application no. 52207/99 Judgment 12 
December 2001. 
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rendition circuits, assessing the relevant ECtHR standards in relation to the 
extraterritorial scope of obligations is important in understanding potential state 
liability for transit or third party states to renditions. Transit states and the emerging 
ECtHR jurisprudence on state liability for complicity in the rendition circuits will be 
the focus of Section 4.    
 
2. Defining Jurisdiction 
 
As an international law concept, jurisdiction epitomises the power of a state to 
regulate or impact upon individuals, property or circumstances.845 It is an exercise of 
state authority, which can create, alter or terminate legal relationships and 
obligations846 – a central feature of state sovereignty, which will be explored in the 
context of extraordinary rendition. In its application, jurisdiction encompasses the 
power to legislate (jurisdiction to prescribe), the power to resolve disputes 
(jurisdiction to adjudicate) and the power to implement laws and court decisions 
(jurisdiction to enforce).847 The legal rules and principles governing jurisdiction are of 
fundamental importance to international relations as they determine both the reach of 
domestic law and the boundaries of external state power.848  
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, the limits of jurisdiction have been widely discussed 
and contested. 849  What this thesis argues is that under traditional approaches to 
jurisdiction in international law – territorial prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction 
– it is uncertain whether domestic rights-protections and laws could have been used to 
protect rendees who were captured, transferred and ill treated abroad. As noted in the 
introduction, the US has committedly defended the scope of jurisdiction as strictly 
territorial. This argument does however disregard the IACHR and international 
findings that human rights treaties can have extraterritorial application.    Through the 
                                               
845 Shaw, M., International Law, 6th ed., (2008, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press); Evans, M. 
D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
846 Shaw, M., International Law, 6th ed., (2008, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p.645. 
847  Ben-Naftali, O. and Shany, Y., ‘Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories’ (2003-2004) 37 (1) Israel Law Review 17, p. 60. 
848 Evans, M. D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 314. 
849  See for example Milanovic, M., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, 
Principles, and Policy (2011, Oxford; Oxford University Press), Lowe, V., International Law 2007, 
Oxford; Oxford University Press); Ryngaert, C., Jurisdiction in International Law, 2nd ed. (2015, 
Oxford; Oxford University Press); Simma, B., and Müller, A., ‘Exercise and Limits of Jurisdiction’ in 
Crawford J., and Koskenniemi, M. (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012, 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press) amongst many others. 
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use of extraordinary rendition, the US appear to have approached the concept of 
jurisdiction – understood in its traditional construct – as a ‘gap’ in the practical 
applicability of rights protections i.e. states only have obligations within their own 
territory. Thus transnational operations and violations of rights in another jurisdiction 
do not trigger state obligations even if these violations were facilitated or outsourced 
by the sending/authorising state. The US proceeded to exploit this ‘gap’ post 9/11 for 
the purposes of the transnational operation of HVDP and in particular the rendition 
circuits. As will be discussed in Section 3, the US has persistently contested the 
extraterritorial application of human rights provisions and has regularly argued 
against such extension of the scope of jurisdiction. This approach appears to have 
become even more entrenched post 9/11. 
 
2.1. Traditional Approach to Jurisdiction in International Law  
 
Traditionally, several bases upon which states are entitled to exercise types of 
jurisdiction have been recognised. 850  Prescriptive jurisdiction, which addresses 
questions such as the extent to which a state can impose legal characterisations upon 
persons and events, is based on principles such as territoriality, nationality, 
universality and protection (preservation).851 This type of jurisdiction was addressed 
in the 1927 Lotus case, where the Permanent Court of International Justice found that 
states are free to exercise what is in essence prescriptive jurisdiction over a given 
situation – in fact states had a “wide measure of discretion” – unless a prohibitive rule 
to the contrary could be identified.852  
The principle of nationality reflects a state’s prerogative to extend the application of 
its laws to its nationals. 853  In the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of Congo v. Belgium case, in a Separate Opinion Judge Guillaume, stated 
                                               
850 Evans, M. D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press), pp. 315–
316. 
851 Ibid, p. 318–330; for further discussion on all principles see also Council of Europe, Model Plan for 
the Classification of Documents concerning State Practice in the Field of Public International Law, 
Resolution (68) 17 adopted in June 1968 and its amendment in June 1997 through Recommendation 
No. R (97) 11, both available at https://www.coe.int/t/cm/adoptedtexts_EN.asp [last accessed 30 March 
2016], Shaw, M., International Law, 6th ed., (2008, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press) and 
Lowe, V. International Law, (2007, Oxford; Oxford University Press) amongst many others. 
852 SS Lotus, 1927 PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10, pp. 18–19.  See also Ryngaert, C., Jurisdiction in 
International Law, 2nd ed. (2015, Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
853 § 401 (a) Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States. See also Evans, M. D. 
(ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 323. 
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that “under the law as classically formulated, a State normally has jurisdiction over an 
offence committed abroad only if the offender, or at the very least the victim, has the 
nationality of that State, or if the crime threatens its internal or external security.”854 
This principle is however used relatively infrequently.855 In circumstances where vital 
state interests are at stake, a state can act and exercise prescriptive jurisdiction in 
order to preserve them under the protective principle.856 Universal jurisdiction will 
arise in circumstances where a crime is considered to be so heinous that other states 
would be justified in taking action to prevent further occurrences of it.857  
In the context of the transnational operation of extraordinary rendition and the 
practical deficiencies in rights enforcement mechanisms, the application of the 
principle of territoriality is arguably most relevant. The principle of territoriality – a 
corollary to the sovereignty of a state over its national territory – is conceivably the 
most important principle in the day-to-day application of state laws.858 The principle 
of territoriality has been described as the most certain way of delimiting competences 
between states.859 Under this principle, a state can exercise prescriptive jurisdiction 
and apply its domestic laws to an incident, which was initiated within its territory but 
concluded outside its territory.860 A state could also exercise prescriptive jurisdiction 
in the reverse scenario – i.e. apply domestic laws to an incident, which was initiated 
outside state territory but completed within state territory. 861  In practice, the 
application of territorial jurisdiction in such circumstances could be problematic. The 
principle presupposes that it is clear where a violatory act is committed however it 
may be problematic to establish the starting point of a violation.862 This difficulty is 
particularly relevant in the context of irregular transfers as illustrated by the infamous 
trial of Adolf Eichmann. 
                                               
854  Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2002, Separate Opinion of Judge Guillaume. 
855 Evans, M. D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press), pp. 323–
324.  
856 Ibid, p. 325. 
857 See for example Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium), 
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2002, p.3. 
858 Evans, M. D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 327. 
859 Buxbaum, H.L., ‘Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict’, (2009) 57 
American Journal of Comparative Law 631. See also Ryngaert, C., Jurisdiction in International Law, 
2nd ed. (2015, Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
860 Ibid, p. 321–322. 
861 Ibid, p. 321–322. 
862 Ibid, p. 331. 
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One of the most contentious issues in the Eichmann trial was the manner in which the 
accused was brought before the District Court of Jerusalem.863 Israel and Argentina 
had each signed an extradition treaty, however neither party had ratified it.864 Fearing 
that he might flee, Israel abducted Eichmann from Argentina.865 Eichmann contended 
that the court had no jurisdiction to try him as to do so would be to lend support to an 
illegal act of the state.866 In addressing this issue, the court referred to precedents from 
the US867 and the UK868 affirming the principle of male captus bene detentus – the 
circumstances of a suspect’s arrest do not compromise the jurisdiction of the trial 
court.869 The court further invoked the agreement reached by Argentina and Israel by 
which Argentina had “forgiven Israel for that violation of her sovereignty”, claiming 
that there no longer was a violation of international law upon which Eichmann could 
rely.870  
The kidnapping of Dragan Nikolić from Serbia and his subsequent handover to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) raised similar 
issues. Nikolić challenged the jurisdiction of the Tribunal as a result of the manner in 
which he was brought to the tribunal.871 In addressing the issue, the Tribunal noted 
that the Eichmann case was a classic example of the application of the principle of 
male captus bene detentus.872 The Trial Chamber referred to the relevant domestic 
case law in the US and the UK as well as other countries on the matter and found that 
taking into account the circumstances of the case, there was no legal impediment to 
the Tribunal’s exercise of jurisdiction.873 In its decision, the Chamber did note that 
                                               
863 In the District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, full text available at http://www.trial-
ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/eichmann_district.pdf [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. See also Schabas, W., ‘The Contribution of the Eichmann Trial to International Law’, (2013) 26 
(3) Leiden Journal of International Law 667, p. 683. 
864 Amnesty International, Eichmann Supreme Court Judgment (2012, London; Amnesty International 
Publications). 
865 Ibid. 
866 Schabas, W., ‘The Contribution of the Eichmann Trial to International Law’, (2013) 26 (3) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 667, p. 683. 
867 United States v. Rauscher 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Ker v. Illinois 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbie v. 
Collins 342 U.S. 519, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 937 (1952). 
868 Ex parte Susanna Scott (1829) 9 B. &C. 446; 109 E.R. 106; R. v. Nelson and Brand (1867) as 
quoted in O’Higgins, P., ‘Unlawful Seizure and Irregular Extradition’ (1960) 36 British Yearbook of 
International Law 285; R. v. O/C Depot Batallion, RASC Colchester Ex parte Elliott, (1949) 1 All E.R. 
373. 
869 Ibid, p. 684. 
870 Ibid, p. 684. 
871 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
by the Tribunal, Case No. IT-94-2-PT, para. 23. 
872 Ibid, para. 84. 
873 Ibid, paras. 79–94, 103–105. 
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national jurisdictions functioned “concurrently on an equal level” and thus it was of 
utmost importance that the exercise of jurisdiction under the nationality principle 
should be respectful of the sovereignty of other states.874 
 
2.2. Territorial Approach to Jurisdiction and Extraordinary Renditions  
 
If territorial prescriptive jurisdiction were applied in the context of the rendition 
circuits, individuals would not be able to access the necessary rights enforcement 
mechanisms in their circumstances. In the case of Khaled el Masri, it was established 
that the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRM) had voluntarily handed 
him over to the US before he was extraordinarily rendered.875 The ECtHR has noted 
that his pre-flight treatment at Skopje Airport was “remarkably consistent with…the 
so-called “capture shock” treatment” by CIA rendition teams”.876 While he has been 
able to enforce his rights against the FYRM for the ill treatment suffered on FYRM 
territory, he has not been able to obtain redress from the US.877 In another known 
extraordinary rendition case Maher Arar, 878 a Canadian citizen was a number of years, 
was eventually transferred to Syria from the US who determined that he was posing a 
threat to national security.879 He was detained incommunicado in Syria for a year; he 
was subjected to torture in the initial stages of his detention.880 He has similarly been 
unable to obtain redress from the US.881  
Both have contended that the inhuman treatment – involving physical and mental 
suffering – began in flight en route to their incommunicado detentions. Neither of 
their captures and subsequent transfers have however resulted in breaches of states 
sovereignty as the transit and sending states acted voluntarily. Thus, establishing the 
exact location of violatory acts on the basis of territorial prescriptive jurisdiction 
would prove challenging. 
                                               
874 Ibid, para. 100.  
875  Khaled el Masri (El Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 
39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012, paras. 20–22.   
876 Ibid, para. 22. 
877 El-Masri v. Tenet 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. VA. 2006). 
878 Maher Arar (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background, (2006, Ottawa; Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services). 
879 Ibid, p. 174. 
880 Ibid, p. 408. 
881 Arar v. Ashcroft 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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The cases of Eichmann882, Nikolić883 and similar could also be discussed through the 
prism of enforcement jurisdiction. The fundamental principle governing enforcement 
jurisdiction is that it cannot be employed on the territory of another state without the 
consent of that state.884 For the purposes of the (ir)regular transfers of individuals, one 
particular application of this principle is relevant – the courts of one state would not 
be permitted to enforce the public laws of another state.885  There is a wealth of 
regional and international treaties and jurisprudence addressing the extradition of 
individuals for the purposes of prosecution as discussed in previous chapters. There 
are occasions however where states do not follow extradition procedures and engage 
in irregular transfers such as renditions.  
If state sovereignty is violated, a state could nonetheless retroactively consent to the 
transfer and thus not pursue the breach of sovereignty as demonstrated by the 
Eichmann case. In terms of the individuals themselves, national practice regarding the 
legality of a trial after an irregular transfer varies. Jurisprudence from the US suggests 
that violations of international agreements would not be sufficient to prevent the trial 
of an individual who was forcibly abducted.886 The UK courts used to follow a similar 
approach however in more recent cases have found that the forcible abduction of 
individuals in violation of established obligations might be serious enough to amount 
to abuse of process and prevent a trial.887  
Thus, the standing of an individual who has been forcibly abducted/irregularly 
transferred in the context of enforcement jurisdiction is unclear. Such legal 
uncertainty in relation to possible violations of international legal norms including the 
non-derogable anti-torture norm indicates that neither territorial nor enforcement 
jurisdiction would provide practically effective rights enforcement for individuals.  
This in turn suggests that the traditional approach towards the concept of jurisdiction 
                                               
882 In the District Court of Jerusalem, Criminal Case No. 40/61, full text available at http://www.trial-
ch.org/fileadmin/user_upload/documents/trialwatch/eichmann_district.pdf [last accessed 30 March 
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883 Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, Decision on Defence Motion Challenging the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
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and the at times inconsistent manner in which different jurisdictional rules have 
developed in international law has arguably allowed the US to engage in hyper 
legalism and exploit what it has identified as a ‘gap’ facilitating the transnational 
operation of the rendition circuits. In more recent times however – including shortly 
after 9/11 – the regional and international bodies have explored whether human rights 
obligations can be imposed extraterritorially on states and thus penalise violatory state 
behaviour. This will be the focus of the following section. 
 
3. Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Standards 
 
If the principle of territoriality forms the core basis for the application of domestic 
laws (prescriptive jurisdiction), the expanding network of regional and international 
human rights treaties has developed into the primary basis for asserting extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 888  The various human rights treaties differ in their formulations of 
jurisdiction and in particular whether it is strictly territorial in its application. The 
texts of both Article 1 ECHR and Article 2 ICCPR use the term jurisdiction with 
reference to state territory.889 The potential extraterritorial application of human rights 
in this context engages complex legal issues and has thus tended to be contentious for 
states.890  
The contentiousness stems from the possibility of finding a state liable for human 
rights violations committed outside its territorial borders. The on-going debates on the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties, which will be outlined further 
below, are quite illustrative of what in essence is a recurrent tension between different 
perspectives on human rights. 891 This friction is caused by the idealised visions of 
human rights as universal attributes which all persons enjoy by virtue of their shared 
humanity, and the more pragmatic views that human rights obligations are contractual 
                                               
888 Evans, M. D. (ed.), International Law, 2nd ed., (2010, Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 327. 
889  Full text of Article 1 of the ECHR is available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf; Full text of Article 2 of the ICCPR is 
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890  Conte, A., ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in Human Rights Accountability for 
Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal of Conflict and Security 233, p. 
233. 
891 Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 24. 
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undertakings binding insofar as states have expressly consented to them as a function 
of pacta sunt servanda.892  
The evolution of the concept of extraterritoriality – the doctrinal development of 
which has at times been inconsistent – has contributed to this contentiousness.893 The 
relevant regional and international formulations of jurisdiction and its scope contain 
noteworthy differences as will be outlined in more depth further below. It is within 
this context that in recent years, domestic courts, regional human rights bodies and 
international tribunals have faced claims that a particular human rights obligation 
applies extraterritorially. In reaching a decision, the relevant bodies have had to take 
into consideration different formulations of the concept of jurisdiction. Thus, as a 
result a doctrinal convergence appears discernible within the more recent opinions 
and decisions of the various regional and international bodies. 894  This will be 
examined in detail in the following discussion with reference to the regional 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR and the IACHR first and then the international approach 
as exemplified by the UN HRC and CAT.  
Aside from being the most comprehensively developed and influential jurisprudence, 
the ECtHR case law is particularly illustrative of the inconsistency and fluctuations of 
the evolution of the concept of extraterritoriality. As such, it is arguably the most 
useful source of tracing the development of the scope of jurisdiction. By proxy, the 
ECtHR jurisprudence helps contextualise the scope of ECHR Contracting State 
obligations – an assessment which is relevant to analysing the liability of transit or 
third party states which facilitated various stages of the rendition circuits. More 
significantly perhaps, the recent ECtHR approach towards the extraterritorial scope of 
states’ rights obligations is another strand of its muscular response towards violations 
committed within expansive counter-terrorism and military operations undertaken 
within the ‘War on Terror’ – Operation Iraqi Freedom and extraordinary renditions 
within HVDP in particular. The decisions in the relevant cases, to be discussed further 
below and in Section 4, illustrate that the ECtHR is seeking to ensure the practical 
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effectiveness of human rights protections even when states engage in potentially 
violatory behaviour beyond their borders. This being the goal of all international 
treaties and the relevant treaty bodies – effective (and universal) respect for human 
rights and freedoms895 – in combination with the existing influence of the ECtHR 
jurisprudence, arguably suggests that the ECtHR approach could serve as a model for 
other institutions such as the HRC, CAT and IACHR in respect of imposing 
extraterritorial obligations on states and imposing liability for violatory transnational 
counter-terrorism operations such as the rendition circuits.       
 
3.1. Regional Approach to Extraterritoriality  
 
A state will be found to owe human rights obligations extraterritorially to individuals 
within its authority and control if these individuals have suffered rights violations, 
which can be attributed to the state within this period of authority and control as will 
be illustrated further below. In terms of the specific rights and obligations, which can 
apply extraterritorially, human rights bodies appear to be increasingly adopting a 
calibrated approach based on the nature of the right and the degree of control a state 
exercises over a territory, an individual or event in question.896 As the constantly 
growing jurisprudence of the ECtHR provides the most thorough examination of 
when extraterritorial obligations may be imposed on states, it will be discussed first. 
At times, the approach of the ECtHR towards the imposition of extraterritorial 
obligations has been inconsistent – an illustration of the contentiousness referred to 
above. The decisions of the ECtHR have proven quite influential in the approach 
taken by the Inter-American Commission in cases involving the US. The discussion 
will further argue that in comparison the ECtHR jurisprudence, the international 
approach towards the extraterritorial application of rights is underdeveloped, which 
has resulted in the creation of exploitable areas of legal uncertainty or ‘gaps’.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
895  Please refer to the Preambles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR and 
UNCAT. 
896 Ibid, p. 22. 
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3.1.1. European Court of Human Rights 
 
Article 1 of the ECHR provides that State Parties shall secure to everyone in their 
jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in the Convention.897 The ECtHR has 
developed significant and at times contested jurisprudence relating to the imposition 
of jurisdiction over extraterritorial activities of states where such activities are alleged 
to have violated the standards contained in the ECHR. In interpreting the scope of 
Article 1 ECHR, the court has found that acts of state authorities within the territory 
of the state may produce external effects, which could be attributable to the state.898  
Such effects include placing an individual at real risk of violations of Article 3 rights 
following a transfer to foreign authorities.899 In its approach to extraterritoriality, the 
Court has oscillated between two models of jurisdiction: the geographical jurisdiction 
model as exemplified in the case of Banković900 and the personal jurisdiction model as 
illustrated in subsequent cases such as Al-Skeini901.902 These two models for potential 
extraterritorial application of rights have also been described as follows: the spatial 
model or jurisdiction as control over territory or an area903 and the personal model or 
jurisdiction as state authority and effective control over an individual.904   
In order to illustrate how the ECtHR approach in relation to the scope of jurisdiction 
has oscillated, it is pertinent to briefly discuss several cases preceding Banković. In 
Cyprus v. Turkey, the European Commission found that Article 1 of the ECHR was 
not limited to national territory.905 The Commission noted that it is clear from the 
language and object of Article 1 and from the purposes of the Convention as a whole 
that Contracting States were bound to secure the Convention rights and freedoms to 
all persons under a state’s actual authority and responsibility regardless of whether 
                                               
897 Full text of the Convention is available at http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf 
[last accessed on 30 March 2016]. 
898 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain (1992) ECHR 52. 
899 Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 and Chahal v. the United Kingdom (1996) 23 
EHRR 413 amongst many other examples. 
900  Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other States, Application no. 52207/99 Judgment 12 
December 2001. 
901 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011. 
902 See further for a similar argument Conte, A., ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in 
Human Rights Accountability for Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal 
of Conflict and Security 233. 
903 As held in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment 23 March 1995 
904  See the detailed examination in Milanovic, M., Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (2011, Oxford; Oxford University Press), Chapter 4 – Models of Extraterritorial Application 
in particular. He has criticised both models “as neither being entirely satisfactory”. (p. 119)  
905 Cyprus v. Turkey (1975), Application No. 6780/74 and No. 6950/75, 2 D. & R. 125, p. 136. 
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that authority is exercised within state territory or abroad.906 The Commission further 
noted that authorised agents of a state including diplomatic or consular agents and 
armed forces not only remain under state jurisdiction abroad but they also bring 
individuals or property within the jurisdiction of the state to the extent that they 
exercise authority over such an individual or property.907 Insofar as acts or omissions 
of authorised agents affect individuals or property under their authority, the 
responsibility of a state would be engaged.908 Thus, obligations would be imposed on 
a state, which during the exercise of control over persons or property, negatively 
impacted on the enjoyment of individual rights. 
In Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, the ECtHR expressly approved the 
above Commission decision by noting that the term jurisdiction is not limited to the 
national territory of a Contracting State Party – state responsibility could be involved 
due to acts of state authority producing effects outside a state’s own territory.909 
While the ECtHR did not elaborate further on this point, it did find that the applicants 
had not come under the jurisdiction of either France or Spain within the meaning of 
Article 1 due to their conviction by an Andorran court. The Court found that while 
judges from France and Spain sat as members of Andorran courts, they did not do so 
in their capacity as either French or Spanish judges.910 Further, the judgments of the 
Andorran courts and in particular the Tribunal de Corts exercised their functions 
autonomously. Thus, Drozd and Janousek’s trial had not been under the control of 
France and Spain and their rights had not been impacted by activities which could be 
attributed officials of these two states. 
In Loizidou v. Turkey, the applicant argued that Turkish forces in Kyrenia, Northern 
Cyprus were preventing her from returning to Kyrenia and from peaceful enjoyment 
of her property. 911  Turkey contested jurisdiction arguing that the applicant’s 
complaint stemmed from acts of the local administration, the Turkish Republic of 
Northern Cyprus (TRNC). 912  The Court noted that its decision on the issue of 
jurisdiction was limited to determining whether the matters complained of by the 
                                               
906 Ibid, p. 136. 
907 Ibid, p. 136. 
908 Ibid, p. 136. 
909 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Application No. 12747/87, Judgment 26 June 1992, para. 
91.  
910 Ibid, para. 96. 
911 Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment 23 March 1995, para. 11. 
912 Ibid, para. 36. 
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applicant are capable of falling within the jurisdiction of Turkey even though they 
occurred outside Turkish national territory.913 The Court then proceeded to outline 
two bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction based on its existing jurisprudence: (1) 
extradition or expulsion scenarios, 914  and (2) circumstances in which state 
responsibility was engaged due to acts of state agents within or outside national 
borders which acts produced effects outside state territory.915  
The Court did not however limit itself to simply restating its previous position that the 
concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 is not restricted to the national territory of a 
Contracting State Party. It further noted that taking into consideration the object and 
purpose of the Convention, where a state exercises lawful or unlawful effective 
control over an area outside its national territory as a consequence of military action, 
extraterritorial jurisdiction could arise.916 The obligation to secure Convention rights 
and freedoms stemmed from such effective control exercised either directly, through 
armed forces or through subordinate local administration. 917  Turkey had 
acknowledged that the applicant’s loss of control over her property was a 
consequence of the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkish troops and 
the establishment of the TRNC. In the circumstances of the case, the Court found the 
acts complained of were capable of falling within Turkish jurisdiction within the 
meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR. 918   In reaching this conclusion, the ECtHR 
referred to “the large number of troops engaged in active duties”, which exercised 
effective overall control over Northern Cypress.919 Thus, according to the Court, those 
affected by the resulting policies and actions would come under the jurisdiction of 
Turkey for the purposes of Article 1 ECHR.920      
In Banković, the Court stated that the underlying principles of the Convention could 
not be interpreted in a vacuum and thus it was necessary for the Court to take into 
                                               
913 Ibid, para. 61. 
914 Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439 and Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden (1992) 
14 EHRR 1 were two cases which the Court expressly referred to as sources of this type of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
915 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Application No. 12747/87, Judgment 26 June 1992 was 
explicitly mentioned by the Court in para. 62.   
916 Loizidou v. Turkey, Application No. 15318/89, Judgment 23 March 1995, para. 52 
917 Ibid, para. 52. 
918 Ibid. 
919 Ibid, para. 56. 
920 Ibid. 
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account the relevant applicable principles of international law.921 From the standpoint 
of public international law, extraterritorial bases922 for the application of jurisdiction 
exist however jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial. In this context, Article 
1 of the ECHR had to be interpreted to reflect “this ordinary and essentially territorial 
notion of jurisdiction”.923 Other (extraterritorial) bases for jurisdiction were found to 
be exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular circumstances of 
each case.924 Citing the Soering925 case, the Court noted that Article 1 set a territorial 
limit on the reach of the Convention thus the engagement undertaken by a state was 
confined to securing rights and freedoms to individuals within its own jurisdiction.926 
The Court added that it was inclined to agree with the Turkish government’s 
submission that the text of Article 1 did not accommodate an ‘effective control’ 
approach towards jurisdiction. The Court stated that the ECHR was a multi-lateral 
treaty operating in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space 
(espace juridique) of contracting states.927 As a corollary, the Convention was not 
intended to be a means of requiring states to impose standards on states not party to 
the Convention.  
The Court further engaged in a narrow interpretation of its previous jurisprudence 
relating to extraterritorial application of the ECHR. In referring to the Soering and 
Cruz Varas928 decisions, liability was found to incur based on state’s actions within its 
territorial jurisdiction. In relation to the case of Loizidou v. Turkey,929 the Court noted 
that it was not necessary to determine whether Turkey actually exercised control over 
the policies and actions of the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus 
(TRNC) – this was “obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties 
in Northern Cyprus” as discussed above.930 Thus, extraterritorial jurisdiction was only 
                                               
921  Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other States, Application No 52207/99 Judgment 12 
December 2001, para. 57. 
922 The Court here referred to “nationality, flag, diplomatic and consular relations, effect, protection, 
passive personality and universality” however went on to note in a subsequent paragraph that “a State’s 
competence to exercise jurisdiction over its own nationals abroad is subordinate to that State’s and 
other States” territorial competence (paras. 59–60). 
923 Ibid, para. 61. 
924 Ibid, para. 61. 
925 Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
926 Ibid, para. 66. 
927 Ibid, para. 80. 
928 Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden (1992) 14 EHRR 1 which expanded the Soering case principle to 
expulsion and deportation; 
929 Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), Application No 15318/89 Judgment 23 March 
1995.  
930 Ibid, para. 70. 
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applicable in circumstances where through the effective control over the relevant 
foreign territory and its inhabitants as a consequence of military occupation or 
through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the government of that territory, a 
state exercises all or some of the public powers normally exercised by a 
government.931  
In the context of the ‘War on Terror’, it is relevant to note that Banković was decided 
after 9/11 and shortly after the initiation of Operation Enduring Freedom, which 
arguably may have heightened the ECtHR’s sensitivity towards assigning 
extraterritorial human rights obligations in military operations/armed conflict 
circumstances.932  This point is of particular relevance to the Court’s notion of espace 
juridique. The lack of explanation of the concept by the Court has sparked much 
criticism and the following argument has been raised to challenge it – as human rights 
are intended to be universal in their nature, the regional basis of the ECHR should not 
be pertinent to extraterritoriality.933 Further, the Court’s suggestion that the ECHR is 
applicable as one whole is not reflective of the ECHR divisible content in practice i.e. 
individual application and enforcement of rights protections.934 In its application of 
the law to the facts of Banković, the ECtHR did not address either implicitly or 
explicitly whether the bombing involved the use of powers normally exercised by a 
local government.935 In other words, the ECtHR did not discuss whether the exercise 
of public governmental powers was part of the test for the application of 
extraterritoriality.936  As such, the decision in the case has been accused of being 
                                               
931 Ibid, para. 71. 
932  Please see Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 
43. This view is also supported by Marko Milanovic in Milanovic, M., ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in 
Strasbourg’ (2012) 23 (1) European Journal of International Law 121, p. 123. In a speech given on 31 
January 2002, the President of the ECtHR, Mr Luzius Wildhaber noted that the ECHR should not be 
applied in a manner which prevents states from taking reasonable and proportionate action to defend 
democracy and the rule of law – European Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2001, (2002, 
Strasbourg; Registry of the European Court of Human Rights), p. 20. 
933  Milanovic, M., ‘Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg’ (2012) 23 (1) European Journal of 
International Law 121, p. 129. 
934  Conte, A., ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in Human Rights Accountability for 
Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal of Conflict and Security 233, p. 
244. 
935  Wilde, R., ‘Triggering State Obligations Extraterritorially: The Spatial Test in Certain Human 
Rights Treaties” (2007) 40 (2) Israeli Law Review 503, p. 516. 
936 Ibid. 
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opportunistic and arbitrary.937 In addition the case has been criticised on the basis of 
creating a legal vacuum – while citizens of ECHR Contracting States are afforded 
high standards of human rights protections, individuals living outside such 
Contracting States are denied access to justice for severe violations or omissions 
directly attributable to ECHR Contracting Parties.938 This is thus a highly problematic 
decision as it could be read by states as providing a “green light to commit human 
rights violations outside of Europe”. 939  While this may be an overstatement, the 
decision in the case is not consistent with the core purposes of the ECHR or the 
divisible operation of its rights protections in practice. 
In the subsequent case of Öcalan v. Turkey,940 the applicant had been arrested by 
Kenyan officials and was subsequently handed over to members of the Turkish 
security service who then returned him to Turkey. The Court found that Öcalan was 
physically forced to return to Turkey by Turkish officials and thus had been subject to 
their authority and control in Nairobi Airport and in transit. This sequence of events 
was sufficient to establish jurisdiction. The Court found that the applicant had been 
brought under the jurisdiction of Turkey as soon as he was handed over to the Turkish 
officials.941  
In Issa and Others v. Turkey,942 the Court noted that a state might be held accountable 
for violations of the Convention rights of persons who were under its authority and 
control through agents operating in the territory of another state.943 On the facts of this 
case however, the Court found that despite the large number of troops involved in the 
military operation in question, Turkey did not exercise effective overall control of the 
entire area of Northern Iraq. The Court further noted that it had not been established 
to the required standard of proof that the Turkish armed forces conducted operations 
in the area in question and in particular that the victims were there at that time.944  
                                               
937 Tzevelekos, V., ‘Reconstructing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights 
Breaches: Direct Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and Concurrent Responsibility’ (2014) 
36 Michigan Journal of International Law 129, p. 149. 
938 Ibid, p. 149 
939 Ibid, p. 149. 
940 (2003) ECHR 125. 
941 Ibid, paras. 91–93. 
942 Application no. 31821/96 Judgment 16 November 2004. Six Iraqi nationals acting on their own 
behalf and on behalf of deceased relatives alleged unlawful arrest, detention, ill treatment and the 
subsequent killing of their relatives in the course of a military operation conducted by Turkey in 
northern Iraq in April 1995. 
943 Ibid, para. 71. 
944 Ibid, paras. 81–82. 
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The Banković test was applied in both of the above cases. In Öcalan, the Court (First 
Section) noted that the circumstances in the case were quite distinguishable from the 
facts of Banković as the applicant was physically forced to return to Turkey by 
Turkish officials and was subject to their authority and control following his arrest 
and return.945 In Issa, the Court (Second Section) noted that from the standpoint of 
public international law, the scope of Article 1 should be understood to indicate that a 
state’s jurisdictional competence is primarily territorial and Banković was an 
illustration of this principle.946 However, the Court further stated that Article 1 is not 
necessarily restricted to national territory and restated the Loizidou case with 
reference to the extraterritorial application of rights based on a state’s effective 
control of an area.  
Effective control of an individual through state agents operating abroad would also 
result in extraterritorial imposition of obligations under Article 1. 947  Quite 
significantly, the Court noted that the ECHR could not be interpreted in a manner, 
which would allow a state to commit such violations on the territory of another state, 
that it could not perpetrate on its own territory.948 In Medvedyev v. France, the Court 
appeared to further distinguish Banković on its facts by noting that situations 
involving an “instantaneous extraterritorial act” as in Banković would not fall under 
the recognised bases for extraterritoriality.949 The rationale for this exclusion was that 
the provisions of Article 1 do not permit a “cause and effect” interpretation of 
jurisdiction.950 On the facts of the case, the Court decided that France had, at least de 
facto, exercised full and exclusive control over the ship in question and its crew from 
the moment of the ship’s inception in a continuous and uninterrupted manner and thus 
the applicants were effectively under French jurisdiction for the purposes of Article 
1.951 The judgments in these cases appear to have revitalised the effective control test 
for extraterritoriality and limited the impact of the Banković decision to its facts.952 
Thus, the judgment in Al-Skeini is arguably the next substantial phase in the evolving 
ECtHR’s approach on the extraterritorial application of rights.   
                                               
945 Öcalan v. Turkey (2003) 37 EHRR 10, para. 91. 
946 Issa and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 31821/96, Judgment 16 November 2004, para. 67. 
947 Ibid, para. 71. 
948 Ibid, para. 71. 
949 Medvedyev v. France, Application 3394/03, Judgment 29 March 2010, para. 64. 
950 Ibid, para. 64. 
951 Ibid, para. 67. 
952 Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 44. 
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The scope of the potential extraterritorial application of the ECHR, was a central 
aspect in the UK High Court’s judgment in R. (On the Application of Mazin Jumaa 
Gatteh Al-Skeini and Others) v. Secretary of State for Defence.953  The UK High 
Court found that the concept of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR did not extend to a 
broad, worldwide extra-territorial personal jurisdiction, which arises from the exercise 
of authority by state agents anywhere in the world.954 Extra-territorial jurisdiction 
under Article 1, the Court noted, was exceptional and limited to the specific cases 
recognised in international law.955 Although the claims of the first five applicants 
failed, the Court reached a different decision on the claim of the sixth applicant – 
Baha Mousa. Mr Mousa died while in custody in a British military base in the 
province of Basra in Iraq. The Court found that his detention in British military prison, 
operating in Iraq with the consent of the Iraqi sovereign authorities and containing 
arrested suspects, fell within the narrow scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction and in 
particular the exception relating to embassies, consulates vessels and aircrafts. This 
judgment was affirmed in the Court of Appeal. The House of Lords (HoL) upheld the 
decision and also found that of the six applicants, only Baha Mousa was under the 
jurisdiction of the UK.956 The HoL noted that finding extraterritorial jurisdiction in 
relation to the other five applicants, would amount to ‘human rights imperialism’ 
through the application of European human rights standards in a non-European 
country.957  
The ECtHR, unanimously, reached a different decision than the HoL. The Court 
reiterated Banković in stating that a state’s jurisdictional competence under Article 1 
ECHR was primarily territorial; only in exceptional circumstances the acts of states or 
effects of such acts outside the territory of a state could be found to constitute an 
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 1.958 The Court further noted that its previous 
                                               
953 [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), [2004] WLR 1401. The case examined the claims of the relatives of 6 
Iraqi citizens who had died in Iraq at a time and within the geographical areas where the United 
Kingdom was recognized as the occupying power. Five of them had been killed in incidents with 
British troops; the sixth applicant died with in the custody of British troops in a military prison.  
954 [2004] EWHC 2911 (Admin), [2004] WLR 1401, [269]. 
955 Ibid. The exceptional circumstances included alleged violations which have occurred due to the 
exercise of state authority in or from a location which has a form of “discrete quasi-territorial quality” 
or where the state agent’s presence in a foreign state has been consented to by that state and is 
protected by international law – diplomatic or consular premises, vessels or air-crafts registered to the 
state. (para. 270) . 
956 Al-Skeini and Others v. the Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26.    
957 Ibid [76] – [79]. 
958 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, paras. 130–
131. 
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jurisprudence demonstrated that in certain circumstances, the use of force by a state’s 
agents operating outside its territory might bring an individual under the state’s 
control thus leading to Convention obligations under Article 1.959 The Court then 
turned to the general principles relevant to jurisdiction under Article 1: the territorial 
principle, state agent authority and control, the effective control over an area, the 
Convention’s legal space. In addressing the territoriality principle, the Court noted 
that in its case law it has recognised a number of exceptional circumstances allowing 
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.960 In each case, the decision as to whether 
a state was exercising extra-territorial jurisdiction must be determined with reference 
to the particular circumstances.  
Following an examination of its own case law, the ECtHR found that it was clear that 
whenever a state exercised control and authority through its agents over an individual 
thus resulting in an individual being under a state’s jurisdiction, the state was under an 
obligation under Article 1 to apply the relevant ECHR rights to that individual.961 In 
determining whether effective control exists, the Court stated that it would assess the 
strength of the military presence in an area.962 Further factors could be relevant, such 
as the extent to which military, economic and political support for a local subordinate 
administration provided a state with influence and control over a region. In relation to 
the Convention’s legal space, the Court emphasised that where the territory of one 
Convention state occupied by the armed forces of another, the occupying state should 
in principle be held accountable for human rights violations occurring within the 
occupied territory. 963  To hold otherwise and deprive a population of Convention 
rights and freedoms would, it was claimed, create a “vacuum of protection within the 
Convention legal space”.964  
The significance of establishing the occupying state’s jurisdiction in such 
circumstances however did not imply that jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR 
can never exist outside the territory covered by the Council of Europe member 
states.965 In the particular circumstances of the case, the UK had assumed authority 
                                               
959 Ibid, para. 136. 
960 Ibid, para. 131–132. 
961 Ibid, para. 137. 
962 Ibid, para. 139. 
963 Ibid, para. 142. 
964  Ibid, para. 142. The court was quoting both the Case of Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary 
Objections), Application No 15318/89 Judgment 23 March 1995 and Banković and Others v. Belgium 
and 16 Other States, Application No 52207/99 Judgment 12 December 2001. 
965 Ibid, para. 142. 
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and responsibility for the maintenance of security in Southeast Iraq. The ECtHR 
found that the UK, through its soldiers engaged in a security operation during the time 
in question, had exercised authority and control over the six individuals killed in the 
course of such operations. The authority and control was sufficient to establish a 
jurisdictional link between the deceased and the UK for the purposes of Article 1 
ECHR.966  
Conte has argued that the ECtHR applied a hybrid personal-geographical model of 
jurisdiction in this case by treating the engagement of British soldiers in security 
operations as an exercise of authority and control over individuals without 
adjudicating on whether British forces had actual control over the region in 
question.967 The deceased individuals were treated as being in the jurisdiction of the 
UK because the British soldiers were exercising authority and control through the acts 
in question and as a result of the exercise of public powers – overall effective control 
of an area was not required.968 The significance of this decision cannot be understated. 
It denotes a new approach to the interpretation of the concept of jurisdiction under 
Article 1 ECHR. More importantly, spatial jurisdiction, which in Banković was found 
to be based on control exercised over buildings, aircraft or ships, is now also based on 
the exercise of physical power and control over the person in question.969 From the 
perspective of effective transnational human rights protections, the Al-Skeini 
judgment appears to allow for a model of greater accountability for extraterritorial 
conduct resulting in violations. Such an approach towards the application of 
jurisdiction is particularly relevant to extraordinary rendition. During an extraordinary 
rendition, an individual is under the effective control and physical authority of the so-
called “rendition teams”,970 which the authorising state has tasked with supervising 
and completing the transfer to the chosen detention facility. After a rendition, an 
individual is under the control and authority of the state or state agents who 
administer and supervise the relevant detention facility. Under a personal jurisdiction 
model such as this one, a rendee could potentially invoke the extraterritorial 
                                               
966 Ibid, para. 149. 
967  Conte, A., ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in Human Rights Accountability for 
Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal of Conflict and Security Law 233, 
p. 249. 
968 Ibid. 
969 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011. 
970  See a detailed outlined in Khaled el Masri (El Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012, paras. 20–22.   
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application of Convention rights both in the context of the transfer itself and the 
subsequent detention.    
The case of Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom971 was decided on the same day as Al-
Skeini. The applicant in this case, a dual British and Iraqi citizen, was detained in a 
facility in Basra City in Iraq for suspected terrorist activity in October 2004. During 
his three-year internment, he had not been charged with any offence. His internment 
“for imperative reasons of security” was initially authorised by the senior officer in 
the detention facility. 972  Reviews were conducted regularly by the Divisional 
Internment Review Committee, which included both UK and non-UK personnel. In 
June 2005, he brought a judicial review claim in the UK challenging the lawfulness of 
his continued detention and the refusal of the Secretary of State for Defence (SSD) to 
return him to the UK.973 The SSD accepted that the applicant’s detention within a 
British military facility brought him under the jurisdiction of the UK under Article 1 
of the ECHR and that the detention did not fall within any of the permitted scenarios 
outlined in Article 5(1) ECHR. However, the SSD contended that Article 5 of the 
ECHR did not actually apply to Mr Al-Jedda as his detention was authorised by UN 
Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1546 and as a matter of international law, the 
effect of the Resolution was to displace Article 5(1).974  
Domestically, the HoL rejected Al-Jedda’s challenge to the lawfulness of his 
detention.975   One of the central issues in the case was the relationship between 
Article 5(1) ECHR and Article 103 of the UN Charter976. The HoL held that Article 
103 UN Charter gave primacy to the UNSC Resolution 1546. As the detention was an 
action covered by this Resolution, the HoL found that the ECHR would not be 
interpreted in a manner that would subject the detention to scrutiny. 977  Thus, a 
complaint by Mr Al-Jedda alleging violation of Article 5(1) ECHR would be held 
incompatible ratione personae with ECHR provisions.  
                                               
971 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08, Judgment 7 July 2011. 
972 Ibid.  
973 Ibid, para. 16. 
974  Ibid. Full text of UN Security Council Resolution 1546 is available at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/381/16/PDF/N0438116.pdf?OpenElement [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
975 R. (on the application of Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 58. 
976 Article 103 of the UN Charter states: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the 
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The ECtHR upheld the complaint of Mr Al-Jedda.978 The Court noted that under 
Article 1 ECHR, the exercise of jurisdiction was a necessary condition to hold a 
Contracting State responsible for infringements of Convention rights.979 The Court 
stated that the detention had taken place within a facility under the exclusive control 
of British forces. Thus, Mr Al-Jedda was within the authority and control of the UK 
throughout. The decision to detain Mr Al-Jedda was made by a British officer who 
was in command of the facility. The existence of detention reviews committees, 
which included Iraqi officials and non-UK representatives, did not prevent the 
detention from being attributable to the UK. The ECtHR found that during the period 
of detention, Mr Al-Jedda fell within the jurisdiction of the UK for the purposes of 
Article 1 ECHR.980 The Court further found that neither Resolution 1546 nor any 
other UN Security Council Resolutions had either explicitly or implicitly required the 
UK to place an individual into indefinite detention without charge. Thus, in the 
absence of a binding obligation to use detention, the provisions of Article 5(1) were 
not displaced and the grounds for detention under Article 5 were inapplicable.981    
The recent jurisprudence of the ECtHR suggests that, in principle, it currently 
recognises extraterritorial jurisdiction in two scenarios. One is spatial jurisdiction, 
which arises in circumstances where a state exercises effective control over a foreign 
territory as noted in cases such as Banković. The second one – personal jurisdiction 
arises in circumstances where a state exercises authority and control over an 
individual. Following the decisions the in cases of Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda it would 
have been reasonable to hope that perhaps the question of extraterritorial jurisdiction 
has become more settled.  
In the more recent case of Jaloud v. the Netherlands,982 the ECtHR has had to assess 
again the extraterritorial application of the ECHR. Azhar Sabah Jaloud was a front 
seat passenger of a car, which failed to stop at a checkpoint in south-eastern Iraq. A 
Dutch lieutenant fired a number of shots at the car injuring Mr Jaloud who later died 
of his injuries. Both the Netherlands and the UK, as a third party intervener, presented 
arguments that Mr Jaloud was not within the jurisdiction of the Netherlands when he 
was shot. According to the Netherlands and the UK, personal jurisdiction arose only 
                                               
978 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 27021/08, Judgment 7 July 2011. 
979 Ibid, para. 74. 
980 Ibid, paras. 84–86. 
981 Ibid, paras. 101–102, 105, 109–110.  
982 Application no. 47708/08, Judgment 20 November 2014. 
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when a state had detained or captured an individual thus personal jurisdiction should 
not apply where an individual was shot. These submissions echo the arguments raised 
in the Banković case, specifically the arguments against a “cause-and-effect type of 
responsibility”,983 which the ECtHR accepted.984  
Both states argued that extra-territorial jurisdiction should continue to be exceptional 
and restricted to very limited circumstances.985 The UK noted that it was only found 
to have jurisdiction in the case of Al-Skeini due to the unique circumstances of the 
case. The circumstances around Mr Jaloud’s death were thus to be distinguished on 
several grounds. The Netherlands had fewer troops deployed and these troops were 
under the operational command of the occupying powers. The US and the UK were 
designated as “occupying powers” by UN Security Council Resolution 1483 and thus 
authority lay with either or both.986 The role and mandate of the Dutch forces was 
more limited that the UK: the Dutch troops had no powers of arrest or detention and 
no role in governing Iraq. Both states argued that the Netherlands did not exercise 
public powers in a manner similar to the UK within the Al-Skeini context thus no 
jurisdiction arose.987  
The ECtHR noted that in establishing jurisdiction under the ECHR, it would assess 
the particular factual context and the relevant rules of international law.988 The Court 
found that the status of “occupying power” within the meaning of Article 42 of the 
Hague Regulations 989  was not per se determinative. Further, the execution of a 
decision or an order given by an authority of a foreign state was not in itself sufficient 
to relieve a Contracting State of its ECHR obligations. The Netherlands, solely by 
accepting the operational control of an occupying power, had not divested of its 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the ECHR.990 The ECtHR noted that the Netherlands 
had retained full command over its military personnel. Although Dutch troops were 
stationed in an area in south-eastern Iraq under the command of a UK officer, the 
                                               
983 Banković and Others v. Belguim and Others, Application no. 52207/99, para. 40. 
984 The court noted that that applicants’ submission was tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely 
affected by an act of a contracting state anywhere in the world, would thereby be brought within the 
jurisdiction of that state under Article 1 ECHR. The court was thus inclined to agree with the 
government submissions that that text of Article 1 ECHR did not accommodate such an approach to 
jurisdiction (Banković and Others v. Belguim and Others, Application no. 52207/99, para. 75). 
985 Ibid, paras. 112–118, 121–123.  
986 Ibid, para. 140. 
987 Ibid. 
988 Ibid, para. 141. 
989 Full text available at https://www.icrc.org/ihl/WebART/195-200052?OpenDocument [last accessed 
on 30 March 2016]. 
990 Ibid, para. 143. 
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Netherlands assumed responsibility for providing security in that area to the exclusion 
of other participating states and retained full command over its contingent.  Further, it 
was not decisive that Iraqi Civil Defence Corps personnel nominally manned the 
checkpoints.  
The ECtHR found that the Dutch troops were not placed “at the disposal” of any 
foreign power such as the UK and were not under “the exclusive direction or control” 
of any other state. 991  Personnel under the command and direct supervision of a 
Netherlands Royal Army Officer manned the checkpoint in question.992 The ECtHR 
was thus satisfied that the Netherlands exercised jurisdiction within the limits of its 
mission and for the purpose of asserting authority and control over persons passing 
through the checkpoint. Thus, the death of Mr Jaloud had occurred within the 
jurisdiction of the Netherlands within the meaning of Article 1 of the ECHR. The 
ECtHR did add that it had not been asked to establish whether the UK might have 
exercised “concurrent” jurisdiction suggesting that perhaps in circumstances similar 
to this case in the future it may engage in such examination.993 
With its reasoning in this case, the ECtHR appears to have increased the possibility 
for the ECHR to apply extraterritorially through the personal jurisdiction model. The 
Court reaffirmed its decision in the Al-Skeini994 case in respect of assumed control 
over a geographic area through the deployment of soldiers engaged in security 
operations in this particular area. The Court additionally focused on the supervision of 
the checkpoint in question – an arguably much narrower yet more mobile potential 
sphere of jurisdiction – without however expanding comprehensively on its reasoning. 
The decision of the Court thus suggests that jurisdiction was imposed on the 
Netherlands because Mr Jaloud came within the specific Dutch authority and control 
established at the checkpoint itself rather than just on the basis of a broader 
geographical area over which a state has assumed authority such as in Al-Skeini. 
Overall, the approach of the ECtHR, especially in more recent cases, indicates that the 
Court is becoming more willing to rely on the personal or effective control 
jurisdiction model. The ECtHR, as noted above, is the main regime where questions 
relating to extraterritoriality arise and as such it is a valuable reference source for both 
                                               
991 Ibid, para. 151. 
992 Ibid, para. 152. 
993 Ibid, para. 153. 
994 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para.149 in 
particular. 
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ECHR Contracting Parties and other human rights institutions.995 Its comprehensive 
and meticulous analysis on the scope of the concept of jurisdiction and in particular 
the extraterritorial obligations states may have through the personal or effective 
control model can thus have broader value and pertinence for different regional and 
international human rights regimes. As Section 3.1.2 will illustrate, the jurisprudence 
of the Inter-American system has been increasingly relying on the personal model of 
jurisdiction.  
More importantly however, cases of the ECtHR have been referenced, analysed and 
utilised by the IACHR in reaching its decisions. In two of these cases involving the 
US, one concerning incommunicado detention, the IACHR expressly noted that a 
state could be held in violation of human rights obligations by subjecting an 
individual to violatory acts in another jurisdiction; furthermore the Commission found 
that a state has an obligation to respect the rights of a person who is within the 
authority and control of a state or state agents abroad. The existing albeit limited 
jurisprudence of the IACHR thus appears to follow closely the more comprehensive 
and established ECtHR case law. The IACHR jurisprudence to date also suggest that 
an extraordinary rendition being used as a means of outsourcing torture, severely 
limiting individual human rights protections and resulting in incommunicado 
detention will be found to be in violation of state obligations.  
 
3.1.2. The Inter-American System 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights 996  (American Convention) and the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man997 (American Declaration) 
have been the main focus of the Inter-American jurisprudence on extraterritoriality.  
Article II of the American Declaration protects the equality of all persons before the 
law as well as their rights and duties as stated in the Declaration. However, as noted 
                                               
995 Tzevelekos, V., ‘Reconstructing the Effective Control Criterion in Extraterritorial Human Rights 
Breaches: Direct Attribution of Wrongfulness, Due Diligence, and Concurrent Responsibility’ (2014) 
36 Michigan Journal of International Law 129. 
996 Full text available at http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm [last accessed on 30 March 2016]. 
997 The Declaration was adopted in 1948, six months prior to the adoption of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. Full text available at http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/Basics/declaration.asp 
[last accessed on 30 March 2016]. 
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in the Banković case, it “contains no explicit limitation on jurisdiction”.998 Article 1 of 
the American Convention, does include a jurisdictional condition similar to Article 1 
of the ECHR namely that state parties are to respect and protect the rights and 
freedoms of all individuals subject to their jurisdiction.999  
While the American Declaration is a non-legally binding instrument, it was the only 
regional human rights instrument in existence when the Inter-American 
Commission1000 (the Commission) was established. After it was granted authority in 
1965 to examine and decide on individual petitions alleging human rights violations, 
the Commission began applying the Declaration to all member states of the 
Organisation of American States (OAS).1001 This is significant as regards to the US, 
which has not ratified the American Convention but is considered to be subject to the 
American Declaration. While the US is yet to recognise the jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, the Commission has mandatory quasi-adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over the US compliance with the American Declaration.1002 Prior to 9/11, 
the Commission dealt with several petitions against US operations in Haiti and 
Grenada that raised questions of extraterritoriality. 
Haitian Centre for Human Rights v. the United States1003 related to the attempts by 
the US to prevent fleeing Haitians from landing on US shores and thus acquiring 
certain procedural rights to apply for asylum. The US noted that the issue for 
consideration here was whether the US had violated articles of the American 
Declaration by interdicting Haitian nationals on the high seas and repatriating them to 
Haiti. The US rejected the contention that the American Declaration had acquired 
legally binding force by virtue of US membership of the OAS and ratification of the 
Charter of OAS. As the Declaration was not a treaty, it had not acquired binding legal 
force according to the US. The Commission found the US in violation of multiple 
provisions of the Declaration. It concluded that through the processes of interdiction 
                                               
998  Banković and Others v. Belgium and 16 Other States, Application No 52207/99 Judgment 12 
December 2001, para. 78. 
999 Article 1(2) of the American Convention specifically limits the obligation of states to ‘human 
beings’ rather than legal persons (ECHR). 
1000 The Commission’s mandate is the promotion and protection of human rights in the American 
hemisphere. It was created by the Organisation of American States in 1959. 
1001 Cerna, C., ‘Extraterritorial Application of the Human Rights Instruments of the Inter-American 
System’ in Coomans, F., and Kamminga, M. T., (ed.) Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties (2004, Oxford; Hart Publishing), p. 141. 
1002 Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 53. 
1003 IACHR Report No. 51/96, Case No. 10.675, Ann. Rep. IACHR 1996. 
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and repatriation, the US was exposing the Haitian refugees to genuine and foreseeable 
risk of death in violation of Article 1. The Commission referred to the Soering1004 
case in noting that a state can be held in violation of human rights obligations by 
subjecting an individual to violatory acts in another jurisdiction.        
In Coard et al. v. the United States,1005 the seventeen petitioners alleged to have been 
detained incommunicado for a number of days by US forces in Grenada, mistreated 
and deprived of their right to fair trial in violation of both the American Declaration 
and the applicable international norms. The extraterritorial application of the 
American Declaration was not raised as an issue by either party. The Commission 
nonetheless noted that under certain circumstances the exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction would be both consistent and required by the norms, which pertain.1006 It 
stated further that as the rights in question were inherent by virtue of a person’s 
humanity, the US was obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person subject to 
its jurisdiction.1007  While this was mostly applicable to a person within a state’s 
territory (spatial jurisdiction), the Commission noted that in certain circumstances this 
obligation could also be applicable to a person who is within the authority and control 
of a state or state agents abroad (extraterritorial jurisdiction).1008   
In Armando Alejandre and Others v. Cuba1009 the Commission found that under the 
terms of its ratione loci, it is competent to decide on human rights violations that 
occur within the territory of OAS member states regardless of whether or not they are 
party to the American Convention. While making its assessment, the Commission 
referred to the decision in Loizidou v. Turkey and the reasoning employed by the 
ECtHR in this case. 1010  It further reaffirmed that in certain circumstances it has 
competency to consider reports that agents of an OAS member state have violated 
human rights protected in the Inter-American system outside the territory of that state. 
                                               
1004 Soering v. the United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
1005  Case 10.951, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 109/99, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106 doc. 6 rev (1999). Following the violent overthrow of the Grenadian governing 
administration including the murder of the Prime Minister – Maurice Bishop, United States and 
Caribbean armed forces invaded Grenada on 25 October 1983, deposing the revolutionary government. 
1006 Ibid, para. 37. 
1007 Ibid. 
1008 The Commission took a similar in approach in Victor Saldano v. Argentina, Petition, IACHR 
Report No. 38/99, para. 17 where it found that Article 1(1) of the American Convention was not 
limited to national territory – in certain circumstances, a state party might be responsible for the acts 
and omissions of its state agents, which produce effects or were undertaken abroad.   
1009 IACHR Report No. 86/99, Case No. 11.589, Ann. Rep. IACHR, para. 23 
1010 Application No. 15318/89, Judgment 23 March 1995. 
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Such extraterritorial jurisdiction would occur when an individual is subject to the 
control of a state through the actions of state agents outside the territory of that state.  
In an inter-state claim brought by Ecuador against Columbia, the Inter-American 
Commission addressed issues similar to the ones raised in Banković. 1011  
Acknowledging Banković, the Commission stated that the exercise of authority over 
persons by state agents acting outside state territory without necessarily having a 
formal, structured and prolonged legal temporal relation is essential in determining a 
jurisdictional link.1012 Thus, it was necessary to establish whether there was a causal 
link between the extraterritorial conduct of a state and the alleged violatory 
behaviour.1013 In deciding that Colombia did exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction over 
the attacked area, the Commission found that rights obligations such as the right to 
life and humane treatment are triggered in the period of time that the agents of a state 
interfere in the lives of person in the territory of another state.1014   
Following 9/11, the Inter-American Commission has faced renewed jurisdictional 
challenges by the US – this time in the context of the Guantánamo Bay detention 
facilities. Lawyers representing individuals detained in Guantánamo – some of whom 
were rendered – sought precautionary measures (injunctive relief) from the 
Commission.1015 The US contested the jurisdiction of the Commission on a number of 
grounds including that the Commission could not issue precautionary measures 
against a non-state-party to the Convention, that the measures would not be binding, 
and that it could not decide on claims governed by international humanitarian law.1016 
In addressing these arguments, the Commission essentially adopted an authority and 
control test. It stated that where an individual was within the authority and control of 
a state within an armed conflict context both international humanitarian and human 
rights law would be engaged.1017 Thus, no person under the authority and control of a 
state, regardless of his or her circumstances, would be devoid of legal protection for 
                                               
1011 Franklin Guillermo Aisalla Molina, Ecuador – Colombia, Inter-State Petition IP-02, Report no. 
112/10, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.140 Doc. 10; the claim was brought by Ecuador on behalf of an Ecuadorian 
victim of a Colombian Air Force operation - Operation Phoenix. 
1012 Ibid, para. 99. 
1013 Ibid. 
1014 Ibid, para. 100–103. 
1015 Inter-American Commission Resolution No. 2/11, Regarding the Situation of the Detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, United States, MC 259-02. 
1016  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Additional Response of the United States to 
Request for Precautionary Measures – Detainees in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/38642.htm [last accessed on 30 March 2016]. 
1017  Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Precautionary Measures in Guantánamo Bay, 
Cuba, PM 259/02. 
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fundamental and non-derogable rights. In an individual petition brought on behalf 
Djamel Ameziane, the Commission found the petitioner to have been within US 
jurisdiction during his capture in Pakistan, his temporary detention in a US airbase in 
Kandahar and his continued detention in Guantánamo.1018 During these periods of 
time, the US and its agents were deemed to have exercised exclusive physical power 
and control over Mr Ameziane.1019         
Thus, influenced by a number of ECtHR decisions as illustrated above, the Inter-
American Commission has similarly adopted the personal jurisdictional model and 
applied it in cases where states have exerted their power over individuals abroad.   
     
3.2. International Approach to Extraterritoriality  
 
The international approach towards the concept of jurisdiction and in particular 
whether human rights obligations could apply extraterritorially is aptly illustrated by 
the approach of CAT with reference to UNCAT and HRC with reference to the 
ICCPR. Unlike the American Convention, the US is a signatory to both UNCAT and 
the ICCPR.1020 However, while the US has ratified the ICCPR and is thus subject to 
the HRC, the US has not yet ratified the necessary Optional Protocol, with which a 
state party accepts the competence of the HRC to receive and consider individual 
petitions – a further illustration of its restrictive approach to international 
obligation. 1021  The process of an extraordinary rendition entails a number of 
violations of the obligations of both Conventions from the manner of the capture and 
the subsequent transfer outside standard extradition procedures to the incommunicado 
detention of individual terrorist suspects. However, the likelihood of rendees imputing 
these violations on the US is linked to whether the relevant provisions have been 
interpreted as having extraterritorial scope. The following discussion will first assess 
the potential for extraterritorial application of UNCAT before proceeding to examine 
the ICCPR. 
 
                                               
1018  Ameziane v. United States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No. 17/12, 
Petition P-900-08. 
1019 Ibid, para. 30-33. 
1020 Please refer to the discussion in Chapter 1. 
1021  The full text of the Optional Protocol and list of signatories is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx [last accessed on 30 March 
2016]. 
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3.2.1. UN Convention against Torture 
   
Under Article 2 (1) of UNCAT, state parties should take effective measures to prevent 
acts of torture in any territory under the jurisdiction of the Convention.1022 While the 
Convention is only applicable to signatory states, the right to be free from torture and 
inhuman (cruel) and degrading treatment has developed into a non-derogatory jus 
cogens norm in international law. 1023  State breaches of it tend to be met with 
indignation and stigmatisation within the international community. 1024  During the 
peak of its transnational counter-terrorism and military operations, the US vigorously 
denied any engagement in torture of individual terrorist suspects despite claims or 
evidence to the contrary – an acknowledgement of the significance of the anti-torture 
norm within the international legal framework.1025  
While the text of Article 2 (1) suggests a strictly territorial approach to the concept of 
jurisdiction, CAT has been interpreting Article 2 in broader terms. In its 2007 General 
Comment on Article 2, CAT advised that a state would have international 
responsibility for acts and omissions of state officials and others including agents, 
private contractors and individuals acting in an official capacity or on behalf of the 
state, in conjunction with the state, under state direction or control or otherwise under 
the colour of law.1026 The scope of “in any territory under its jurisdiction” under 
Article 2 (1) was deemed to include areas where a state party exercises directly or 
indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective control in accordance with 
international law.1027 The mention of private contractors is noteworthy, as the US has 
utilised private contractors – both to provide security to operational bases 1028  or 
                                               
1022 The full text of the Convention is available http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html [last accessed on 
30 March 2016]. 
1023 Please refer to the discussions in Chapters 1 on the use of Syria as a receiving state for rendition 
and 2 on jus cogens and UNCAT in particular. 
1024 Ibid. 
1025 See for example Tempest, M., ‘Bush ‘Disgusted’ at Torture of Iraqi Prisoners’, The Guardian 30 
April 2004, ‘US does not Torture, Bush insists’ BBC News 7 November 2005 or ‘Full Text: Rice 
Defends US Policy’, BBS News 5 December 2005 in addition to the use of the now repealed ‘Torture 
Memos’. 
1026 Committee Against Torture, General Comment 2: Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties, UN 
Doc CAT/C/GC/2, para. 15. 
1027 Ibid, para. 16. 
1028 Cameron, L., and Chetail, V., Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under 
Public International Law (2013, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p. 98–101. 
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complete flights1029 - within the so-called rendition circuit as part of its transnational 
counter-terrorism and military operations.1030  
Thus the US as a state signatory is strictly prohibited from engaging in behaviour in 
violation of the anti-torture norm and non-refoulement both within its territory and 
abroad. However, as illustrated in Chapter 1, the US has consistently sought to restrict 
the applicability of UNCAT through domestic legislative mechanisms. Its post 9/11 
approach has become even more problematic as Executive interpretations as well as 
existing legislative means have been used to limit US obligations in respect of the 
anti-torture norm. The above quoted comments by John Bellinger are illustrative of 
how the US Executive understands US obligations under UNCAT. Similarly 
concerning approach – (severe) restriction of the domestic and extraterritorial 
applicability core human rights protections – has been adopted in respect of the 
ICCPR.  
 
3.2.2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
Article 2 (1) of the ICCPR outlines that each state party undertakes to respect and 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the Covenant.1031 On a conjunctive reading of the Article, the US has 
interpreted the obligations to apply only to those individuals who were within both the 
territory and jurisdiction of a state i.e. a very strict and narrow territorial approach.1032 
The HRC1033 has however noted that the obligations under Article 2 (1) are applicable 
to any individual within the power or effective control of the state including in 
circumstances where the individual is not within the territory of the state. 1034 
Significantly, the HRC has outlined categories of individuals to whom ICCPR rights 
                                               
1029 Quinn, B., and Cobain, I., ‘Mundane Bills bring CIA’s Rendition Network into Sharper Focus’, 
The Guardian 31 August 2011. 
1030 Please refer to the relevant discussion in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
1031  Full text of the Covenant is available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx [last accessed on 30 March 2016]. 
1032 Van Schaack, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 28. 
1033 Article 28 of the ICCPR established the Human Rights Committee (HRC) as the monitoring body, 
which can receive complaints from individuals who have allegedly suffered human rights violations 
once all available domestic remedies have been exhausted - Full text of the Optional Protocol is 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/OPCCPR1.aspx [last accessed on 30 
March 2016]. 
1034  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10. 
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would be applicable as all individuals, regardless of nationality or statelessness, such 
as asylum seekers, refugees, migrant workers and other persons, who may find 
themselves in the territory or subject to the jurisdiction of the state party.1035   
The reference to “other persons” is particularly relevant in the context of 
extraordinary rendition as it could potentially apply to rendees. The cases of Lopez 
Burgos v. Uruguay1036 and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay1037 are quite illustrative 
in this respect. Both cases concerned the kidnapping of Uruguayan citizens by 
Uruguayan state agents. On return to Uruguay, the individuals in question were 
subjected to treatment, which violated their human rights. The HRC noted that while 
the arrest, initial detention and mistreatment of Lopez Burgos allegedly took place on 
foreign soil, the individuals in question were subject to the jurisdiction of 
Uruguay.1038 In interpreting Article 1 of the Optional Protocol, the HRC focused on 
the relationship between the individual and the state in relation to a violation rather 
than on the place where it occurred. In both cases, the HRC did not expand on the 
basis of this relationship however in its reasoning it appears to link the imposition of 
jurisdiction to Uruguay with the Uruguayan citizenship of the agents. The HRC 
concluded that it would be unconscionable to interpret the obligations under Article 2 
(1) ICCPR as permitting one state party to violate the Covenant on the territory of 
another state party.   
 
3.2.3 Assessment of CAT and HRC Approach 
 
In 2001, the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
were adopted under a General Assembly Resolution.1039 Under Article 7, the acts of a 
state agent committed abroad would be imputable to the state even in circumstances 
where the agent has acted beyond his or her authorised powers or in contravention of 
instructions. The recent findings of the HRC and the CAT have reaffirmed the 
doctrine of imputability. In addition, both Committees have expanded on the links 
                                               
1035  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10. The HRC 
was re-affirming General Comment 15 adopted in 1986 – Human Rights Committee, General 
Comment 15: The Position of Aliens under the Covenant, UN Doc HRI/Gen/1/Rev.6  
1036 Human Rights Committee Communication R.12/52 UN Doc Supp No 40 A/36/40, p. 176. 
1037 Human Rights Committee Communication 56/1979 UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1, p. 92. 
1038 Human Rights Committee Communication R.12/52 UN Doc Supp No 40 A/36/40, para. 12.1 and 
Human Rights Committee Communication 56/1979 UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1, para. 10.1. 
1039 Annex to General Resolution 56/83 (12 December 2001) UN Doc A/Res/56/83. 
 186
between the effective control of state agents over an individual and the conduct of 
foreign agents within the territory of a state.1040  
Ahmed Agiza1041 and Mohammed Alzery1042 lodged complaints with CAT and the 
HRC respectively after being expelled from Sweden to Egypt. In the case of Agiza, 
the CAT found that the combination of facts in this particular case should have 
informed Sweden that Mr Agiza would be at real risk of torture in Egypt.1043 CAT 
noted that this was confirmed when immediately preceding the expulsion, Mr Agiza 
was subjected to treatment violatory of at least Article 16 of UNCAT on Swedish 
territory by foreign agents but with the acquiescence of Swedish police.1044  
The HRC reached a similar conclusion by stating that the treatment suffered by Mr 
Alzery was imputable to Sweden under the ICCPR and under the applicable rules of 
state responsibility.1045 As the acts complained of had occurred in the presence of 
Swedish state agents, they could be treated as having been committed with the 
consent of Sweden and were thus imputable to Sweden.1046  
These international bodies have thus addressed extraterritoriality in cases involving 
the acts of foreign agents within the territory of a state with the consent of that state 
and acts by state agents when exercising direct control over an individual abroad. 
Both the HRC and CAT have dealt with the extraterritorial effects of state conduct 
and situations where this conduct may give rise to jurisdiction under the ICCPR.1047 
As discussed in the previous two Chapters, a state may be in violation of its human 
rights obligations if it transfers or extradites a person to a country where they are 
likely to suffer torture or other ill treatment.1048 In the case of Munaf v. Romania, the 
                                               
1040  As referred to by Conte, A., ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in Human Rights 
Accountability for Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal of Conflict 
and Security 233, p. 237. 
1041 Agiza v. Sweden Opinion of the Committee against Torture, 24 May 2005, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003. 
1042 Alzery v. Sweden Human Rights Committee Communication No 1416/2005 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005. 
1043 Agiza v. Sweden Opinion of the Committee against Torture, 24 May 2005, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003, 
para. 13.4. 
1044 Ibid. Article 16 (1) of the Convention against Torture states: “Each State Party shall undertake to 
prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.” 
1045  Alzery v. Sweden Human Rights Committee Communication No 1416/2005 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005, paras. 11.3–11.4. 
1046 Ibid, para 11.6. 
1047 Ibid, p. 239. 
1048  C v. Australia, Human Rights Committee Communication 832/1998 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/72/D/832/1998; Ahani v. Canada, Human Rights Committee Communication 1051/2002 UN 
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HRC confirmed its previous findings that a state may be responsible for 
extraterritorial violations that are a necessary and foreseeable consequence of its 
conduct as judged on the facts known by the state.1049  
In the context of the extraordinary rendition programme, it is also important to note 
that both the HRC and CAT have found the extraterritorial extension of rights to 
apply to military operations abroad. As discussed in the preceding Chapter, the US 
persistently argued that the ‘War on Terror’, within which extraordinary renditions 
operated, was an armed conflict, which required the use of US Army Forces. CAT has 
interpreted the text of Article 2 (1) UNCAT to refer to all areas where the state 
exercises, directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, de jure or de facto effective 
control including embassies, detention facilities or other areas over which a state 
exercises factual or effective control. 1050  The HRC has similarly stated that the 
extraterritorial application of rights extends to those within the power or effective 
control of the forces of a state acting outside its territory, regardless of the 
circumstances in which such power or effective control was obtained including during 
military operations.1051   
The Committees have not however defined what constitutes power or effective 
control by military forces abroad.1052 In addition, there is no clarity on the type(s) of 
actions by military personnel committed done outside a military base that could 
trigger jurisdiction in circumstances where a state is an occupying power or is 
undertaking aerial operations over a foreign territory unlike in the ECtHR 
jurisprudence.1053 Thus, in comparison, there is much less clarity within the HRC and 
CAT approaches on whether an individual would be found to have been in the 
effective control of a state during military operations abroad. This suggests that there 
will continue to be an area of legal uncertainty, which states could exploit until the 
HRC and CAT findings encompass a broader and more comprehensive range of 
                                                                                                                                      
Doc CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002; Mutombo v. Switzerland, Committee against Torture Communication 
13/1993 UN Doc A/49/44. 
1049  Munaf v. Romania, Human Rights Committee Communication 1539/2006 UN Doc 
CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006, paras. 14.2–14.4.  
1050 Committee against Torture, General Comment 2: Implementation of Article 2 by State Parties, UN 
Doc CAT/C/GC/2, para. 7. 
1051  Human Rights Committee, General Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligations 
Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, para. 10. 
1052  Conte, A., ‘Human Rights Beyond Borders: A New Era in Human Rights Accountability for 
Transnational Counter-Terrorism Operations?’ (2013) 18 (2) Journal of Conflict and Security 233, p. 
241. 
1053 Ibid, p. 241. 
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circumstances within which the extraterritorial application of rights could be triggered 
similar to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The existence of already comprehensive 
guidelines on the extraterritorial application of rights within the ECtHR could provide 
a model and be an important contribution to such future development and clarification 
by both the HRC and CAT. In order to ensure that international legal obligations are 
practically effective and accessible to individuals who have been subjected to 
violatory behaviour while in the effective control of a state, this future evolution is 
necessary. Otherwise states such as the US could continue – if deemed necessary to 
operate transnational counter-terrorism programmes – to interpret their obligations 
under both UNCAT and the ICCPR as strictly territorial. As the experience of the 
IACHR suggests, the case law of the ECtHR and its findings has proven quite 
beneficial in reaching and grounding a decision particularly in relation to the 
extraterritorial scope of obligations and ensuring practical effectiveness of rights. 
Additionally, as illustrated by numerous ECtHR decisions, the ECtHR itself has relied 
on the findings of others courts – for example the ICJ1054 – due to already established 
precedent. Thus, arguably, other courts and adjudicatory bodies could similarly rely 
on the ECtHR. 
 
3.3. The Personal Jurisdiction Model at Regional and International Level: 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The examination of the relevant jurisprudence at regional and international level thus 
suggests that if there is an exercise of power or effective control by state agents over 
an individual within the terms of the personal model of jurisdiction, which leads to 
violations of the ECHR, ICCPR or UNCAT, such violations can be imputed to the 
state. As expressly stated by the HRC, jurisdiction is applicable regardless of whether 
the acts were committed with the acquiescence of the government of the foreign 
state.1055   The development of the personal jurisdiction model has however been 
inconsistent and there are discernible disparities between the regional and 
international approaches. This arguably facilitates states at international level in 
                                               
1054 Please refer to the discussion on lex specialis and lex generalis in Chapter 2. 
1055 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay Human Rights Committee Communication R.12/52 UN Doc Supp No 40 
A/36/40 and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay Human Rights Committee Communication 56/1979 
UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1. 
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particular when attempting to restrict the scope of their obligations by relying on areas 
of legal uncertainty or crevasses within the jurisprudence.  
As the case law of the ECtHR illustrates, the jurisprudence on jurisdiction has been 
quite contested and prone to big shifts; an approach states have sought to capitalise on. 
As the more recent case law of the ECtHR and other regional and international bodies 
illustrates, courts have become increasingly willing to adopt and apply an 
interpretation of jurisdiction based on effective control. States have however 
continued to challenge the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction. In particular, while 
questioning whether extraterritorial human rights obligations arise, states have relied 
at times on previous case law not explicitly repealed – an approach similar to the one 
justifying the use of balancing in respect of Article 3 of the ECHR.1056  
Due to the length and scale of US-led transnational counter-terrorism operations, 
reliant on strategic partners such the UK, cases similar to Jaloud and Al-Skeini are 
likely to continue to arise. Thus, a more consistent interpretation of extraterritorial 
obligations is preferable both at regional and international level. It is important that 
the ECtHR does not regress from its judgments in Al-Skeini and Jaloud but rather 
continues to refine it and reinforce it. The alternative would be a further convolution 
of the existing jurisprudence. In particular, the approach the ECtHR adopts towards 
scenarios falling somewhere between Banković and Al-Skeini could be quite 
significant. Banković illustrated the harm that can be caused by state agents who are 
entirely remote from a victim and exercise limited to no territorial control; Al-Skeini 
addressed circumstances where a state had voluntarily assumed some control over a 
territory and population during a quasi-occupation.1057 In Jaloud, the ECtHR focused 
on the supervision of a much narrower yet more mobile potential sphere of 
jurisdiction – a checkpoint – thus suggesting that jurisdiction could be imposed on the 
basis of specific state authority and control established in certain particular 
circumstances.  
As Banković has not been expressly overruled, in circumstances where the state, its 
agents and instrumentalities become increasingly remote, finding a jurisdictional link 
between a state and an individual for the purposes of extending ECHR obligations 
                                               
1056 Please refer to the detailed discussion in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
1057 Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 47. 
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could prove particularly problematic.1058 Thus, arguably, the crevasse between Al-
Skeini and Banković has created a space of legal uncertainty within which a state 
could potentially limit or circumvent its obligations by embracing detached means of 
engaging in military or counter-terrorism operations such as bombing, taking the 
example from Banković. The support for and operation of various stages of the 
rendition circuits within a number of ECHR Contracting States is arguably a good 
illustration of the impact of these deficiencies stemming from the convoluted and 
fragmented ECtHR extraterritoriality test.  
 
4. Jurisdictional Rules and Extraordinary Rendition and the United States   
 
The period between 2001 (Banković decision) and 2011 (Al-Skeini decision) 
coincided with the height of the US-led transnational campaign against terrorism and 
the peak of extraordinary renditions. During this period, a number of European states 
such as Ireland (Shannon Airport) and the UK (Diego Garcia Island) facilitated the 
completion of rendition circuits either by providing refuelling facilities or authorising 
blanket flyovers.1059  As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, due to the type of 
operational support provided at Shannon Airport as a transit point, it would be very 
difficult to find jurisdiction and impose obligations on Ireland even if a flight stopping 
over was en route to render an individual, which transfer would result in ill treatment. 
In comparison, Diego Garcia has developed into a legal black hole despite being part 
of the British Indian Ocean Territory with Britain being a signatory to a number of 
regional and international human rights conventions and treaties. Following Al-Skeini 
and Jaloud rather than continuously re-evaluating the scope of the personal 
jurisdiction model on a case by case basis thus allowing states such as the UK to 
consistently challenge the scope of its extraterritorial obligations, the more pertinent 
question perhaps ought to be what human rights obligations a state should be 
realistically expected to uphold in its extraterritorial operations. 
At international level, the HRC and CAT should adopt a similar approach. As the 
above analysis illustrates, the findings of these bodies are undeveloped in the context 
of ever expanding and ever more transnational state security operations and have thus 
                                               
1058 Ibid, p. 47. 
1059  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). Please also refer to the discussion in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis. 
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left exposed areas of legal uncertainty. This is particularly problematic in the context 
of the US ‘War on Terror’ legal construct as an armed conflict and with reference to 
the pre-existing US approach towards international obligations. 1060  The US has 
strongly argued, in front of both international and regional bodies such as CAT and 
the Inter-American Commission, that the obligations contained in the relevant human 
rights instruments have no extraterritorial application.1061  
This contentiousness surrounding the extraterritorial application of human rights 
standards arguably stems from the very core of the human rights project and its 
aspiration for universality1062 in particular. An idealised vision of human rights would 
suggest that all rights are inherently universal attributes by virtue of our humanity – in 
this context extraterritoriality should arguably be uncontested.1063 However, a more 
pragmatic view in the post-9/11 context suggests that human rights obligations are 
contractual undertakings, which states are bound to only when they have specifically 
consented and chosen to be bound.1064 Thus, the strength and practical application of 
the international legal standards will flow from their incorporation in the daily routine 
of states. 1065  One particular reason for state compliance (or such domestic 
incorporation of international standards) is that states are instrumental in the drafting 
of regional and international legal documents. However, within this context the 
international legal framework is arguably a constraint, which sits very lightly on the 
shoulders of those who conform to it.1066 While in peaceful and harmonious times, it 
may be less detrimental for a state to concede to an international norm than to rebel 
against it, during times of national security emergency, a more powerful state may 
choose not to abide by the relevant international rules.1067  
                                               
1060 See further the discussion in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis. 
1061 Please see United States’ Response to the Questions Asked by the Committee Against Torture: 
U.S. Delegation Oral Responses to CAT Committee Questions 5 May 2006 (Answers to Questions 16-
20 in particular), available at http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/68561.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1062 The UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner refers to universality thus: “The principle 
of universality of human rights is the cornerstone of international human rights law.” See full text 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
1063 Van Schaak, B., ‘The United States’ Position on the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Obligations: Now is the Time for Change’, (2014) 90 International Law Studies 20, p. 24. 
1064 Ibid. 
1065 Lowe, V. International Law, (2007, Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 9. 
1066 Ibid, p. 20. 
1067  De Londras, F., Detention in the ‘War on Terror’: Can Human Rights Fight Back? (2011, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 171. See also Baldwin, F., “The Rule of Law, Human 
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Thus when faced with a national security emergency such as the events of 9/11, the 
US can choose to restrict its obligations in a manner which allows it to engage in the 
type of counter-terrorism measures deemed necessary to respond to a security threat. 
As illustrated in the preceding chapters, through a hyper legalistic exploitation of 
broad fault lines and specific gaps within the international legal framework, the US 
has sought to severely restrict the application of relevant international human rights 
provisions thus limiting its obligations. The evolution of the traditional understanding 
of the scope of jurisdiction in international law itself has resulted in the creation of 
exploitable legal spaces as discussed further above. CAT and the HRC have been 
increasingly focusing on the personal model of jurisdiction aiming to expand the 
international jurisdictional rules. Their undeveloped legal framework on the 
extraterritorial application of human rights obligations has however left areas of legal 
uncertainty exposed. Thus, while the US have persistently relied on a strictly 
territorial approach to jurisdiction, the development of the international legal 
framework in relation to the scope of jurisdictional rules has arguably left areas of 
legal uncertainty which have facilitated the US in restricting its human rights 
obligations by adopting a hyper legalistic approach. The concept of jurisdiction in this 
context has therefore been relied on by the US as an existing and exploitable ‘gap’ or 
fault line, which can facilitate the transnational operationalisation of the rendition 
circuits. 
However while the relevant international bodies and IACHR have not and arguably 
may not be in a position to adjudicate on extraordinary rendition cases for the reasons 
outlined above, the ECtHR has had the opportunity to do so. The emerging 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR on these irregular transfers has resulted in the evolution 
of third party responsibility for wrongful acts of foreign (US) officials within 
Contracting States’ jurisdiction. 1068  Aside from being heavily critical of the US 
HVDP and extraordinary renditions, the Court has developed a test of complicity 
through which it has imposed liability on Contracting State parties for their 
connivance or acquiescence in such wrongdoing. As noted above, since the 2011 Al-
Skeini case,1069 the ECtHR appears to have taken a strong approach against states’ 
rights violations committed abroad as part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom strand of 
                                               
1068 Allen, S., ‘The Scope of Third-Party Responsibility for Serious Human Rights Abuses under the 
European Convention of Human Rights: Wrongdoing in the British Indian Ocean Territory’ (2016) 16 
(4) Human Rights Law Review 1. 
1069 Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07, 7 July 2011. 
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‘War on Terror’. Starting with its momentous decision in the El-Masri case,1070 its 
first decision on an extraordinary rendition case, the ECtHR has taken a similarly 
muscular approach to another stand of the ‘War on Terror’ – HVDP and in particular 
the rendition circuits.  
 
5. Jurisdictional Rules, Extraordinary Renditions and Third Party 
Responsibility 
 
The decision of the ECtHR in El-Masri v. Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia1071 - the first one to address the operation of the extraordinary rendition 
programme within Europe – was long awaited. Mr El-Masri was travelling back to 
Germany from Macedonia when he was detained at the Macedonian border on 
suspicions of having a forged passport. He was questioned about possible ties with 
Islamic organisations and then transported to a hotel in Skopje. He was detained 
incommunicado and repeatedly interrogated in that hotel until he was handed over to a 
CIA rendition team at Skopje airport. He was then transferred to the ‘Salt Pit’ prison 
in Afghanistan where he was detained incommunicado again and subjected to 
enhanced interrogation and ill treatment for a number of months.1072 While he was 
eventually transferred back in a ‘disguised reverse rendition’1073 to Europe, he was 
released in Albania rather than Germany where local police initially suspected him of 
being a terrorist. Thus, in this context, the decision and approach taken by the 
European Court of Human Rights in relation to its decision on Article 3 and 5 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights is of particular importance.  
In discussing the procedural aspect of Article 3, the Court noted that Article 3 read in 
conjunction with Article 1 requires by implication that there should be an effective 
official investigation of the alleged violations of Article 3.1074 The investigation by 
Macedonia was found to be inadequate and hence had deprived Mr El-Masri of 
having an accurate account of the suffering he endured and role of those responsible 
in his ordeal. The inquiry of the Macedonian Public Prosecutor was not thorough, 
independent from the executive nor was Mr El-Masri able to participate effectively in 
                                               
1070  Khaled El-Masri (El Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 
39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012. 
1071 Ibid. 
1072 Ibid, 24–25.   
1073 Ibid, para. 31–33. 
1074 Ibid, para. 182. 
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any capacity, thus, there was a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3.1075 
Similar finding was made by the Court in relation to Article 5.1076  
In relation to the substantive element of Article 3, the ECtHR stated that Mr El-
Masri’s transfer was not pursuant to a legitimate request for extradition or any other 
recognised international legal procedure, there was no arrest warrant for Mr El-Masri 
and the relevant international and foreign jurisprudence and numerous UN and NGO 
reports suggested that the US has resorted to or tolerated practices manifestly contrary 
to the principles of the ECHR including extraordinary rendition. Thus, Macedonia 
knew or ought to have known that there was a real risk that Mr El-Masri would be 
subjected to ill treatment and it failed to dispel any doubts on that matter.1077  Further, 
taking into account the manner in which the applicant was transferred into the custody 
of the US, the court found that Mr El-Masri was subjected to an extraordinary 
rendition.1078  
The Court’s robust approach towards the use of extraordinary rendition has continued 
in the two recent cases of Al Nashiri v. Poland1079 and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. 
Poland. 1080  Both cases involved allegations of torture, ill treatment and secret 
detention of two men suspected of terrorist acts. Both Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah 
allege that they were extraordinarily rendered on the same flight and held at a CIA 
‘black site’ in Poland. With judgments on 24 July 2014, the Court held unanimously 
that Poland had violated its Article 381081 ECHR obligations and in both the case of 
Al Nashiri and Abu Zubaydah there had been a violation of Article 3 in its substantive 
and procedural aspects, Articles 5, 6, 8 and 13.1082  
In its decision in relation to Mr Zubaydah, the Court noted that the lack of Polish 
cooperation with international inquiries into the rendition circuits is a relevant 
element in assessing Poland’s alleged knowledge and complicity in the CIA rendition 
                                               
1075 Ibid, para. 182–194. 
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1079 Application no. 28761/11, Judgment 24 July 2014. 
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circuits.1083 The Court also referred to statements made by the former President of 
Poland who had noted “the decision to cooperate with the CIA carried the risk that the 
Americans would use inadmissible methods.”1084 The Court found that the Polish 
authorities had known that the CIA used Szymany Airport and the Stare Kiejkuty 
military base for the purposes of the HVDP.1085 The Court added the following:  
 
“It is inconceivable that the rendition aircraft could have crossed Polish airspace, 
landed in and departed from a Polish airport, or that the CIA occupied the premises in 
Stare Kiejkuty and transported detainees there, without the Polish State being 
informed of and involved in the preparation and execution of the HVD Programme on 
its territory. It is also inconceivable that activities of such character and scale, 
possibly vital for the country’s military and political interests, could have been 
undertaken on Polish territory without Poland’s knowledge and without the necessary 
authorisation being given at the appropriate level of the State authorities.”1086  
 
Poland ought to have known that due to the nature and purposes of the CIA activities, 
by “enabling” the CIA to detain individual terror suspects on its territory, it was 
exposing them to a serious risk of ill treatment. 1087  Thus, Poland had been in a 
position of responsibility to secure the rights of such individuals.1088 In finding that 
Poland had facilitated the detention process and created the conditions for ill 
treatment, the Court made a formative judgment linking a European state to the 
extraordinary rendition programme. 
As regards to Mr Al Nashiri, the Court held that there had been violations of Article 2 
and 3 taken together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 6 (abolition of the death 
penalty).1089 The Court similarly found that Poland had cooperated in the preparation 
and execution of the CIA rendition, secret detention and interrogation operations on 
its territory and ought to have known that by facilitating the CIA in detaining the 
applicants on Polish territory, it was exposing the applicants to a serious risk of ill 
                                               
1083 Application no. 7511/13, Judgment 24 July 2014, para. 431. 
1084 Ibid, para. 438. 
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1088 Ibid, p. 445. 
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treatment in violation of the Convention.1090 In particular, the Court stated that Poland 
on account of its “acquiescence and connivance” in the HVDP was responsible for the 
violations of the applicants’ rights committed on Polish territory.1091  
In its most recent 2016 decision – Nasr and Ghali v. Italy1092 - the Court found that 
having regard to all evidence in the case, it was established that the Italian authorities 
were aware that the applicant had been a victim of extraordinary rendition, which had 
began with his abduction from Italy. 1093  The Court found that by allowing US 
authorities to abduct Mr Osama Nasr (known as Abu Omar), the Italian authorities 
had knowingly exposed him to a real risk of ill treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights. 1094  The Court found that the legitimate 
principle of state secrecy had “clearly been applied by the Italian executive in order to 
ensure that those responsible did not have to answer for their actions.”1095 Those who 
were responsible and facilitated his abduction had ultimately been granted 
impunity.1096 Under Articles 43 and 44 of the Convention, this Chamber judgment is 
not final yet, however it does strongly indicate will reaffirm its previous decisions and 
continue developing its extraordinary rendition jurisprudence particularly in relation 
to complicity. 
While all four cases represent a strong criticism of the HVDP, extraordinary 
renditions and the behavior of the US as well as Macedonia, Poland and Italy for their 
complicity, there are important distinctions between the Macedonian and Italian case 
and the Polish cases. In both the El-Masri1097 and Nasr and Ghali1098 cases (based on 
what is known before the decision becomes final and is published in full), the ECtHR 
found that the complicity of Macedonia and Italy respectively in non-refoulement 
violations was based on actual knowledge. In El-Masri this decision was reached on 
the basis of two factors: first, as the Macedonian officials had failed to prevent acts of 
torture committed in their presence, they had connived or acquiesced to this ill 
treatment and second, the Macedonian officials knew or ought to have known that by 
handing over Mr El-Masri to a CIA rendition team there was serious risk of ill 
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treatment following the transfer.  
In comparison, while the Polish authorities were also found in violation of the non-
refoulement principle, Polish officials did not possess full knowledge of the CIA 
wrongdoing at the ‘black site’ situated on Polish territory despite the fact that Poland 
had facilitated the transfer of detainees to and from this secret detention centre.1099 It 
was acknowledged that it was unlikely that Polish officials had actually witnessed the 
ill treatment of detainees.1100 Nevertheless, the ECtHR decided that these officials 
ought to have known the full extent of the wrongdoing carried out by US officials 
within Poland’s jurisdiction as a result of the credible and detailed reports, which had 
entered the public domain.1101 Thus, the lack of direct knowledge about the particular 
interrogation practices being used in the CIA black site did not mean that Poland 
could avoid responsibility under the ECHR.1102 Instead, the Court drew attention to 
the reliable and publicly available evidence, which showed that Polish officials knew 
about the general nature and purposes of HVDP at the material time; evidence which 
indicated that the CIA practices were manifestly contrary to the principles enshrined 
in the ECHR.1103  
From this perspective, the Polish cases in particular represent a significant advance in 
the ECtHR’s jurisprudence regarding the positive nature of the substantive and 
procedural aspects of the obligations contained in Article 3.1104 From a substantive 
perspective, the Court stressed that Contracting States are responsible for maintaining 
an environment within which all acts violatory of Article 3 are strictly prohibited. 
Thus, if a Contracting State’s official or officials have access to credible information 
which indicates that serious human rights violations are being committed within its 
jurisdiction, they ought to take the necessary steps to prevent further violations.1105 In 
addition, the authorities are under a positive procedural obligation in such 
circumstances – they must investigate credible allegations of such wrongdoing 
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effectively as such official action is necessary for the maintenance of “public 
confidence in [their adherence to the rule of law and [for] preventing any appearance 
of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts”.1106   
In summary, the emerging ECtHR jurisprudence on complicity thus indicates that 
there is a scale of conduct with which to assess the specific levels of knowledge and 
participation required to underpin a finding of third party responsibility.1107 This scale 
includes cases of active participation where Contracting State officials are directly 
engaged in acts of ill treatment carried out by foreign officials within its 
jurisdiction.1108 Such liability may arise where Contracting State officials witnessed 
wrongful acts being committed by foreign officials however [the state officials] 
neglected to take steps to prevent these wrongdoings from occurring such as in the El-
Masri1109 and Nasr and Ghali1110 cases.1111 However, as the Polish cases indicate, the 
threshold for engaging third party responsibility under the ECHR could be triggered 
by inactive participation or in other words through inactivity combined with a 
sufficient level of knowledge regarding the existence of potential rights violations.1112 
The emerging ECtHR jurisprudence on third party responsibility for extraordinary 
renditions is a welcome addition to its most recent case law on the extraterritorial 
scope of right obligations. The Court’s muscular approach in ensuring practical 
effectiveness of individual human rights and providing a remedy for violations 
incurred during various strand of the ‘War on Terror’ is most commendable. The 
ECtHR case law has demonstrated that there is strength inherent within the regional 
human rights framework, which can resist the severity of the challenge posed by 
extraordinary renditions. This approach however is in stark contrast with the still 
developing and thus limited jurisprudence of other regional and international bodies. 
The inconsistencies and lack of clarity within the latter approaches has left areas of 
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Judgment 24 July 2014, para. 489. 
1107 Allen, S., ‘The Scope of Third-Party Responsibility for Serious Human Rights Abuses under the 
European Convention of Human Rights: Wrongdoing in the British Indian Ocean Territory’ (2016) 16 
(4) Human Rights Law Review 1, p. 8. 
1108 Ibid. 
1109 Application no. 39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012 
1110 Application no. 44883/09, Judgment 23 February 2016. 
1111 Allen, S., ‘The Scope of Third-Party Responsibility for Serious Human Rights Abuses under the 
European Convention of Human Rights: Wrongdoing in the British Indian Ocean Territory’ (2016) 16 
(4) Human Rights Law Review 1, p. 8. 
1112  Al Nashiri v. Poland, Application no. 28761/11, Judgment 24 July 2014 and Husayn (Abu 
Zubaydah) v. Poland, Application no. 7511/13, Judgment 24 July 2014. 
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uncertainty, which can and have been exploited by the US in constructing its ‘War on 
Terror’. Thus, as noted above, the ECtHR jurisprudence offers a worthwhile model, 
which other adjudicatory bodies should consider adopting to ensure the practical 
effectiveness of human rights protections going forward. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Over the course of co-called ‘War on Terror’, hundreds of suspected terrorists were 
captured and rendered to various known and unknown detention facilities where they 
were subjected to incommunicado detention and enhanced interrogation.1113 Through 
hyper legalism, the US took advantage of conceptual spaces of uncertainty and 
practical enforcement deficiencies within the international legal framework in order to 
operationalise the rendition circuits. The development of the international 
jurisdictional rules especially in relation to the extraterritorial application of rights 
obligation has been one such area of uncertainty exploited by the US. As illustrated 
by the preceding analysis, the question whether a state can be held responsible for 
extraterritorial human rights violations has been frequently occupying regional courts 
and international bodies. It is likely to remain a pressing issue as seen by most recent 
ECtHR case of Jaloud v. The Netherlands.1114  
However, while the jurisprudence of the regional human rights bodies, in particular 
the ECtHR, has been consistently evolving with reference to the increasingly 
transnational nature of state security operations and third party involvement, the 
relevant international bodies have lagged behind. The underdeveloped and somewhat 
inconsistent international approach towards extraterritorial scope of obligations, has 
facilitated the US in adopting a strictly territorial approach to jurisdiction and by 
proxy restricting the applicability of the relevant human rights provisions to the 
HVDP and extraordinary renditions. Thus, the concept of jurisdiction has been 
approached as an existing exploitable gap within the international legal framework. 
The last chapter of this thesis will explore another such gap – the use of private 
operators as part of security operations.  
 
                                               
1113  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
1114 Application no. 47708/08, Judgment 20 November 2014.  
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Chapter 5: Privatisation, Intelligence Cooperation and the Rendition 
Circuits 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The events of 9/11 were followed by a series of international bodies’ 
recommendations urging improvement and expansion of domestic and transnational 
security and counter-terrorism measures. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognised “the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence” and recommended greater exchange of 
operational or intelligence information amongst other security and counter-terrorism 
oriented measures.1115 Having invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, 1116 NATO 
Member States (Allies) similarly urged states to combat the threat posed by 
international terrorist organisations through collaboration and assistance with 
measures such as blanket flyover clearances, flight stopover and refuelling facilities 
and expanded intelligence sharing and cooperation mechanisms between Allies.1117  
It is within this highly charged and security-focused environment that the rendition 
circuits as part of HVDP were operationalised despite substantive enhancements in 
domestic US counter-terrorism and national security legislation.1118 One of the most 
salient facets of such an extraordinary rendition – its transnational scope – would not 
have been possible without first the preliminary agreement and then on-going 
cooperation of transit and receiving states. Apart from providing operational support 
during a circuit, such states have facilitated the US in circumventing jurisdictional 
                                               
1115 Security Council Resolution 1368 (2001), Press Release SC/7143 full text available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/SC7143.doc.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016] and Security 
Council Resolution 1373 (2001), Press Release SC/7158, full text available at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7158.doc.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1116  Article 5, North Atlantic Treaty 1949, full text available at 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm [last accessed 30 March 2016]. Please 
also refer to the discussion in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis. 
1117  Please refer to the discussions in Chapter 1, which examines transit points providing blanket 
overflight clearance, stopovers facilities and exchange of intelligence. 
1118 See for example US Patriot Act of 2001 as well extensions of the Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1952, the Foreign Surveillance and Intelligence Act of 1978 and the Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 1986. See also the more detailed discussion in the Introductory Chapter. 
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rules1119 and by proxy in diluting its obligations under the relevant international legal 
provisions. The expansion in intelligence cooperation, information sharing and use of 
private operators as part of state security services within counter-terrorism operations 
has enabled other key aspects of the rendition circuits. Private air carriers and charter 
companies – relying on blanket overflight clearances – have been used in order to 
conceal the operation and purpose of rendition flights.1120 Intelligence cooperation 
and sharing has facilitated, led to the capture of individual terrorist suspects and/or 
resulted in their subsequent extraordinary rendition as illustrated in known cases such 
Maher Arar,1121 Khaled El-Masri1122 and Osama Nasr (or Abu Omar).1123  
An extraordinary rendition violates a number of international human rights norms 
including the absolute jus cogens prohibition on torture. The use of private flight 
operators and the enhanced bi- and multi-lateral intelligence cooperation and sharing 
have facilitated this violatory behaviour by the US. This Chapter argues that the 
reliance on private operators and the post 9/11 enhanced intelligence cooperation 
mechanisms have been utilised by the US as specifically tailored gaps within the 
international legal framework in order to operate the rendition circuits. These two 
gaps and by proxy the US approach towards them should however be distinguished. 
As Section 2 will illustrate, there are very limited international law constraints in 
relation to private operators in general and private charter companies in particular. As 
such, this is an existing gap – or area of legal uncertainty – within the international 
legal framework.  
In comparison, the nature of intelligence gathering, cooperation and exchange is one 
that requires a certain level of covertness and secrecy. By virtue of this nature, 
                                               
1119  The US has adopted a very strictly territorial approach to jurisdiction and do not accept the 
personal model of jurisdiction as discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. 
1120 See for example the case of Richmor Aviation, Inc. v. Sportsflight Air, Inc., 2011 NY Slip Op 
01905 [82 AD3d 1423]. Richmor Aviation is a company identified as a legitimate charter agent in 
European Parliament Report on the Alleged Use of European countries by the CIA for the 
Transportation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, (2006/2200(INI)) full text available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A6-2007-
0020&language=EN [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1121 Maher Arar (Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in relation to Maher 
Arar, Report of the Events relating to Maher Arar – Factual Background, (2006, Ottawa; Minister of 
Public Works and Government Services). 
1122  Khaled El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09 
Judgment 13 December 2012. 
1123  Sandberg, B., ‘Abu Omar Case: Italian Court Delivers Damning Verdict on CIA Renditions’ 
Spiegel Online International 5 November 2009 available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/abu-omar-case-italian-court-delivers-damning-verdict-on-
cia-renditions-a-659418.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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accountability concerns have arisen before. However what distinguishes the pre and 
post-9/11 is the expansion of the scope and span of intelligence exchange and new 
methods for surveillance as Section 3 will demonstrate. These expansions in 
intelligence capabilities and sharing have not been matched by additional 
accountability mechanisms. It is within this context that the US has utilised 
intelligence cooperation to facilitate the operation of the rendition circuits. While both 
the use of private operators and intelligence cooperation are not new phenomena, their 
post 9/11 roles in the context of HVDP have posed a more multifaceted challenge to 
the enforcement mechanisms of the international legal framework. What distinguishes 
the two however is that the use of private charter companies is more akin to a legal 
black hole whereas expansive intelligence cooperation and sharing is more of a legal 
grey hole.   
 
2. The Use of Private Actors and Private Companies 
 
The growing importance of private or non-state actors in transnational military and 
counter-terrorism operations has become a significant contemporary challenge for the 
effective protections of international human rights law (IHRL).1124 For a number of 
years, states have engaged in outsourcing the provision of what traditionally were 
considered to be state services to private operators.1125 The most publicised aspect of 
such outsourcing has arguably been the rapid process of privatisation and 
commercialisation within the criminal justice system.1126 Court escort duties, routine 
parole supervision, specialist prison services as well as the building and management 
of penal institutions have increasingly been contracted out to commercial 
companies.1127  
Thus, from this perspective, extending the use of private operators and contractors 
from domestic to transnational security operations is perhaps not a surprising 
                                               
1124 For a broadly similar point, see further Cameron, L., and Chetail, V., Privatizing War: Private 
Military and Security Companies under Public International Law (2013, Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press). 
1125 See further on this note Garland, D., The Culture of Control (2002, Oxford; Oxford University 
Press); Simon, J., Governing through Crime: How the War on Terror transformed American 
Democracy and created a Culture of Fear (2006, New York; Oxford University Press); Born, H., 
Leigh, I. and Wills, A. (eds.) International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability  (2011, New 
York; Routledge) 
1126 Garland, D., The Culture of Control (2002, Oxford; Oxford University Press), p. 116–117.  
1127 Ibid.  
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phenomenon. Yet, this trend appears spurred on by the post-Cold War decline of the 
standing military across a number of countries and the exigencies of the ‘War on 
Terror’ following 9/11.1128 Since 9/11, such contractors have engaged in gathering 
intelligence, first covertly transporting and then interrogating detainees.1129 Despite 
this expansion of the range of activities fulfilled by private contractors and their ever 
growing number, the development of accountability mechanisms has lagged behind. 
The development of forms of privatisation catering for expansive and violatory 
counter-terrorism practices such as extraordinary rendition for the purposes of HVDP 
has thus been quite concerning.1130 In this context, private operators are not needed 
due to their comparatively lower cost or work efficiency.1131 Their use within the 
rendition circuits as Section 2.1 will outline was specifically aimed at exploiting 
existing gaps in the international legal framework and by proxy circumventing 
international legal obligations.  
 
2.1. Private Charter Companies and the Rendition Circuits: International 
Enforcement Gap 
 
A great diversity of opinions exists on who is subject to international law with 
corporations in addition to states increasingly being considered bound by international 
law.1132 In comparison, however, within the regional and international human rights 
Conventions and Treaties, the protections of rights and freedoms are constructed 
around a vertical individual/state relationship where individuals can invoke their 
human rights claims against the state.1133 The implementation mechanisms attached to 
                                               
1128 Dickinson, L. A., ‘Outsourcing Covert Activities’ (2012) 5 Journal of National Security Law and 
Policy 521, p. 521. The ‘War on Terror’ has been credited with vast expansion of private military and 
security companies. See further Liu, H., ‘Leashing the Corporate Dogs of War: The Legal Implications 
of Modern Private Military Companies’ (2010) 15 (1) Journal of Conflict & Security Law 141 – 168 
and White, N. D., ‘Regulation of Private Military and Security Sector: Is the UK Fulfilling its Human 
Rights Duties?’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 585. 
1129 Dickinson, L. A., ‘Outsourcing Covert Activities’ (2012) 5 Journal of National Security Law and 
Policy 521, p. 521. 
1130 For similar observations see further De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating 
in the ‘Gap’ between Security and Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96. 
1131 Ibid. 
1132 See also Lowe, V., International Law (2007, Oxford; Oxford University Press); Crawford, J., and 
Koskenniemi, M., Cambridge Companion to International Law (2012, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press); Alvarez, J., ‘Are Corporations “Subjects” of International Law?”, (2011) 9 Santa 
Clara Journal of International Law 1; Ku, J., ‘The Limits of Corporate Rights under International 
Law’, (2012) 12 Chicago Journal of International Law 729. 
1133 Cameron, L., and Chetail, V., Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under 
Public International Law (2013, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p. 290 – 291. See for 
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various international Conventions or Treaties such as the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC) or the Committee against Torture (CAT) are geared towards State Parties 
only.1134 Therefore, as IHRL currently stands, a codified obligation to control private 
actors operating outside the national territory of a state and to prevent human rights 
violations from these private actors has not yet crystallised.1135 This is applicable even 
in circumstances where those private actors have the nationality of the state concerned 
and therefore a state may impose certain obligations in conformity with international 
law.1136  
Thus, in general, IHRL does not have the capacity to govern the actions of private 
actors directly as its constituents are primarily states.1137 IHRL has sought to address 
this legal vacuum by requiring states to implement the necessary structures, standards 
and laws, which would protect individuals from violatory behaviour by non-state 
actors.1138 These measures however have focused on state accountability for actions 
of private operators rather than imposing obligations on private actors.1139 Therefore, 
in practical terms, a state continues to bear rights-related responsibilities while rights 
obligations remain limited, if any, for a corporation.1140 In the context of transnational 
                                                                                                                                      
example the texts of the UN Convention against Torture and Optional Protocol, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Optional Protocol, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. See also the UN 
Working Group on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises, details available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/WGHRandtransnationalcorporationsandotherbusiness
.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1134 Cameron, L., and Chetail, V., Privatizing War: Private Military and Security Companies under 
Public International Law (2013, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), p. ix. See further the role of 
each Committee outline here http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/Pages/CCPRIndex.aspx and 
here http://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cat/pages/catindex.aspx [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1135 De Schutter, O., International Human Rights Law (2010, Cambridge; Cambridge University Press), 
p. 162. 
1136 Ibid, p. 163. See further the approach of the Human Rights Committee Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay 
Human Rights Committee Communication R.12/52 UN Doc Supp No 40 A/36/40 and Celiberti de 
Casariego v. Uruguay Human Rights Committee Communication 56/1979 UN Doc CCPR/C/OP/1. 
1137 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 108. 
1138  See example the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(Article 2 and 4 in particular); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and 
Eradication of Violence against Women (its preamble in particular); UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities; The UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and 
Other Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights; The European Parliament Code of Conduct 
for European Enterprises operating in Developing Countries. 
1139 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations, Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31. 
1140 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 108. 
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counter-terrorism operations such as extraordinary rendition as part of HVDP, this 
construction of state/non-state rights-related obligations presents a convenient 
opportunity for a state to limit its obligations. As illustrated by regional body reports 
and case law, corporate entities including charter services for aircraft rentals, aviation 
and logistics companies have been regularly used by the US in the context of 
extraordinary renditions.1141 The following brief assessment of the regulatory regime 
of the civil aviation industry will contextualise how the US were able to exploit the 
use of private flights as a legal black hole for the purpose of the rendition circuits. The 
discussion will also illustrate that this area of existing legal and regulatory uncertainty 
has lend itself to manipulative misuse by the US in operationalising the extraordinary 
rendition programme.  
 
2.1.1 Aviation Industry: International Standards and Obligations  
 
The 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation 1142  imposes a number of 
requirements on civilian aircrafts such as adherence to appropriate nationality and 
registration marks, 1143  possession of the necessary documents such as a list of 
passengers and their departure and arrival destinations1144 and prior authorisation of 
flight path over a state territory.1145 Under Article 16, the appropriate authorities of 
each Contracting State can, without reasonable delay, search the aircraft of another 
Contracting State on landing or departure and inspect the documents required under 
the Convention. Thus, for the purposes of the extraordinary rendition programme – 
concealment of an individual and their identity en route to incommunicado detention 
and enhanced interrogation1146 – the civil aircraft regulatory regime is too restrictive 
and by proxy incompatible. Military aircrafts are recognised as state aircrafts under 
Article 3 of the Convention thus similarly they would have to comply with the 
                                               
1141 Fava. G., Working Document No. 8 on the Companies linked to the CIA Aircraft used by the CIA 
and the European Countries in which the CIA Aircraft have made Stopovers, European Parliament 
DT\641333EN.doc. 
1142  The full text of the Convention is available at 
http://www.icao.int/publications/Documents/7300_orig.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1143 Article 20 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
1144 Article 29 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
1145 Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. 
1146 See for example the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, full text available at 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/executive-summary_0.pdf [last accessed 30 
March 2016] and Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and 
Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
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necessary identification requirements making such an aircraft easily recognisable. A 
chartered or rented civilian aircraft can however fulfil the requirement for 
concealment as they would not be immediately associated with facilitating state 
security or counter-terrorism operations.1147 
In a report detailing the different private companies and charter services used by the 
CIA for extraordinary renditions, Giovanni Fava noted that through the use of such 
aircraft states could reach places where military aircraft would be considered 
suspicious.1148 What is of particular significance is that most of the charter or rent 
companies were ‘shell companies’, which only existed on paper (post office boxes for 
example) or had only one employee, usually a lawyer.1149 Such shell companies were 
listed as the owner of aircraft, which were subject to regular buy-and-sell 
transactions.1150 After each transaction, the aircraft were re-registered for the purposes 
of losing their track.1151  
On occasion, shell companies relied on what were referred to as ‘operating companies’ 
– they would provide a CIA chartered aircraft with all the necessary logistics (pilots, 
catering and technical assistance).1152 However, there were also circumstances where 
aircraft were leased from recognised charter agents.1153 A case between one such 
charter agent – Richmor Aviation, Inc. and Sportsflight Air, Inc, an aircraft broker, 
confirmed that flights within the rendition circuits were privately outsourced by the 
US to a network of companies.1154 This further illustrates the significance placed on 
the covert operations of rendition flights and that the concealment requirement was 
subsidiary to the aim of limiting rights-related state obligations.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1147 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 109. 
1148 Giovanni Fava, Working Document No. 8 on the Companies linked to the CIA, Aircraft used by 
the CIA and the European Countries in which the CIA Aircraft have made Stopovers, European 
Parliament, DT\641333EN.doc, p. 2. 
1149 Ibid, p. 2. 
1150 Ibid, p. 2. 
1151 Ibid, p. 2. 
1152 Ibid, p. 2. 
1153 Ibid, p. 2. 
1154 Richmor Aviation, Inc. v Sportsflight Air, Inc. 2011 NY Slip Op 01905 [82 AD3d 1423]. The case 
in question concerned a dispute over fees. Richmor was a company identified as a legitimate charter 
agent in the Fava Reports. 
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2.1.2. ‘Shell’ or ‘Rogue’ Charter Companies: A Gap in the Aviation Regulation  
 
Despite the comprehensively developed transnational civil aviation regulatory 
regime,1155 the primary focus is on organising and regulating the logistical elements of 
the industry.1156 As illustrated through regional and international cooperation, industry 
organisations tend to focus on harmonising regulatory requirements and ensuring that 
regulation does not negatively impact on competitiveness and profitability.1157 The 
International Civil Aviation Organisation did list strengthening the law governing 
international civil aviation as one of its strategic objectives however the language 
used was so broad that it is unclear whether human rights considerations formed part 
of the proposed measures.1158 There is no similar reference or progress update in 
subsequent strategic objectives.1159  
In the context of shell or rogue companies used as part of the extraordinary rendition 
programme, the current regulatory regime for private aircraft operators offers little, if 
any, practically effective rights protection mechanisms. Arguably, the industry itself 
might not see the involvement of civil aviation companies as part of the rendition 
circuits as a problem.1160 Such an approach would not be due to the nature of the 
activities engaged in but rather as noted above the implicated companies are ones 
which are set up on very temporary basis, with limited, if any staff and no fixed 
premises. Therefore, these companies are not an on-going or long-term concern for 
the industry itself either in relation to competitiveness and profitability. 1161 Thus, at 
international level, there is no practically enforceable and effective deterrent for states 
such the US wishing to outsource activities, which facilitate or result in violatory 
                                               
1155 Some of the international and regional organisations and industry bodies include: International 
Civil Aviation Organization and European Aviation Safety Agency with states as members; there are 
also a number of airlines, airports, travel agencies and others regulatory bodies and organisations such 
as International Air Transport Association, International Business Aviation Council and Association of 
European Airlines amongst many others. 
1156 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 110. 
1157 Ibid. 
1158  ‘Strategic Objectives of ICAO for 2005 – 2010’ available at 
http://www.icao.int/Documents/strategic-objectives/strategic_objectives_2005_2010_en.pdf [last 
accessed 30 March 2016], Strategic Objective F. 
1159 See further ‘Strategic Objectives of ICAO for 2011 – 2013’ and ‘Strategic Objectives of ICAO for 
2014 – 2016’ available at http://www.icao.int/about-icao/pages/strategic-objectives.aspx [last accessed 
30 March 2016]. 
1160 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 114. 
1161 Ibid.  
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practices to private aviation companies. As such, it appears the lack of accountability 
or deterrent mechanisms in respect of private aviation companies is a legal black hole. 
Such a hole in the law creates a zone in which officials – in the context of rendition 
circuits, those who authorise a circuit and hire a private charter company – can act 
unconstrained by the rule of law. 1162 The presence of this zone, allows officials to 
then argue that what they do is legal as the official decisions are either necessary or 
made in good faith. If such a legal black hole is properly created, it would not cause 
tension within the rule of law.1163 At present, there appears to be no incentive to 
regulate such companies more comprehensively or through stricter licensing or 
outright prohibition of certain activities.1164  
Albeit for different reasons, at domestic level, there are similarly no incentives to 
dissuade a state determined to engage in expansive counter-terrorism measures not to 
outsource some of its operations.  
 
2.2. Private Charter Companies and the Rendition Circuits: Practical Enforcement 
Challenges at Domestic Level 
 
One of the core distinctions between the pre and post 9/11 construct of renditions has 
been the use of private operators within the transnational rendition circuits.1165 While 
the capturing, detention and interrogation have remained within the purview and 
authority of the state and its apparatuses such as intelligence services,1166  private 
aviation companies have operationalised the actual rendition flights. The rendition 
circuits relied on private actors for three core services: provision of logistics including 
aircraft and flight planning, contracting of pilots and other essential professionals for 
                                               
1162 Dyzenhaus, D. The Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (2006, New York; 
Cambridge University Press), p. 202. 
1163 Ibid, p. 42. 
1164 White, N. D., ‘Regulation of Private Military and Security Sector: Is the UK Fulfilling its Human 
Rights Duties?’ (2016) 16 Human Rights Law Review 585, p. 585. 
1165 Please see cases such as Ilich Sanchez Ramirez v. France, Application No. 28780/95, European 
Commission of Human Rights, Decision 24 June 1996 and capture of Adolf Eichmann, details of the 
abduction are available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/aichman_eng.htm [last accessed 30 
March 2016]. 
1166 Please see for example Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program: Executive Summary, full text available at 
http://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/press/executive-summary_0.pdf [last accessed 30 
March 2016] and the Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and 
Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc). 
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the operation of the flight and provision of security to state agents on the flights.1167 
There is no indication that private operators engaged directly in any mistreatment of 
rendees.1168 However, their specific role in facilitating the operation of extraordinary 
rendition has exposed weaknesses in the practical effectiveness of human rights 
obligations. Individuals rendered had limited, if any, chance of challenging 
successfully their irregular transfers and imposing liability on the private operators.                     
The case of Mohamed et al v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc1169 is an illustrative example. 
The five plaintiffs brought a suit against Jeppesen under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 claiming that they were subject to an enforced disappearance and 
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.1170 The plaintiffs contended 
that the CIA acting jointly with other government agencies and officials of foreign 
governments had operated the extraordinary rendition programme to gather 
intelligence by apprehending and transferring individuals suspected of terrorist 
activities clandestinely for the purposes of detention and interrogation.1171  
In this context, publicly available information established that Jeppesen had provided 
flight planning and logistical support services to aircraft and crew on all flights 
irregularly transferring the five plaintiffs. The claim further stated that Jeppesen 
played an integral role in the forced abductions and detentions and provided direct 
and substantial services to the US for the extraordinary rendition programme. Thus, 
Jeppessen should have had actual or constructive knowledge of the objectives of the 
programme including the forced disappearance and ill treatment the plaintiffs would 
be subjected to. The US, as an intervenor–appellee, argued that the petition should be 
dismissed on the basis of state secret privilege as it applied to the nature and extent of 
the alleged activities, which privilege it invoked on behalf of itself and Jeppesen.1172  
The Court originally acceded to the government’s application however this was 
reversed on appeal. 1173 The Appeal Court found that the US government had failed to 
                                               
1167 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 100. 
1168 Ibid. 
1169 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, No. 08-15693 D.C. No. 5:07-CV-02798-JW, 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeal, p. 13526. The five applicants were Binyam Mohamed, Abou Elkassim Britel, Ahmed 
Agiza, Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah and Bisher Al-Rawi. 
1170 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, No. 08-15693 D.C. No. 5:07-CV-02798-JW, 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeal, p. 13526. 
1171 Ibid.  
1172 Ibid, p. 13528. 
1173 Mohamed et al. v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, US 579 F.3d 953, 961-962. 
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establish a basis for dismissal under the state secrets privilege.1174 The Appeal Court 
did permit the government to reassert the doctrine at subsequent stages of the 
litigation.1175  Following this decision by a three-judge panel, the US government 
submitted a petition for a re-hearing of the application by a full-panel Appeal Court as 
the case concerned information essential to the maintenance of national security. 1176 
If the case proceeded, this information was in danger of being publicly exposed thus 
jeopardising national security.  
Jeppesen Dataplan also submitted a petition for re-hearing by a full Appeal Court 
arguing that discovery in this case would be impossible due to the government’s state 
secrets privilege claim.1177 Thus, in these circumstances, Jeppesen would be unable to 
properly and effectively challenge the plaintiffs’ allegations as the relevant 
information would be inaccessible under the state secrets privilege.1178 The plaintiffs 
argued that if the government succeeded in this case, anyone would be effectively 
prevented from taking an action for damages following ill treatment as part of being 
subject to an extraordinary rendition and potentially in even broader 
circumstances.1179  
In September 2010, the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit reached a very closely 
divided verdict in the case. 1180  The government invocation of the state secrets 
privilege was upheld. The Court reiterated a long-standing Supreme Court precedent 
characterizing accession to a state secrets claim as “exceptional”1181 and as including 
cases where discovery requirements might result in the exposure of evidence 
“revealing military” (and thus by proxy state) secrets.1182 In this context, the Court 
concluded that compelling disclosure of evidence about the existence and scope of the 
extraordinary rendition programme, the role Jeppesen Dataplan and/or other 
governments might play in the rendition circuits or any element of CIA’s counter-
terrorism practices would result in the revelation of state secrets that it was bound to 
                                               
1174 Ibid. 
1175 Ibid. 
1176 Mohamed et al. v Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, Fed. R. App. P. 35(a)(2). 
1177 Ibid. 
1178 Ibid. 
1179 Ibid. 
1180 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, No. 08-15693 D.C. No. 5:07-CV-02798-JW, 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeal. The Court was split 6-5 in reaching this decision. 
1181 Totten v. US, 92 U.S. 105 (1876). 
1182 US v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953). 
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protect. 1183   Thus, the entire case had to be struck out and could not proceed 
further.1184  
Similar decision was reached in two other cases relating to extraordinary rendition on 
the basis of state secrets doctrine. In both the cases of El-Masri v. Tenet1185 and Arar v. 
Ashcroft1186, the courts dismissed the complaints. The US intervened as a defendant in 
the District Court case in El-Masri on the basis that the case posed an unreasonable 
risk that state secrets would be disclosed. The case was dismissed at District Court 
stage on this basis and the decision was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals.1187 The 
Supreme Court declined to hear the case.1188 The Arar case was similarly decided on 
national security and foreign policy grounds.1189  
Unlike these two cases, the Court in Jeppessen did however recognised the existence 
of extraordinary rendition and noted that the programme in itself was not a state secret. 
However, partial disclosure of the existence and some aspects of the practice, did not 
prevent other details from remaining a state secret if their disclosure would risk grave 
harm to national security.1190 The Court further acknowledged that the documents 
submitted by the plaintiffs to corroborate the alleged involvement of Jeppesen were 
not subject to the privilege. However, even if the plaintiffs could structure their entire 
argument on non-privileged evidence, unlikely as it might be, any defence put 
forward by Jeppesen’s would unjustifiably risk the disclosure of state secrets.1191 
However, the Court went on to note that its decision did not intend to bar any 
potential non-judicial relief and acknowledged that the denial of a judicial forum 
based on state secrets privilege posed concerns at both individual and structural 
levels.1192  
                                               
1183 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, No. 08-15693 D.C. No. 5:07-CV-02798-JW, 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeal, p. 13532. 
1184 Ibid, p. 13543. 
1185 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. VA. 2006). Mr El-Masri filed a suit against the US for his detention in 
Macedonia, subsequent extraordinary rendition to Afghanistan and ill treatment and detention while in 
Afghanistan.  
1186 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Mr Arar filed a complaint against a number of US officials 
such the Attorney General of the US and the Director of the FBI amongst others following his 
detention by US officials at JFK Airport and subsequent extraordinary rendition to Syria via Jordan and 
his ill treatment while detained in Syria. 
1187 El-Masri v. Tenet 479 F. 3d 296, 4th Circuit Court of Appeals. 
1188 Greenhouse, L., ‘Supreme Court refuses to hear Torture Appeal’ The New York Times 9 October 
2007 available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/09/washington/09cnd-scotus.html?_r=0 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1189 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
1190 Ibid, p. 13551–13552.   
1191 Ibid, p. 13544, 13552. 
1192 Ibid, p. 13553. 
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At individual level, the Court noted, striking out this case has blocked access to one 
judicial remedy and deprived the plaintiffs from the opportunity to prove the alleged 
mistreatment and obtain damages. 1193  At structural level, dismissing the case 
prevented further judicial review in this civil litigation – an important check on 
alleged abuses by government officials and alleged private contractors. Thus, the 
Court appeared to regret having to reach this decision. This apparent frustration by the 
Court is arguably a tacit acknowledgement that in this particular context individual 
rights protections were practically unenforceable. More significantly perhaps, what 
this litigation does illustrate is the ability of a state to rely on a sovereign defence such 
as state secrets privilege in relation to outsourced and privatised activities.1194 Thus, 
arguably, the most significant legacy of all three cases and Jeppessen in particular is 
the exposed structural deficiency in rights protections of the domestic US justice 
system, which can allow a private operator to benefit from the application of the state 
secret privilege. 
 
2.3. Private Flight Operators: Concluding Remarks 
 
The comprehensive IHRL framework, which protects individuals and imposes 
obligations to states, is yet to extend its application to private operators. In the context 
of the ‘War on Terror’, a complex, widely-publicised and multi-theatre transnational 
campaign against terrorism, the highly developed public sphere from a rights-
protection perspective posed a conceptual challenge for a state wishing to engage in 
clandestine and irregular activities.1195 The solution to the problem of how a state 
might be able to operate or facilitate violatory practices thus arguably lay in the 
private sphere.1196 This is particularly the case if the private sphere is perceived as a 
mostly unregulated legal space or a legal black hole from a human rights perspective 
and therefore there is sufficient level of exploitable uncertainty or gap to facilitate the 
concealment of unlawful activity.1197  
                                               
1193 Ibid. 
1194 For broadly similar comments see further De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: 
Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96. 
1195 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 98. 
1196 Ibid. 
1197 Ibid. 
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This thesis has argued that through the ‘War on Terror’ legal paradigm the US sought 
to exploit perceived or existing gaps within the international legal framework in order 
to operationalise the transnational scope of the rendition circuits. The regular reliance 
on private companies and charter services to complete rendition flights has exploited 
one such gap – the lack of regulation of rogue or shell private charter companies. This 
gap has developed as a result of the regulatory aims of both IHRL and the 
international civil aviation provisions. While IHRL has focused on protecting 
individual rights by imposing obligations only on states, the international civil 
aviation industry has accentuated competition and profitability. Within the thus 
created unregulated legal space facilitating and arguably encouraging states to 
outsource activities to private operators, the US designed the rendition circuits in 
manner allowing it to fully exploit this gap. The enhanced intelligence sharing and 
cooperation post 9/11 securitisation has been approached in a similar manner.  
 
3. The Post 9/11 Push for Enhanced Intelligence: An Expansion of an Existing 
Rights Enforceability Gap 
 
The immediate international responses by the UN Security Council and NATO and 
domestic legislative1198 and political1199 reaction of countries such as the US and the 
UK are illustrative of the extensive post 9/11 securitisation. A common feature of 
these responses has been the commitment to and inclination towards more 
collaborative and transnational counter-terrorism responses. Recent advances in 
surveillance and the increasing scope and span of bi- and multi-lateral intelligence 
sharing and cooperation are representative of this push for collaboration on matters of 
                                               
1198 See further the discussions in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis on the USA Patriot Act, which 
came into force on 26 October 2001 and the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which  
came into force on 14 December 2001. Both these Acts extended already available and broad counter-
terrorism and crime prevention powers as well as expanded reliance on immigration and asylum 
measures amongst other modifications on existing legislation. 
1199 Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Statement to the Nation 11 September 2001, full text 
available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/page1596 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair Labour Party Conference Speech 2 
October 2001, full text available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6 [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. Former US President George W Bush Speech on Terrorism 6 September 2006, full text 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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national security at both domestic and international level. 1200  More significantly 
perhaps, enhancing national security has been one of the key drivers for improved 
data sharing and expanding means of state surveillance.1201 
Bilateral and multilateral intelligence cooperation between states is not a new 
phenomenon as evidenced by organisations such as Europol and Interpol and 
agreements such as the UKUSA.1202 With the end of the Cold War however and 
particularly after 9/11, the scope and span of intelligence agencies has expanded 
significantly in line with the increasingly transnational nature of the security 
threats.1203 The fight against terrorism has spurred on a dramatic growth in bilateral 
and multilateral intelligence cooperation in terms of both the volume of the 
information shared and the number of joint operations. 1204  In addition, pieces of 
legislation such as the USA Patriot Act have aimed to achieve more enhanced 
integration of law enforcement and security agencies and improved information 
sharing – a cooperation described as vital in pre-empting terrorist attacks.1205 The 
resulting dilution of institutional barriers between the agencies responsible for internal 
and external security and bi- and multi-lateral state cooperation has arguably led to 
the development of a much broader and more far-reaching understanding of what 
national security entails.1206 
This upsurge in intelligence cooperation similar to the use of private operators have 
presented a growing challenge to states’ accountability at domestic and international 
level particularly in the context of covert and violatory counter-terrorism programmes 
such as extraordinary rendition. The exchange of intelligence information has been a 
                                               
1200 Please also refer to the discussion in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis. 
1201 Goold, B.J., ‘Privacy, Identity and Security’ in Goold, B.J. and Lazarus, L. (eds.), Security and 
Human Rights (2007, Portland; Hart Publishing), p. 57. 
1202  For further details on the UKUSA agreement please refer to the National Security Agency’s 
declassification of certain papers available at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/declass/ukusa.shtml [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1203  See further Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and 
Unlawful Inter-state Transfers involving Council of Europe Member States AS/Jur (2006) 16 Part II, p. 
56. 
1204 Leigh, I., “Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation” in Born, H., Leigh, I. and Wills, A. (eds.) 
International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability  (2011, New York; Routledge), p. 3.  
1205 The full text of the remarks by former US President George W Bush at the signing ceremony for 
the USA Patriot Act 2001 is available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushtext_102601.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1206 See further Ramraj, V.V. et al (eds.), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (2012, Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press), Zedner, L. Security (2009, New York; Routledge), Born, H., Leigh, I. 
and Wills, A. (eds.) International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability  (2011, New York; 
Routledge), Goold, B.J. and Lazarus, L. (eds.), Security and Human Rights (2007, Portland; Hart 
Publishing). 
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core component of the rendition circuits as it has led to the capture of a number of 
individuals who were rendered as part of the HVDP.1207 This Chapter argues that 
while intelligence cooperation is not necessarily a gap within the international legal 
framework per se, its use for the purposes of extraordinary renditions as a legal grey 
hole has resulted in serious violations of human rights.  
 
3.1. Existing Concerns relating to Intelligence Cooperation  
 
The main function of intelligence agencies is to detect potential threats to national 
security such as terrorism threats by gathering information in a covert manner without 
alerting targeted individuals.1208 To achieve this goal, intelligence services utilise a 
range of investigative techniques including undisclosed surveillance and/or searches 
of premises and objects, interception and monitoring of (electronic) communications 
and infiltration of organisations amongst others.1209 The adoption of such measures to 
counter-terrorism could arguably be justified in the context of state’s positive 
obligations under IHRL to protect individual’s life.1210 States are under an obligation 
to take preventative measures if there is a suspected or known risk to an individual or 
individuals from either criminal acts or acts of terrorism.1211 The HRC has noted on 
several occasions that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
protects the right to security of the person in contexts other than formal deprivation of 
liberty.1212  
While intelligence services have an important role in understanding and responding to 
terrorist threats, their role should arguably be defined and constrained more 
effectively within an institutional framework consistent with the rule of law and 
                                               
1207 See cases such as Khaled El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application 
no. 39630/09 Judgment 13 December 2012 and Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian 
Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (2006, Ottawa; 
Public Works and Government Services). See also the comprehensive report of Open Society Justice 
Initiative, Globalising Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; 
Open Society Foundations).  
1208  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, para. 25.  
1209 Ibid, para. 26.  
1210  The right to life is codified in the European Convention on Human Rights (Article 2), the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 6), American Convention on Human 
Rights (Article 4) amongst others. 
1211  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, para. 26.  
1212 See for example Delgado Paez v. Colombia, Communication No. 195/1985.  
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democracy.1213 This is particularly important in a context where both national and 
international accountability mechanisms intended to regulate intelligence cooperation 
and sharing are underdeveloped.1214 The lack of such a framework poses challenges in 
assessing the compliance of states with their human rights obligations and by proxy 
potentially renders individual rights protections practically ineffective if their rights 
have been violated due to incorrect intelligence as will be illustrated further below. 
The Special Rapporteur on Human Rights has noted that states can make use of 
certain preventative, intelligence-gathering measures regulated by courts in order to 
counter terrorism. 1215  From this perspective the development of what has been 
described as intelligence legalism1216 within the US is of note. 
Through the combined operation of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
(FISA)1217 and Executive Order 12 3331218 , in actuality there is a comprehensive 
compliance apparatus staffed by hundreds of people in both the executive and judicial 
branches.1219 This infrastructure is tasked with implementing and enforcing a complex 
framework of rules in relation to intelligence gathering, cooperation and compliance 
with other obligations; thus if rights or rights-protecting procedures have been 
announced, this apparatus proceeds to effectuate these rights and follow these 
procedures going forward.1220 Errors – at times quite significant as will be illustrated 
in Section 3.2 – do however occur. As such, a good oversight framework requires its 
institutions not just to support and enforce compliance but also to design adequate and 
appropriate rules and procedures.1221  
However, the offices tasked with ensuring that the US intelligence apparatus complies 
with existing rules are almost entirely composed of compliance officers.1222 Thus, 
                                               
1213 Ibid, p. 56 
1214 Leigh, I., “Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation” in Born, H., Leigh, I. and Wills, A. (eds.) 
International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability  (2011, New York; Routledge), p. 6-7. 
1215  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, para. 30. 
1216 Schlanger, M., ‘Intelligence Legalism and the National Security Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap’ 
(2015) 6 Harvard National Security Journal 112, p. 113. 
1217 Full text available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-92/pdf/STATUTE-92-Pg1783.pdf 
[last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1218 Exec. Order No. 12 333, 46 Ref. Reg. 59941 (4 December 1981) amended by Exec. Order No. 13 
284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (23 January 2003); Exec. Order No.  13 355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53594 (27 August 
2004) and Exec. Order No. 13 470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45325 (30 July 2008). 
1219  For details please refer to Schlanger, M., ‘Intelligence Legalism and the National Security 
Agency’s Civil Liberties Gap’ (2015) 6 Harvard National Security Journal 112, p. 113. 
1220 Ibid, p. 113. 
1221 Ibid. 
1222 Ibid. 
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their role is to improve compliance with existing rules and not necessarily consider a 
more tailored approach reflective of individual rights protections. In this context the 
manner in which intelligence services approach the issue of compliance is to ask 
whether they legally could use a certain intelligence measure rather than whether they 
should.1223 This methodology is similar to the reasoning adopted by the US Executive, 
following the 9/11 moral panic catalyst, in deciding what counter-terrorism approach 
to adopt. 
The preference for engaging with the first question – the scope of legality – rather 
than the appropriateness and necessity considerations contained within the second 
question has resulted in what has been described as intelligence legalism. Intelligence 
legalism has three core features: imposition of substantive rules, which are given the 
status of law (i.e. veneer of legality) rather than policy, some albeit limited court 
enforcement of these rules and empowerment of lawyers. 1224  A crucial aspect of 
intelligence legalism has been that rather than shifting power to the courts, it has 
shifted power to agency counsel and the Department of Justice (part of the Executive) 
thus instituting internal rules governing intelligence operations.1225 As a result of the 
comprehensive focus on compliance and law (understood as Executive Orders, 
legislative instruments such as FISA, court orders, regulations), intelligence legalism 
has in actuality obscured the absence of what should be an additional focus on 
tailored and enforceable individual rights protections.1226 Thus, as this approach gives 
systematically insufficient weight to individual liberties and freedoms, it has resulted 
in legitimising liberty-infringing programmes. 1227  In other words, intelligence 
legalism has triggered the second cycle of legality where obligations are increasingly 
approached in a formal or empty manner suggesting an appearance of legality rather 
than a substantive commitment. As such, an extensive compliance regime in respect 
of intelligence gathering or cooperation, which gradually develops into a legal grey 
hole, can be as damaging as the inherent risk of over-inclusiveness as Section 3.2 will 
discuss.    
 
 
                                               
1223 Ibid. 
1224 Ibid. 
1225 Ibid, p. 123. 
1226 Ibid, p. 118. 
1227 Ibid. 
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3.2. Post 9/11 Challenges posed by Intelligence Gathering and Cooperation   
 
Increasingly, intelligence agencies have used ‘data mining’ – matching material from 
various databases to a number of variables – as part of their information gathering 
methods particularly in relation to counter-terrorism pre-emption.1228 However, the 
inherent risk of over-inclusiveness has arguably reduced the threshold of what 
constitutes acceptable targeted surveillance. 1229  The technical capabilities of data 
mining are such that if the parameters of what is considered suspicious are broadened, 
surveillance could amount to arbitrary or unlawful interference with privacy.1230 This 
is particularly important in the context of counter-terrorism measures where 
intelligence gathering and sharing could have significant implications for individual 
human rights. Cases such as Maher Arar and Khaled El Masri – both of whom were 
extraordinarily rendered – have exposed the dangers of intelligence cooperation in 
such circumstances.  
In each of these two cases, intelligence gathering and information sharing led to the 
capture, incommunicado detention and ill treatment during interrogation of the 
individuals in question. 1231  In relation to Mr Arar, the Canadian Commission of 
Inquiry found that there was no evidence presented that Mr Arar had committed any 
offence or posed a threat in Canada.1232  Rather, the Canadian police had wished to 
interview him as a witness due to his association with other individuals.1233 This 
information was passed on to US officials who then placed Mr Arar on a watch 
list. 1234  As was subsequently discovered the information was inaccurate and it 
portrayed Mr Arar in an unfairly negative fashion overstating his importance to the 
                                               
1228 Please refer to for example the extensive information provided as part of the Snowden Revelations 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/the-nsa-files [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1229  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, para. 32. 
1230 Ibid, para. 32. 
1231 Arar v. Ashcroft 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D. N.Y. 2006) available at http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-
2nd-circuit/1498466.html [last accessed 30 March 2016] and Khaled El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012. 
1232  Commission of Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar, Report 
of the Events Relating to Maher Arar (2006, Ottawa; Public Works and Government Services), p. 13 – 
15 available at http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/cm_arar_rec-eng.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1233 Ibid. 
1234 Ibid. 
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Canadian investigation.1235 This information did however result in his extraordinary 
rendition to Syria where he was ill treated for nearly a year.1236  
Khaled El Masri was detained at a state border and subsequently also extraordinarily 
rendered following bilateral intelligence information sharing and cooperation.1237 He 
was detained for 24 days in a Skopje hotel before being handed over to a CIA 
rendition team.1238 The Macedonian authorities argued that his capture and detention 
were in line with increased security over the festive New Year period, border control 
officials were operating on a higher state of alert.1239 The authorities stated that the 
investigation and interrogation Mr El Masri was subjected to was within routine 
domestic procedures and was necessary due to the suspicions relating to his 
passport.1240 An electronic request was made to the central Interpol database – no 
Interpol warrant existed.1241  
However as found within 2006 Council of Europe Report 1242  – quoted by the 
European Court of Human Rights – the Macedonian Intelligence Services (UBK) 
routinely consulted with the CIA and exchanged information. A full description of Mr 
El Masri was transmitted to the CIA for analysis. The CIA analysis confirmed – based 
on still classified intelligence information – that Khaled El Masri was involved with 
terrorist organisations.1243 The CIA requested that he be immobilised and detained 
until they could arrange for a transfer. A European Parliament Resolution adopted in 
2006 has referred his detention in both Macedonia and Afghanistan as illegal.1244 On 
the basis of the available evidence, the only known reason why Mr El Masri was 
eventually extraordinarily rendered was due to the unfounded suspicions that his 
passport was falsified.  
As these two cases illustrate, the exchange of intelligence information and in 
particular the methods associated with its collection, require careful and thorough 
assessment of the validity of the information before it is relied upon to take punitive 
                                               
1235 Ibid. 
1236 Please also refer to the discussion of this case in Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
1237  Khaled El-Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 39630/09, 
Judgment 13 December 2012. 
1238 Ibid, para. 17, 21–22.  
1239 Ibid, para. 37. 
1240 Ibid. 
1241 Ibid. 
1242  See further Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and 
Unlawful Inter-state Transfers involving Council of Europe Member States AS/Jur (2006) 16 Part II. 
1243 Ibid. 
1244 Resolution on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transportation and Illegal 
Detention of Prisoners, European Parliament 2006/2027 (INI), doc. P6_TA (2006) 0316. 
 220
actions against an individual.1245 This is especially important in a terrorism prevention 
context where flawed intelligence information or exchange can result in severe 
collateral impacts such as violations of individual rights including the prohibition on 
torture.1246 In the context of increasingly transnational counter-terrorism and security 
measures – extraordinary renditions being a particularly apt example – oversight and 
accountability of intelligence agencies needs to improve. Currently, the growing 
cooperation between domestic national intelligence and security agencies at regional 
and transnational level has not been matched by an equivalent growth in international 
collaboration on oversight, accountability and review bodies.1247 
The ICJ Eminent Jurist Panel recommended that it is imperative that states establish 
independent oversight mechanisms legally regulating the gathering and sharing of 
intelligence information and ensuring that the work of intelligence cooperation 
agencies is fully compliant with human rights standards.1248 Similar recommendations 
were made by the Arar Commission in Canada and the Venice Commission, which 
while acknowledging the need for intelligence sharing, urged for caution in relation to 
the content of that information and the use it may be put to by a recipient.1249 Both 
reports emphasised on the need for stronger and effective regulatory mechanisms 
regarding the operations of intelligence services to avoid the pitfalls of creating an 
accountability black hole within the state.1250  
                                               
1245 Chaskalson, A., ‘The Widening Gyre: Counter-terrorism, Human Rights and the Rule of Law, 
(2008) 67 (1) Cambridge Law Journal 69, p. 85. 
1246 Forcese, C., ‘The Collateral Casualties of Collaboration: The Consequences for Civil and Human 
Rights of Transnational Intelligence Sharing’ in Born, H., Leigh, I. and Wills, A. (eds.) International 
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1247 Leigh, I., “Accountability and Intelligence Cooperation” in Born, H., Leigh, I. and Wills, A. (eds.) 
International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability  (2011, New York; Routledge), p. 4. 
1248  International Commission of Jurists, Assessing Damage, Urging Action, available here 
http://icj.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Report-summary-of-the-eminent-
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Council of Europe, Secretary General’s Report under Article 52 ECHR on the Question of Secret 
Detention and Transport of Detainees Suspected of Terrorist Acts, notably by or at the instigation of 
Foreign Agencies, available here https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=976731&Site=COE [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1250 Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member 
States in Respect of Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, Opinion no. 363 
/ 2005, CDL – AD (2006) 009, paras. 120 where the report makes reference to the creation of a “State 
within a State”. 
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Such an improvement on oversight and accountability is becoming even more 
necessary as post 9/11 states have increasingly outsourced intelligence collection to 
private contractors.1251 A UN report has noted that in the US seventy per cent of 
intelligence activities are being outsourced to private actors. 1252  While the 
involvement of private actors could be necessary as a technical matter in order to have 
access to information such as electronic surveillance, some of the outsourced 
activities have included the interrogation of detainees by private contractors under the 
direction and control of the US government.1253 This use of private contractors is yet 
another example of the increasing outsourcing of an array of state security services in 
the context of counter-terrorism operations.  As noted in the preceding section, the 
private sphere is a relatively unregulated legal space from a human rights perspective 
and therefore there is sufficient level of exploitable uncertainty or gap to facilitate the 
concealment of unlawful activity.1254         
In order to operationalise the rendition circuits and the HVDP, the US relied on a 
transnational network of exchanging and gathering intelligence information. This 
exchange, as illustrated by the cases of Arar and El-Masri, has resulted in serious 
violations of individual human rights and by proxy, has posed severe challenges to the 
practical enforceability of the human rights framework. Thus, while traditionally, 
intelligence cooperation may not have been considered an exploitable gap with 
reference to IHRL per se, the significantly increased post 9/11 scope and span of 
available measures and growing reliance on private companies suggests that 
intelligence sharing and cooperation is developing into an exploitable non-regulated 
legal space.  
 
 
 
 
                                               
1251  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, UN Doc. A/HRC/10/3, para. 41. See also Priest, 
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Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment available at 
http://fas.org/irp/congress/2007_hr/011107transcript.pdf [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1254 De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and 
Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96, p. 98. 
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4. Conclusion 
 
Following the events of 9/11, the US has sought to limit its rights-related obligations 
by utilising or exposing what were perceive as gaps in the system. For the purposes of 
HVDP, they exploited existing effectiveness deficiencies within the international 
legal framework such as private flight operators in order to facilitate and engage in 
violatory behaviour. Without ignoring the potential for transnational private 
regulation to address and close this gap, the privatised operation of rendition circuit 
flights has exposed the practical inability of the regional and international human 
rights structures to disincentivise or curb violatory behaviour by states.1255  
The effects of the increasingly transnational and expansive exchange of intelligence 
information, the development of intelligence legalism in the US and the more recent 
inclusion of private entities as part of intelligence gathering have further contributed 
to decreased accountability for these measures and by proxy further restrictions on the 
practical effectiveness of human rights protections. The international human rights 
framework and practical effectiveness deficiencies within it have been exploited by 
the transnational operation of extraordinary renditions and individual rights 
protections have been severely challenged. However as the concluding remarks will 
argue through the recent developments in the European Court of Human Rights and 
international, regional and domestic inquiries, the human rights framework has 
demonstrated strength and resilience within.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1255 For a broadly similar argument, please see De Londras, F., ‘Privatized Sovereign Performance: 
Regulating in the ‘Gap’ between Security and Rights’, (2011) 38 (1) Journal of Law and Society 96. 
 223
Post 9/11 and the High Value Detainee Programme: The Human 
Rights Response  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following 9/11, much of the academic and public discourse has focused on achieving 
– if at all possible – the ‘right’ balance between justifiable restrictions of civil liberties 
in order to (significantly) improve national security. The immediate legislative1256 and 
political1257 responses of countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom 
have been illustrative of the preference for more expansive national security policies 
balanced against the perceived necessary restrictions of the individual human rights 
and civil liberties of those who were suspected of acts of terrorism or were seen to be 
a security threat. Additionally, the US adopted the paradigm of war and announced 
that it will engage in a multi-front multi-faceted transnational campaign against 
terrorism in order to respond to and eradicate the threat.1258  
At international level, bodies such as the UN Security Council and NATO engaged in 
the development of transnational security framework and strongly urged states to 
adopt bi- and multi-lateral agreements and arrangements and expand intelligence 
sharing and cooperation in order to combat the threat of terrorism effectively. 
Through the so-called law making UN Security Council Resolution 1373, the creation 
of the Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee and the first invocation of 
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, these bodies demonstrated willingness to 
                                               
1256 See further the discussions in the Introductory Chapter of this thesis on the USA Patriot Act, which 
came into force on 26 October 2001 and the UK Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, which 
came into force on 14 December 2001. Both these Acts extended already available and broad counter-
terrorism and crime prevention powers as well as expanded reliance on immigration and asylum 
measures amongst other modifications on existing legislation. 
1257 Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair’s Statement to the Nation 11 September 2001, full text 
available at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040621031906/http://number10.gov.uk/page1596 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. Former UK Prime Minister Tony Blair Labour Party Conference Speech 2 
October 2001, full text available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour6 [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. Former US President George W Bush Speech on Terrorism 6 September 2006, full text 
available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/06/washington/06bush_transcript.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 [last 
accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1258  Please see further ‘Transcript of President Bush’s Address’, CNN News 21 September 2001 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
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facilitate a transnational environment accommodative of expansive counter-terrorism 
measures. It is within this atmosphere focused on pre-empting, preventing and 
muscularly responding to the threat of Al Qaeda and international terrorism in general   
that counter-terrorism measures such as the high value detainee programme (HVDP) 
including extraordinary renditions were conceived. 
In post 9/11 construct, extraordinary rendition, a form of covert irregular transfer, has 
developed into a means of outsourcing torture and facilitating incommunicado 
detention in conditions that constitute multiple and persistent violations of human 
rights. It is, thus, a complex phenomenon, comprising of grave and multiple violations 
of international obligations, which severely challenges the perception that 
international human rights law has the capacity to effectively protect individual rights 
and particularly to uphold the absolute, jus cogens character of the prohibition against 
torture. What this thesis has aimed to assess is whether extraordinary rendition poses 
a unique and corrosive threat to human rights protections; concurrently, it has 
examined whether the human rights framework has demonstrated strength within to 
resist the severity of the challenge posed by the rendition circuits.  
There has been much work – from academic scholars, UN and regional bodies, NGOs 
and investigative journalism – establishing the contours of the extraordinary rendition 
programme. This work has focused on the actual existence of these circuits, the 
number of individuals rendered, Council of Europe member state involvement and on 
outlining the violations that extraordinary renditions entail. 1259  Much of this work 
has characterised extraordinary renditions as a case of ‘simple’ violation of 
international or regional human rights obligations and has engaged in listing exactly 
which provisions of the various human rights treaties were breached. This thesis has 
approached the issue from a different and original standpoint. By focusing on the 
hyper compulsion for legality (or hyper legalism for short) adopted by the US towards 
every component of its transnational counter-terrorism campaign starting with the 
                                               
1259  Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Secret Detentions and Illegal Transfers of 
Detainees involving Council of Europe Member States, AS/Jur (2007) 36; Venice Commission, 
Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of Council of Europe Member States in Respect of 
Secret Detention Facilities and Inter-State Transport of Prisoners, Opinion no. 363 / 2005 CDL-AD 
(2006) 009; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, Mission to the United States of America, UN Doc. 
A/HRC/6/17/Add.3; Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and 
Extraordinary Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc); Satterthwaite, M. and Fisher, A., 
‘Tortured Logic: Renditions to Justice, Extraordinary Rendition, and Human Rights Law’ (2006) 6 The 
Long Term View 52; Weissbrodt, D. and Bergquist, A., ‘Extraordinary Rendition: A Human Rights 
Analyses’ (2006) 19 Harvard Human Rights Journal 123 and many others. 
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negation of the applicability of IHRL as lex generalis, the determination that due to 
the “novel” nature of the ‘War on Terror’ ‘armed conflict’, core IHL protections were 
inapplicable or severely restricted, the denial of extraterritorial scope of rights 
obligations and the liability limiting use of diplomatic assurances and private 
operators, this thesis argues that these areas conceptualised in combination have been 
exploited by the US in order to operationalise extraordinary renditions. While the 
thesis assesses the comprehensiveness of the human rights and humanitarian law 
frameworks, it goes further than just outlining the range of rights violations 
committed as part of the rendition circuits. The thesis also explores the relationship 
between the post 9/11 moral panic and the interpretation catalysts, which have 
influenced the conception and development of the extraordinary rendition programme 
and the subsequent reliance on hyper legalism to provide a veneer of legality to every 
stage of the circuits.  
The thesis thus argues that the existence and operation of the rendition circuits is as 
much the result of multi-faceted, comprehensive and inter-connected legal and 
political arguments within an international and domestic environment focused on pre-
emption, prevention and securitisation as is also the product of exploitative or male 
fides interpretation of its existing obligations under public international law and the 
human rights and humanitarian law frameworks. In so doing, this thesis has raised 
questions about the fundamental structure and capacity of international human rights 
law from an effectiveness perspective. However, the recent forceful decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights and numerous UN, regional and NGO reports 
exposing the operation of the programme, suggest that the institutions of the human 
rights framework have fought back and demonstrated that the human rights 
framework has resilience within. 
 
2. Human Rights Fight Back? 
 
Counter-terrorism legislation can pose not only an inherent threat to civil liberties but 
also as the history of the such preventative legislation demonstrates, it can have 
limited practical use in eradicating terrorism.1260 Those caught in the wide net cast by 
                                               
1260 Dysenhaus, D., ‘Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication of 
National Security’ (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, p. 2; See also Jackson, J., 
‘Many Years on in Northern Ireland: the Diplock Legacy’, (2009) 60 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 
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expansive counter-terrorism measures and legislation are more often than not the 
‘other’ or the ‘alien’ – (illegal) immigrants, refugees, those of different skin colour, 
political dissidents, the already marginalised or within US domestic legislation 
anyone who is not a US citizen or non-nationals.1261 When such terrorism legislation 
is adopted, the normally broad and politically underpinned understandings of ‘terrorist’ 
and ‘national security’ tend to give the Executive a wide scope for dealing with those 
considered to be a security threat or a ‘folk devil’.1262 What has distinguished the pre 
and post 9/11 legislative counter-terrorism approaches, is that the relationship 
between the state and ‘other’ – the ‘folk devil’ who poses a security threat – appears 
to have been permanently recalibrated. Criminal law, immigration and general 
security related legislation together with specific counter-terrorism laws now operate 
in combination as part of the state terrorism pre-emption toolkit.  
However, legislative tools – domestically and internationally – were not deemed 
sufficient by the US post 9/11. When faced with an intense moral panic and lingering 
fear, the transnational counter-terrorism approach catalysed by US Executive 
decision-making resulted in severe and persistent violations of human rights. These 
violations facilitated by a hyper legalistic approach towards international legal 
obligations also resulted in the resurfacing of a long-standing debate in the academic 
scholarship and practice – how much deference should be afforded to the Executive in 
respect of its activities in matters of foreign affairs and national security.1263 History 
                                                                                                                                      
213; Donohue, L., ‘Terrorism and Trial by Jury: The Vices and Virtues of British and American 
Criminal Law’, (2007) 59 Stanford Law Review 1321; English, R., Terrorism: How to Respond (2009, 
Oxford; Oxford University Press). 
1260 Ibid. 
1261 Dysenhaus, D., ‘Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication of 
National Security’ (2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, p. 2; Luban, D., “Eight 
Fallacies about Liberty and Security” in Wilson, R. (ed.), Human Rights in the ‘War on Terror’ (2005, 
Cambridge; Cambridge University Press); and Cohen, S., Folk Devils and Moral Panics, 3rd ed. (2002, 
New York; Routledge). 
1262 Macklin, A., ‘Borderline Security’, in Daniels, R. J., et al (eds.), The Security of Freedom: Essays 
on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (2001) (2001, Toronto; Toronto University Press) and Dysenhaus, D., 
‘Humpty Dumpty Rules or the Rule of Law: Legal Theory and the Adjudication of National Security’ 
(2003) 28 Australian Journal of Legal Philosophy 1, p. 2. Saul, B., Defining Terrorism in International 
Law (2006, Oxford; Oxford University Press); Pantazis, C. and Pemberton, S., ‘From the ‘Old’ to the 
‘New’ Suspect Community: Examining the Impacts of Recent UK Counter-Terrorist Legislation’ 
(2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 646; Greene, A., ‘The Quest for a Satisfactory Definition of 
Terrorism: R v Gul’ (2014) 77 (5) Modern Law Review 780. 
1263  Ingber, R., ‘International Law Constraints as Executive Power’ (2016) 57 (1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 49; Posner, E. A. and Sunstein, C. R., ‘Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law’ 
(2007) 116 Yale Law Journal 1170 and Posner, R., Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of 
National Emergency (2006, New York; Oxford University Press). 
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suggests that the courts have tended to be deferential – at times considerably – to 
executive national security policy and international law interpretation.1264  
The domestic US decisions relating to the operation of the rendition circuits and use 
of private charter companies - Mohamed et al v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc,1265 El-Masri 
v. Tenet1266 and Arar v. Ashcroft1267 - seem to follow previous US courts’ history of 
judicial deference. However, the US Supreme Court decisions in the so-called 
Guantánamo jurisprudence – the cases of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,1268 Rasul v. Bush1269 
and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld1270 suggest that this is not an entirely apt assessment. In the 
first two cases, the Supreme Court found that Guantánamo Bay detainees are entitled 
to a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis for their detention before a 
neutral decision maker and to invoke the jurisdiction of US federal courts. In the 
Hamdan case, the Court found that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
affords minimal protection to individuals associated either with a signatory or a non-
signatory of the Conventions who are involved in a conflict on the territory of a 
signatory. 1271  Thus, in these cases, the Supreme Court refused to accept the US 
Executive interpretation that individuals detained as part of the conflict with Al Qaeda 
have limited, if any, protections under international humanitarian law. 
In other domestic approaches relating to various strands of the ‘War on Terror’, the 
approach of the Italian Supreme Court towards the extraordinary rendition of Mr 
Osama Nasr (Abu Omar) is illustrative of the role domestic courts can play in 
enforcing the human rights framework. In 2009, twenty-three US agents were 
convicted in abstentia and sentenced to imprisonment for their role in the kidnapping 
                                               
1264  Ingber, R., ‘International Law Constraints as Executive Power’ (2016) 57 (1) Harvard 
International Law Journal 49, p. 85, Ewing, K., ‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: A 
Comment’ (2007) 3 International Journal of Law in Context 313 and Tushnet, M., “Defending 
Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime” (2003) Wisconsin Law Review 273. 
1265 Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc, No. 08-15693 D.C. No. 5:07-CV-02798-JW, 9th Circuit Court 
of Appeal, p. 13526. The five applicants were Binyam Mohamed, Abou Elkassim Britel, Ahmed 
Agiza, Mohamed Farag Ahmad Bashmilah and Bisher Al-Rawi. 
1266 437 F. Supp. 2d 530 (E.D. VA. 2006). Mr El-Masri filed a suit against the US for his detention in 
Macedonia, subsequent extraordinary rendition to Afghanistan and ill treatment and detention while in 
Afghanistan.  
1267 414 F.Supp.2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Mr Arar filed a complaint against a number of US officials 
such the Attorney General of the US and the Director of the FBI amongst others following his 
detention by US officials at JFK Airport and subsequent extraordinary rendition to Syria via Jordan and 
his ill treatment while detained in Syria. 
1268 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). 
1269 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
1270 548 U.S. 557 (2006).       
1271 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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of Mr Nasr.1272 Three US citizens were acquitted due to their diplomatic immunity. 
Two Italian agents were convicted of complicity in the abduction however five were 
acquitted as evidence which reportedly documented their cooperation with the US 
was classified as secret and could not be used in the trial.1273  
The forceful European Court of Human Rights’ approach towards extraordinary 
renditions arguably stands out the most. The Court was highly critical of both the US 
high value detainee programme and in particular of the operation of extraordinary 
renditions as well as the connivance and acquiescence of European Convention of 
Human Rights Contracting States. In a particularly forceful comment across three of 
the cases, the Court stated that aside from compliance with its Convention obligations 
if there is to be “public confidence in [the adherence to the rule of law and [to] 
prevent any appearance of impunity, collusion in or tolerance of unlawful acts”,1274 
state officials must investigate credible allegations of such wrongdoing effectively.  
Such official action is necessary for the maintenance of public confidence.  
Overall, post 9/11 courts appear mostly resistant to state arguments relating to their 
role in or (lack of) knowledge of violatory counter-terrorism operations, Executive 
interpretations on the general applicability of international law standards and have 
rejected arguments severely restricting the availability of core rights protections to 
individuals. As such the courts have aimed to ensure access to practically effective 
individual protections and remedies. Concomitantly, they have added a supplementary 
layer of transparency further elucidating the violations committed by the operation of 
HVDP and the rendition circuits. This elucidation has been multi-front however – by 
courts, by journalists, 1275  by NGOs, 1276  by regional1277  and international1278  rights 
                                               
1272  Sandberg, B., ‘Abu Omar Case: Italian Court Delivers Damning Verdict on CIA Renditions’ 
Spiegel Online International 5 November 2009 available at 
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/abu-omar-case-italian-court-delivers-damning-verdict-on-
cia-renditions-a-659418.html [last accessed 30 March 2016]. 
1273 Ibid. 
1274  Khaled El-Masri (El Masri v. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Application no. 
39630/09, Judgment 13 December 2012, para. 192; Al Nashiri v. Poland, Application no. 28761/11, 
Judgment 24 July 2014, para. 495 and Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v. Poland, Application no. 7511/13, 
Judgment 24 July 2014, para. 489. 
1275  Mayer, J., ‘Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary Rendition” 
Program’ The New Yorker 14 February 2005 and Paglen, T. and Thompson, AC, Torture Taxi: On the 
Trail of the CIA’s Rendition Flights (2006, New York; Melville House). 
1276  Open Society Justice Initiative, Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary 
Rendition (2013, New York; GHP Media, Inc) 
1277 Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Alleged Secret Detentions and Unlawful Inter-
state Transfers involving Council of Europe Member States AS/Jur (2007) 36 and Report by the 
Secretary General on the Use of His Powers under Article 52 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, Council of Europe SG/Inf (2006) 5, 28 February 2006. 
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bodies and domestic investigations.1279 Arguably, such a multi-front resistance and 
effort is needed when facing a clandestine, transnational and multi-actor operation 
such as the rendition circuits to pierce the veil of secrecy and start the process of 
accountability. This approach may also prove significant in the future, as, while other 
components of HVDP1280 have been dismantled, extraordinary renditions – subject to 
improved monitoring mechanisms to prevent ill treatment – have remained available 
as a counter-terrorism tool for the US.1281   
 
3. Concluding Remarks  
 
This thesis has argued that extraordinary renditions through a hyper legalistic 
exploitation of gaps have sought to expose and utilise practical effectiveness 
deficiencies within the human rights framework potentially eroding the framework in 
its current form. These were areas of legal uncertainty or vacuum either fashioned or 
existing, which were exploited for the purposes of the US transnational counter-
terrorism operations. The US ‘War on Terror’ legal and political paradigm, through 
reliance on these gaps, aimed to create a legal environment within which the relevant 
legal obligations were in flux and thus an expansive counter-terrorism programme 
such as extraordinary rendition could operate unchecked.  
While the challenge posed by the rendition circuits has been severe and potentially 
corrosive, the human rights framework has aimed to resist the challenge posed by 
expansive counter-terrorism practices. The approach taken by the European Court of 
                                                                                                                                      
1278  For example Human Rights Council, Joint Study on Global Practices in relation to Secret 
Detention in the Context of Countering Terrorism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism, the Special 
Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention and the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
General Assembly UN Doc. A/HRC/13/42. 
1279 For example Report of the Detainee Inquiry (2013, London; Government Publications) and Report 
of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Detention and Interrogation Program. 
1280 Please refer to Executive Order 13491 – Ensuring Lawful Interrogations, The White House, 22 
January 2009, Executive Order 13491 revoked all executive directives, orders, and regulations 
including but not limited to those issued to or by the CIA between 11 September 2001 and January 
2009. Thus, in effect, secret detention facilities were no longer to be used, enhanced interrogation was 
prohibited, the full protections of Geneva Conventions I-IV and all other relevant international 
provisions were made available to remaining detainees. 
1281 Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Policies Issues: Its Recommendations to the 
President, Department of Justice (Office of the Attorney General), 24 August 2009 (updated on 15 
September 2014), full text available at https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/special-task-force-
interrogations-and-transfer-policies-issues-its-recommendations-president [last accessed 30 March 
2016]. 
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Human Rights – which jurisprudence has consistently influenced other regional and 
international bodies - and the Italian Supreme Court and the comprehensive UN, 
Council of Europe and NGO reports exposing the operation of extraordinary rendition 
are illustrative of this resistance. The human rights framework, in most recent times, 
is fighting back.  
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